Aristotle
384-322 B.C.E. - Wrote in Greek
Categories
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by E. M. Edghill
Categories
By Aristotle
Section 1
Part 1
Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common
name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus,
a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name 'animal';
yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name,
the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should
any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one
case will be appropriate to that case only.
On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which
have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common.
A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, inasmuch
as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases:
for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement
in the one case would be identical with that in the
other.
Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their
name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the
grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous
man from the word 'courage'.
Part 2
Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the
latter are such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former
'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.
Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are
never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual
man, and is never present in a subject.
By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts
are present in a whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the
said subject.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable
of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is
present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a
certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material
basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.
Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present
in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is
predicable of grammar.
There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in
a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the
individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual
and has the character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in
some cases there is nothing to prevent such being present in a subject.
Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a
subject.
Part 3
When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable
of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is
predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man';
it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual
man is both 'man' and 'animal'.
If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are
themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and
the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic',
are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished
by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from
another in being 'two-footed'.
But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing
to prevent their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is
predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate
will be differentiae also of the subject.
Part 4
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity,
quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection.
To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse',
of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of
quality, such attributes as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater',
fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum',
under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying',
'sitting', are terms indicating position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance',
'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized',
affection.
No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation;
it is by the combination of such terms that positive or negative statements
arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false,
whereas expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white',
'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or false.
Part 5
Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of
the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present
in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary
sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the
primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the
species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man',
and the genus to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that
is to say, the species 'man' and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary
substances.
It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the
definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance,
'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of
the species man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man'
in describing the individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be
predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and
animal. Thus, both the name and the definition of the species are predicable
of the individual.
With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present
in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their
definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however,
the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to
prevent the name being used. For instance, 'white' being present in a body
is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white:
the definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the
body.
Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a
primary substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident
by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated
of the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were
no individual man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated
of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore
in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it
was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except
primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present
in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything
else to exist.
Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than
the genus, being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one
should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render
a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating
the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive
account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating
that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual
in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who
gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive
account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus
'plant'.
Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances
in virtue of the fact that they are the entities which underlie every.
else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present
in them. Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance
and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus: for
the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus
is predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated
of the genus. Thus we have a second ground for asserting that the species
is more truly substance than the genus.
Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera,
no one is more truly substance than another. We should not give a more
appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which
he belonged, than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same
method of definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is
more truly substance than another; an individual man is not more truly
substance than an individual ox.
It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we
exclude primary substances, we concede to species and genera alone the
name 'secondary substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey
a knowledge of primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the
genus that we appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make
our definition more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter.
All other things that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs,
and so on, are irrelevant to the definition. Thus it is just that these
alone, apart from primary substances, should be called
substances.
Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because
they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation
that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also
between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs,
on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these,
on the other. For these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual
man 'skilled in grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species
and to the genus to which he belongs. This law holds good in all
cases.
It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never
present in a subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject
nor predicated of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances,
it is clear from the following arguments (apart from others) that they
are not present in a subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual
man, but is not present in any subject: for manhood is not present in the
individual man. In the same way, 'animal' is also predicated of the individual
man, but is not present in him. Again, when a thing is present in a subject,
though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present,
the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only
the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use
both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference
to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a
subject.
Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case
that differentiae cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics 'terrestrial'
and 'two-footed' are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in
it. For they are not in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia
may be predicated of that of which the differentia itself is predicated.
For instance, if the characteristic 'terrestrial' is predicated of the
species 'man', the definition also of that characteristic may be used to
form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man' is
terrestrial.
The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the
whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should
have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the
phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated' that we meant 'otherwise
than as parts in a whole'.
It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions
of which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all
such propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species.
It is true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything,
it can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances,
the species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species
and of the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the
species and of the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species
and that of the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that
of the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the predicate
will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the definition of the
differentiae will be applicable to the species and to the individuals.
But it was stated above that the word 'univocal' was applied to those things
which had both name and definition in common. It is, therefore, established
that in every proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms
the predicate, these are predicated univocally.
All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the
case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a
unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we speak, for instance,
of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech gives the impression that we are
here also indicating that which is individual, but the impression is not
strictly true; for a secondary substance is not an individual, but a class
with a certain qualification; for it is not one and single as a primary
substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are predicable of more than one
subject.
Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the
term 'white'; 'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species
and genus determine the quality with reference to a substance: they signify
substance qualitatively differentiated. The determinate qualification covers
a larger field in the case of the genus that in that of the species: he
who uses the word 'animal' is herein using a word of wider extension than
he who uses the word 'man'.
Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could
be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or
animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary.
Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many
other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary
of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of 'ten', or of any
such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the contrary of 'little', or
'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative terms no contrary
exists.
Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree.
I do not mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance
than another, for it has already been stated' that this is the case; but
that no single substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance,
one particular substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than
himself at some other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more
man than another, as that which is white may be more or less white than
some other white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less
beautiful than some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover,
is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees at different times. A
body, being white, is said to be whiter at one time than it was before,
or, being warm, is said to be warmer or less warm than at some other time.
But substance is not said to be more or less that which it is: a man is
not more truly a man at one time than he was before, nor is anything, if
it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance, then, does not admit
of variation of degree.
The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while
remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary
qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves
unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the
same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good
and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But
one and the selfsame substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable
of admitting contrary qualities. The same individual person is at one time
white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time
good, at another bad. This capacity is found nowhere else, though it might
be maintained that a statement or opinion was an exception to the rule.
The same statement, it is agreed, can be both true and false. For if the
statement 'he is sitting' is true, yet, when the person in question has
risen, the same statement will be false. The same applies to opinions.
For if any one thinks truly that a person is sitting, yet, when that person
has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be false. Yet although
this exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a difference in
the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves changing
that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was
hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly
that which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process
of change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing that
substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But statements
and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the
alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to
be theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' remains unaltered, but it is at
one time true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has been
said of statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner
in which the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that
it should be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself
changing that it does so.
If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements
and opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention
is unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity,
not because they themselves undergo modification, but because this modification
occurs in the case of something else. The truth or falsity of a statement
depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the statement itself
of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing which can alter
the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change takes place
in themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting contrary
qualities.
But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within
the substance itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting
contrary qualities; for a substance admits within itself either disease
or health, whiteness or blackness. It is in this sense that it is said
to be capable of admitting contrary qualities.
To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while remaining
numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities,
the modification taking place through a change in the substance
itself.
Let these remarks suffice on the subject of
substance.
Part 6
Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities
are such that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other
parts: others have within them no such relation of part to
part.
Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous,
lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and
place.
In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary
at which they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives
have no common boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also
do not join at any boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible
in the case of number that there should be a common boundary among the
parts; they are always separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete
quantity.
The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident:
for it is measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech
which is vocal. Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have
no common boundary. There is no common boundary at which the syllables
join, but each is separate and distinct from the rest.
A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is
possible to find a common boundary at which its parts join. In the case
of the line, this common boundary is the point; in the case of the plane,
it is the line: for the parts of the plane have also a common boundary.
Similarly you can find a common boundary in the case of the parts of a
solid, namely either a line or a plane.
Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past,
present, and future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a continuous
quantity; for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have
a common boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied
by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of
the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity,
for its parts have a common boundary.
Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position
each to each, or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative
position to each other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible
to distinguish each, and to state the position of each on the plane and
to explain to what sort of part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly
the parts of a plane have position, for it could similarly be stated what
was the position of each and what sort of parts were contiguous. The same
is true with regard to the solid and to space. But it would be impossible
to show that the arts of a number had a relative position each to each,
or a particular position, or to state what parts were contiguous. Nor could
this be done in the case of time, for none of the parts of time has an
abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position.
It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue
of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in counting, 'one'
is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of number may
be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible to discover
any distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of speech.
None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is pronounced,
it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do not
abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of parts
which have position, and some of those which have not.
Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong
to the category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative
is a quantity in a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some
one of these quantities, properly so called, that we apply quantitative
terms to other things. We speak of what is white as large, because the
surface over which the white extends is large; we speak of an action or
a process as lengthy, because the time covered is long; these things cannot
in their own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should
any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be made in
terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year, or something
of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a white object
in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered. Thus
the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature
quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if at
all, only in a secondary sense.
Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities
this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits
long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or of any such quantities.
A man might, indeed, argue that 'much' was the contrary of 'little', and
'great' of 'small'. But these are not quantitative, but relative; things
are not great or small absolutely, they are so called rather as the result
of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain
large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than others of
its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an external
standard, for if the terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely, a
mountain would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say that
there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those in
the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say
that a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre
far outnumber those in the house. The terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits
long,' and so on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate
relation, for they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore,
plain that these are to be classed as relative.
Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have
no contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is
not to be apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something
external? Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it will come about
that the same subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same
time, and that things will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it
happens at times that the same thing is both small and great. For the same
thing may be small in comparison with one thing, and great in comparison
with another, so that the same thing comes to be both small and great at
one and the same time, and is of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities
at one and the same moment. Yet it was agreed, when substance was being
discussed, that nothing admits contrary qualities at one and the same moment.
For though substance is capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no
one is at the same time both sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time
both white and black. Nor is there anything which is qualified in contrary
ways at one and the same time.
Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary
to themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same
thing is both great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great'
is the contrary of itself. But this is impossible. The term 'great', therefore,
is not the contrary of the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even
though a man should call these terms not relative but quantitative, they
would not have contraries.
It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears
to admit of a contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary
of 'below', when it is the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and
this is so, because nothing is farther from the extremities of the universe
than the region at the centre. Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries
of every kind men have recourse to a spatial metaphor, for they say that
those things are contraries which, within the same class, are separated
by the greatest possible distance.
Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One
thing cannot be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly
with regard to number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than what
is 'five' is five; nor is one set of three more truly three than another
set. Again, one period of time is not said to be more truly time than another.
Nor is there any other kind of quantity, of all that have been mentioned,
with regard to which variation of degree can be predicated. The category
of quantity, therefore, does not admit of variation of
degree.
The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality
are predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal
or unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to another;
number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them, indeed can
all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned.
That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be
termed equal or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or
one particular quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with
another in terms of equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity.
Thus it is the distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal
and unequal.
Categories
By Aristotle
Section 2
Part 7
Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something
else or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other
thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is explained by reference to something
else, for it is superiority over something else that is meant. Similarly,
the expression 'double' has this external reference, for it is the double
of something else that is meant. So it is with everything else of this
kind. There are, moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception,
knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by
a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is a habit
of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is the attitude
of something. So it is with all other relatives that have been mentioned.
Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature of which is explained
by reference to something else, the preposition 'of' or some other preposition
being used to indicate the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great
in comparison with son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute
by comparison with something. Again, that which is called similar must
be similar to something else, and all other such attributes have this external
reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular
attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to
be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid
attitudes.
It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has
a contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a contrary,
ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives; 'double' and 'triple'
have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.
It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree.
For 'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications
'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in character:
for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a reference to something
external. Yet, again, it is not every relative term that admits of variation
of degree. No term such as 'double' admits of this modification. All relatives
have correlatives: by the term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master, by
the term 'master', the master of a slave; by 'double', the double of its
hall; by 'half', the half of its double; by 'greater', greater than that
which is less; by 'less,' less than that which is greater.
So it is with every other relative term; but the case we use to
express the correlation differs in some instances. Thus, by knowledge we
mean knowledge the knowable; by the knowable, that which is to be apprehended
by knowledge; by perception, perception of the perceptible; by the perceptible,
that which is apprehended by perception.
Sometimes, however, reciprocity of correlation does not appear
to exist. This comes about when a blunder is made, and that to which the
relative is related is not accurately stated. If a man states that a wing
is necessarily relative to a bird, the connexion between these two will
not be reciprocal, for it will not be possible to say that a bird is a
bird by reason of its wings. The reason is that the original statement
was inaccurate, for the wing is not said to be relative to the bird qua
bird, since many creatures besides birds have wings, but qua winged creature.
If, then, the statement is made accurate, the connexion will be reciprocal,
for we can speak of a wing, having reference necessarily to a winged creature,
and of a winged creature as being such because of its
wings.
Occasionally, perhaps, it is necessary to coin words, if no word
exists by which a correlation can adequately be explained. If we define
a rudder as necessarily having reference to a boat, our definition will
not be appropriate, for the rudder does not have this reference to a boat
qua boat, as there are boats which have no rudders. Thus we cannot use
the terms reciprocally, for the word 'boat' cannot be said to find its
explanation in the word 'rudder'. As there is no existing word, our definition
would perhaps be more accurate if we coined some word like 'ruddered' as
the correlative of 'rudder'. If we express ourselves thus accurately, at
any rate the terms are reciprocally connected, for the 'ruddered' thing
is 'ruddered' in virtue of its rudder. So it is in all other cases. A head
will be more accurately defined as the correlative of that which is 'headed',
than as that of an animal, for the animal does not have a head qua animal,
since many animals have no head.
Thus we may perhaps most easily comprehend that to which a thing
is related, when a name does not exist, if, from that which has a name,
we derive a new name, and apply it to that with which the first is reciprocally
connected, as in the aforesaid instances, when we derived the word 'winged'
from 'wing' and from 'rudder'.
All relatives, then, if properly defined, have a correlative. I
add this condition because, if that to which they are related is stated
as haphazard and not accurately, the two are not found to be interdependent.
Let me state what I mean more clearly. Even in the case of acknowledged
correlatives, and where names exist for each, there will be no interdependence
if one of the two is denoted, not by that name which expresses the correlative
notion, but by one of irrelevant significance. The term 'slave,' if defined
as related, not to a master, but to a man, or a biped, or anything of that
sort, is not reciprocally connected with that in relation to which it is
defined, for the statement is not exact. Further, if one thing is said
to be correlative with another, and the terminology used is correct, then,
though all irrelevant attributes should be removed, and only that one attribute
left in virtue of which it was correctly stated to be correlative with
that other, the stated correlation will still exist. If the correlative
of 'the slave' is said to be 'the master', then, though all irrelevant
attributes of the said 'master', such as 'biped', 'receptive of knowledge',
'human', should be removed, and the attribute 'master' alone left, the
stated correlation existing between him and the slave will remain the same,
for it is of a master that a slave is said to be the slave. On the other
hand, if, of two correlatives, one is not correctly termed, then, when
all other attributes are removed and that alone is left in virtue of which
it was stated to be correlative, the stated correlation will be found to
have disappeared.
For suppose the correlative of 'the slave' should be said to be
'the man', or the correlative of 'the wing"the bird'; if the attribute
'master' be withdrawn from' the man', the correlation between 'the man'
and 'the slave' will cease to exist, for if the man is not a master, the
slave is not a slave. Similarly, if the attribute 'winged' be withdrawn
from 'the bird', 'the wing' will no longer be relative; for if the so-called
correlative is not winged, it follows that 'the wing' has no
correlative.
Thus it is essential that the correlated terms should be exactly
designated; if there is a name existing, the statement will be easy; if
not, it is doubtless our duty to construct names. When the terminology
is thus correct, it is evident that all correlatives are
interdependent.
Correlatives are thought to come into existence simultaneously.
This is for the most part true, as in the case of the double and the half.
The existence of the half necessitates the existence of that of which it
is a half. Similarly the existence of a master necessitates the existence
of a slave, and that of a slave implies that of a master; these are merely
instances of a general rule. Moreover, they cancel one another; for if
there is no double it follows that there is no half, and vice versa; this
rule also applies to all such correlatives. Yet it does not appear to be
true in all cases that correlatives come into existence simultaneously.
The object of knowledge would appear to exist before knowledge itself,
for it is usually the case that we acquire knowledge of objects already
existing; it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find a branch of
knowledge the beginning of the existence of which was contemporaneous with
that of its object.
Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels
at the same time the knowledge which was its correlative, the converse
of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not
exist there can be no knowledge: for there will no longer be anything to
know. Yet it is equally true that, if knowledge of a certain object does
not exist, the object may nevertheless quite well exist. Thus, in the case
of the squaring of the circle, if indeed that process is an object of knowledge,
though it itself exists as an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge of
it has not yet come into existence. Again, if all animals ceased to exist,
there would be no knowledge, but there might yet be many objects of
knowledge.
This is likewise the case with regard to perception: for the object
of perception is, it appears, prior to the act of perception. If the perceptible
is annihilated, perception also will cease to exist; but the annihilation
of perception does not cancel the existence of the perceptible. For perception
implies a body perceived and a body in which perception takes place. Now
if that which is perceptible is annihilated, it follows that the body is
annihilated, for the body is a perceptible thing; and if the body does
not exist, it follows that perception also ceases to exist. Thus the annihilation
of the perceptible involves that of perception.
But the annihilation of perception does not involve that of the
perceptible. For if the animal is annihilated, it follows that perception
also is annihilated, but perceptibles such as body, heat, sweetness, bitterness,
and so on, will remain.
Again, perception is generated at the same time as the perceiving
subject, for it comes into existence at the same time as the animal. But
the perceptible surely exists before perception; for fire and water and
such elements, out of which the animal is itself composed, exist before
the animal is an animal at all, and before perception. Thus it would seem
that the perceptible exists before perception.
It may be questioned whether it is true that no substance is relative,
as seems to be the case, or whether exception is to be made in the case
of certain secondary substances. With regard to primary substances, it
is quite true that there is no such possibility, for neither wholes nor
parts of primary substances are relative. The individual man or ox is not
defined with reference to something external. Similarly with the parts:
a particular hand or head is not defined as a particular hand or head of
a particular person, but as the hand or head of a particular person. It
is true also, for the most part at least, in the case of secondary substances;
the species 'man' and the species 'ox' are not defined with reference to
anything outside themselves. Wood, again, is only relative in so far as
it is some one's property, not in so far as it is wood. It is plain, then,
that in the cases mentioned substance is not relative. But with regard
to some secondary substances there is a difference of opinion; thus, such
terms as 'head' and 'hand' are defined with reference to that of which
the things indicated are a part, and so it comes about that these appear
to have a relative character. Indeed, if our definition of that which is
relative was complete, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that no substance is relative. If, however, our definition was not complete,
if those things only are properly called relative in the case of which
relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence, perhaps
some explanation of the dilemma may be found.
The former definition does indeed apply to all relatives, but the
fact that a thing is explained with reference to something else does not
make it essentially relative.
From this it is plain that, if a man definitely apprehends a relative
thing, he will also definitely apprehend that to which it is relative.
Indeed this is self-evident: for if a man knows that some particular thing
is relative, assuming that we call that a relative in the case of which
relation to something is a necessary condition of existence, he knows that
also to which it is related. For if he does not know at all that to which
it is related, he will not know whether or not it is relative. This is
clear, moreover, in particular instances. If a man knows definitely that
such and such a thing is 'double', he will also forthwith know definitely
that of which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which
he knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is double.
Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it follows necessarily
that he will forthwith definitely know that also than which it is more
beautiful. He will not merely know indefinitely that it is more beautiful
than something which is less beautiful, for this would be supposition,
not knowledge. For if he does not know definitely that than which it is
more beautiful, he can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more
beautiful than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be
that nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man
apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that also
definitely to which it is related.
Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it
is possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not
necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.
It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus
these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to
say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a difficult
matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive
examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not
without advantage.
Part 8
By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to
be such and such.
Quality is a term that is used in many senses. One sort of quality
let us call 'habit' or 'disposition'. Habit differs from disposition in
being more lasting and more firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge
and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when acquired only in a moderate
degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and difficult to displace,
unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through disease or any such
cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and so on, are
not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to
vice.
By a disposition, on the other hand, we mean a condition that is
easily changed and quickly gives place to its opposite. Thus, heat, cold,
disease, health, and so on are dispositions. For a man is disposed in one
way or another with reference to these, but quickly changes, becoming cold
instead of warm, ill instead of well. So it is with all other dispositions
also, unless through lapse of time a disposition has itself become inveterate
and almost impossible to dislodge: in which case we should perhaps go so
far as to call it a habit.
It is evident that men incline to call those conditions habits
which are of a more or less permanent type and difficult to displace; for
those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are not said to
have such and such a 'habit' as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed,
we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs
from disposition in this, that while the latter in ephemeral, the former
is permanent and difficult to alter.
Habits are at the same time dispositions, but dispositions are
not necessarily habits. For those who have some specific habit may be said
also, in virtue of that habit, to be thus or thus disposed; but those who
are disposed in some specific way have not in all cases the corresponding
habit.
Another sort of quality is that in virtue of which, for example,
we call men good boxers or runners, or healthy or sickly: in fact it includes
all those terms which refer to inborn capacity or incapacity. Such things
are not predicated of a person in virtue of his disposition, but in virtue
of his inborn capacity or incapacity to do something with ease or to avoid
defeat of any kind. Persons are called good boxers or good runners, not
in virtue of such and such a disposition, but in virtue of an inborn capacity
to accomplish something with ease. Men are called healthy in virtue of
the inborn capacity of easy resistance to those unhealthy influences that
may ordinarily arise; unhealthy, in virtue of the lack of this capacity.
Similarly with regard to softness and hardness. Hardness is predicated
of a thing because it has that capacity of resistance which enables it
to withstand disintegration; softness, again, is predicated of a thing
by reason of the lack of that capacity.
A third class within this category is that of affective qualities
and affections. Sweetness, bitterness, sourness, are examples of this sort
of quality, together with all that is akin to these; heat, moreover, and
cold, whiteness, and blackness are affective qualities. It is evident that
these are qualities, for those things that possess them are themselves
said to be such and such by reason of their presence. Honey is called sweet
because it contains sweetness; the body is called white because it contains
whiteness; and so in all other cases.
The term 'affective quality' is not used as indicating that those
things which admit these qualities are affected in any way. Honey is not
called sweet because it is affected in a specific way, nor is this what
is meant in any other instance. Similarly heat and cold are called affective
qualities, not because those things which admit them are affected. What
is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an 'affection'
in the way of perception. For sweetness has the power of affecting the
sense of taste; heat, that of touch; and so it is with the rest of these
qualities.
Whiteness and blackness, however, and the other colours, are not
said to be affective qualities in this sense, but -because they themselves
are the results of an affection. It is plain that many changes of colour
take place because of affections. When a man is ashamed, he blushes; when
he is afraid, he becomes pale, and so on. So true is this, that when a
man is by nature liable to such affections, arising from some concomitance
of elements in his constitution, it is a probable inference that he has
the corresponding complexion of skin. For the same disposition of bodily
elements, which in the former instance was momentarily present in the case
of an access of shame, might be a result of a man's natural temperament,
so as to produce the corresponding colouring also as a natural characteristic.
All conditions, therefore, of this kind, if caused by certain permanent
and lasting affections, are called affective qualities. For pallor and
duskiness of complexion are called qualities, inasmuch as we are said to
be such and such in virtue of them, not only if they originate in natural
constitution, but also if they come about through long disease or sunburn,
and are difficult to remove, or indeed remain throughout life. For in the
same way we are said to be such and such because of
these.
Those conditions, however, which arise from causes which may easily
be rendered ineffective or speedily removed, are called, not qualities,
but affections: for we are not said to be such virtue of them. The man
who blushes through shame is not said to be a constitutional blusher, nor
is the man who becomes pale through fear said to be constitutionally pale.
He is said rather to have been affected.
Thus such conditions are called affections, not
qualities.
In like manner there are affective qualities and affections of the
soul. That temper with which a man is born and which has its origin in
certain deep-seated affections is called a quality. I mean such conditions
as insanity, irascibility, and so on: for people are said to be mad or
irascible in virtue of these. Similarly those abnormal psychic states which
are not inborn, but arise from the concomitance of certain other elements,
and are difficult to remove, or altogether permanent, are called qualities,
for in virtue of them men are said to be such and such.
Those, however, which arise from causes easily rendered ineffective
are called affections, not qualities. Suppose that a man is irritable when
vexed: he is not even spoken of as a bad-tempered man, when in such circumstances
he loses his temper somewhat, but rather is said to be affected. Such conditions
are therefore termed, not qualities, but affections.
The fourth sort of quality is figure and the shape that belongs
to a thing; and besides this, straightness and curvedness and any other
qualities of this type; each of these defines a thing as being such and
such. Because it is triangular or quadrangular a thing is said to have
a specific character, or again because it is straight or curved; in fact
a thing's shape in every case gives rise to a qualification of
it.
Rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, seem to be terms
indicating quality: yet these, it would appear, really belong to a class
different from that of quality. For it is rather a certain relative position
of the parts composing the thing thus qualified which, it appears, is indicated
by each of these terms. A thing is dense, owing to the fact that its parts
are closely combined with one another; rare, because there are interstices
between the parts; smooth, because its parts lie, so to speak, evenly;
rough, because some parts project beyond others.
There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly
so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated.
These, then, are qualities, and the things that take their name
from them as derivatives, or are in some other way dependent on them, are
said to be qualified in some specific way. In most, indeed in almost all
cases, the name of that which is qualified is derived from that of the
quality. Thus the terms 'whiteness', 'grammar', 'justice', give us the
adjectives 'white', 'grammatical', 'just', and so on.
There are some cases, however, in which, as the quality under consideration
has no name, it is impossible that those possessed of it should have a
name that is derivative. For instance, the name given to the runner or
boxer, who is so called in virtue of an inborn capacity, is not derived
from that of any quality; for lob those capacities have no name assigned
to them. In this, the inborn capacity is distinct from the science, with
reference to which men are called, e.g. boxers or wrestlers. Such a science
is classed as a disposition; it has a name, and is called 'boxing' or 'wrestling'
as the case may be, and the name given to those disposed in this way is
derived from that of the science. Sometimes, even though a name exists
for the quality, that which takes its character from the quality has a
name that is not a derivative. For instance, the upright man takes his
character from the possession of the quality of integrity, but the name
given him is not derived from the word 'integrity'. Yet this does not occur
often.
We may therefore state that those things are said to be possessed
of some specific quality which have a name derived from that of the aforesaid
quality, or which are in some other way dependent on
it.
One quality may be the contrary of another; thus justice is the
contrary of injustice, whiteness of blackness, and so on. The things, also,
which are said to be such and such in virtue of these qualities, may be
contrary the one to the other; for that which is unjust is contrary to
that which is just, that which is white to that which is black. This, however,
is not always the case. Red, yellow, and such colours, though qualities,
have no contraries.
If one of two contraries is a quality, the other will also be a
quality. This will be evident from particular instances, if we apply the
names used to denote the other categories; for instance, granted that justice
is the contrary of injustice and justice is a quality, injustice will also
be a quality: neither quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor indeed any
other category but that of quality, will be applicable properly to injustice.
So it is with all other contraries falling under the category of
quality.
Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated
of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also
the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may
exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is
white, it may become whiter.
Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if
we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties
might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which
are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of
variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well
admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree
in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical
learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions. However
that may be, it is an incontrovertible fact that the things which in virtue
of these qualities are said to be what they are vary in the degree in which
they possess them; for one man is said to be better versed in grammar,
or more healthy or just, than another, and so on.
The qualities expressed by the terms 'triangular' and 'quadrangular'
do not appear to admit of variation of degree, nor indeed do any that have
to do with figure. For those things to which the definition of the triangle
or circle is applicable are all equally triangular or circular. Those,
on the other hand, to which the same definition is not applicable, cannot
be said to differ from one another in degree; the square is no more a circle
than the rectangle, for to neither is the definition of the circle appropriate.
In short, if the definition of the term proposed is not applicable to both
objects, they cannot be compared. Thus it is not all qualities which admit
of variation of degree.
Whereas none of the characteristics I have mentioned are peculiar
to quality, the fact that likeness and unlikeness can be predicated with
reference to quality only, gives to that category its distinctive feature.
One thing is like another only with reference to that in virtue of which
it is such and such; thus this forms the peculiar mark of
quality.
We must not be disturbed because it may be argued that, though
proposing to discuss the category of quality, we have included in it many
relative terms. We did say that habits and dispositions were relative.
In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not.
Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else,
for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge
are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything
external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all,
are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said be the
knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is
the knowledge of something, not the music of something.
Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it
is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are
said to be such and such. It is these that we actually possess: we are
called experts because we possess knowledge in some particular branch.
Those particular branches, therefore, of knowledge, in virtue of which
we are sometimes said to be such and such, are themselves qualities, and
are not relative. Further, if anything should happen to fall within both
the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary
in classing it under both these heads.
Categories
By Aristotle
Section 3
Part 9
Action and affection both admit of contraries and also of variation of
degree. Heating is the contrary of cooling, being heated of being cooled,
being glad of being vexed. Thus they admit of contraries. They also admit
of variation of degree: for it is possible to heat in a greater or less
degree; also to be heated in a greater or less degree. Thus action and
affection also admit of variation of degree. So much, then, is stated with
regard to these categories.
We spoke, moreover, of the category of position when we were dealing
with that of relation, and stated that such terms derived their names from
those of the corresponding attitudes.
As for the rest, time, place, state, since they are easily intelligible,
I say no more about them than was said at the beginning, that in the category
of state are included such states as 'shod', 'armed', in that of place
'in the Lyceum' and so on, as was explained before.
Part 10
The proposed categories have, then, been adequately dealt
with.
We must next explain the various senses in which the term 'opposite'
is used. Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives
to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives
to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives.
Let me sketch my meaning in outline. An instance of the use of
the word 'opposite' with reference to correlatives is afforded by the expressions
'double' and 'half'; with reference to contraries by 'bad' and 'good'.
Opposites in the sense of 'privatives' and 'positives' are' blindness'
and 'sight'; in the sense of affirmatives and negatives, the propositions
'he sits', 'he does not sit'.
(i) Pairs of opposites which fall under the category of relation
are explained by a reference of the one to the other, the reference being
indicated by the preposition 'of' or by some other preposition. Thus, double
is a relative term, for that which is double is explained as the double
of something. Knowledge, again, is the opposite of the thing known, in
the same sense; and the thing known also is explained by its relation to
its opposite, knowledge. For the thing known is explained as that which
is known by something, that is, by knowledge. Such things, then, as are
opposite the one to the other in the sense of being correlatives are explained
by a reference of the one to the other.
(ii) Pairs of opposites which are contraries are not in any way
interdependent, but are contrary the one to the other. The good is not
spoken of as the good of the had, but as the contrary of the bad, nor is
white spoken of as the white of the black, but as the contrary of the black.
These two types of opposition are therefore distinct. Those contraries
which are such that the subjects in which they are naturally present, or
of which they are predicated, must necessarily contain either the one or
the other of them, have no intermediate, but those in the case of which
no such necessity obtains, always have an intermediate. Thus disease and
health are naturally present in the body of an animal, and it is necessary
that either the one or the other should be present in the body of an animal.
Odd and even, again, are predicated of number, and it is necessary that
the one or the other should be present in numbers. Now there is no intermediate
between the terms of either of these two pairs. On the other hand, in those
contraries with regard to which no such necessity obtains, we find an intermediate.
Blackness and whiteness are naturally present in the body, but it is not
necessary that either the one or the other should be present in the body,
inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or black.
Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many other things,
but it is not necessary that either the one quality or the other should
be present in that of which they are predicated: it is not true to say
that everything that may be good or bad must be either good or bad. These
pairs of contraries have intermediates: the intermediates between white
and black are grey, sallow, and all the other colours that come between;
the intermediate between good and bad is that which is neither the one
nor the other.
Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow
and all the other colours that come between white and black; in other cases,
however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but we must define it
as that which is not either extreme, as in the case of that which is neither
good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.
(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same subject.
Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is a universal
rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has reference to that
to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We say that that is capable
of some particular faculty or possession has suffered privation when the
faculty or possession in question is in no way present in that in which,
and at the time at which, it should naturally be present. We do not call
that toothless which has not teeth, or that blind which has not sight,
but rather that which has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature
it should. For there are some creatures which from birth are without sight,
or without teeth, but these are not called toothless or
blind.
To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as
the corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive', 'blindness'
a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to 'sight', 'to
be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness is a 'privative',
to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is not a 'privative'.
Moreover, if 'blindness' were equivalent to 'being blind', both would be
predicated of the same subject; but though a man is said to be blind, he
is by no means said to be blindness.
To be in a state of 'possession' is, it appears, the opposite of
being in a state of 'privation', just as 'positives' and 'privatives' themselves
are opposite. There is the same type of antithesis in both cases; for just
as blindness is opposed to sight, so is being blind opposed to having
sight.
That which is affirmed or denied is not itself affirmation or denial.
By 'affirmation' we mean an affirmative proposition, by 'denial' a negative.
Now, those facts which form the matter of the affirmation or denial are
not propositions; yet these two are said to be opposed in the same sense
as the affirmation and denial, for in this case also the type of antithesis
is the same. For as the affirmation is opposed to the denial, as in the
two propositions 'he sits', 'he does not sit', so also the fact which constitutes
the matter of the proposition in one case is opposed to that in the other,
his sitting, that is to say, to his not sitting.
It is evident that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed
each to each in the same sense as relatives. The one is not explained by
reference to the other; sight is not sight of blindness, nor is any other
preposition used to indicate the relation. Similarly blindness is not said
to be blindness of sight, but rather, privation of sight. Relatives, moreover,
reciprocate; if blindness, therefore, were a relative, there would be a
reciprocity of relation between it and that with which it was correlative.
But this is not the case. Sight is not called the sight of
blindness.
That those terms which fall under the heads of 'positives' and
'privatives' are not opposed each to each as contraries, either, is plain
from the following facts: Of a pair of contraries such that they have no
intermediate, one or the other must needs be present in the subject in
which they naturally subsist, or of which they are predicated; for it is
those, as we proved,' in the case of which this necessity obtains, that
have no intermediate. Moreover, we cited health and disease, odd and even,
as instances. But those contraries which have an intermediate are not subject
to any such necessity. It is not necessary that every substance, receptive
of such qualities, should be either black or white, cold or hot, for something
intermediate between these contraries may very well be present in the subject.
We proved, moreover, that those contraries have an intermediate in the
case of which the said necessity does not obtain. Yet when one of the two
contraries is a constitutive property of the subject, as it is a constitutive
property of fire to be hot, of snow to be white, it is necessary determinately
that one of the two contraries, not one or the other, should be present
in the subject; for fire cannot be cold, or snow black. Thus, it is not
the case here that one of the two must needs be present in every subject
receptive of these qualities, but only in that subject of which the one
forms a constitutive property. Moreover, in such cases it is one member
of the pair determinately, and not either the one or the other, which must
be present.
In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', on the other hand,
neither of the aforesaid statements holds good. For it is not necessary
that a subject receptive of the qualities should always have either the
one or the other; that which has not yet advanced to the state when sight
is natural is not said either to be blind or to see. Thus 'positives' and
'privatives' do not belong to that class of contraries which consists of
those which have no intermediate. On the other hand, they do not belong
either to that class which consists of contraries which have an intermediate.
For under certain conditions it is necessary that either the one or the
other should form part of the constitution of every appropriate subject.
For when a thing has reached the stage when it is by nature capable of
sight, it will be said either to see or to be blind, and that in an indeterminate
sense, signifying that the capacity may be either present or absent; for
it is not necessary either that it should see or that it should be blind,
but that it should be either in the one state or in the other. Yet in the
case of those contraries which have an intermediate we found that it was
never necessary that either the one or the other should be present in every
appropriate subject, but only that in certain subjects one of the pair
should be present, and that in a determinate sense. It is, therefore, plain
that 'positives' and 'privatives' are not opposed each to each in either
of the senses in which contraries are opposed.
Again, in the case of contraries, it is possible that there should
be changes from either into the other, while the subject retains its identity,
unless indeed one of the contraries is a constitutive property of that
subject, as heat is of fire. For it is possible that that that which is
healthy should become diseased, that which is white, black, that which
is cold, hot, that which is good, bad, that which is bad, good. The bad
man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and thought, may
make some advance, however slight, and if he should once improve, even
ever so little, it is plain that he might change completely, or at any
rate make very great progress; for a man becomes more and more easily moved
to virtue, however small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore,
natural to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has made
in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him completely
and establish him in the contrary state, provided he is not hindered by
lack of time. In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', however, change
in both directions is impossible. There may be a change from possession
to privation, but not from privation to possession. The man who has become
blind does not regain his sight; the man who has become bald does not regain
his hair; the man who has lost his teeth does not grow his grow a new set.
(iv) Statements opposed as affirmation and negation belong manifestly to
a class which is distinct, for in this case, and in this case only, it
is necessary for the one opposite to be true and the other
false.
Neither in the case of contraries, nor in the case of correlatives,
nor in the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', is it necessary for one
to be true and the other false. Health and disease are contraries: neither
of them is true or false. 'Double' and 'half' are opposed to each other
as correlatives: neither of them is true or false. The case is the same,
of course, with regard to 'positives' and 'privatives' such as 'sight'
and 'blindness'. In short, where there is no sort of combination of words,
truth and falsity have no place, and all the opposites we have mentioned
so far consist of simple words.
At the same time, when the words which enter into opposed statements
are contraries, these, more than any other set of opposites, would seem
to claim this characteristic. 'Socrates is ill' is the contrary of 'Socrates
is well', but not even of such composite expressions is it true to say
that one of the pair must always be true and the other false. For if Socrates
exists, one will be true and the other false, but if he does not exist,
both will be false; for neither 'Socrates is ill' nor 'Socrates is well'
is true, if Socrates does not exist at all.
In the case of 'positives' and 'privatives', if the subject does
not exist at all, neither proposition is true, but even if the subject
exists, it is not always the fact that one is true and the other false.
For 'Socrates has sight' is the opposite of 'Socrates is blind' in the
sense of the word 'opposite' which applies to possession and privation.
Now if Socrates exists, it is not necessary that one should be true and
the other false, for when he is not yet able to acquire the power of vision,
both are false, as also if Socrates is altogether non-existent.
But in the case of affirmation and negation, whether the subject
exists or not, one is always false and the other true. For manifestly,
if Socrates exists, one of the two propositions 'Socrates is ill', 'Socrates
is not ill', is true, and the other false. This is likewise the case if
he does not exist; for if he does not exist, to say that he is ill is false,
to say that he is not ill is true. Thus it is in the case of those opposites
only, which are opposite in the sense in which the term is used with reference
to affirmation and negation, that the rule holds good, that one of the
pair must be true and the other false.
Part 11
That the contrary of a good is an evil is shown by induction: the
contrary of health is disease, of courage, cowardice, and so on. But the
contrary of an evil is sometimes a good, sometimes an evil. For defect,
which is an evil, has excess for its contrary, this also being an evil,
and the mean. which is a good, is equally the contrary of the one and of
the other. It is only in a few cases, however, that we see instances of
this: in most, the contrary of an evil is a good.
In the case of contraries, it is not always necessary that if one
exists the other should also exist: for if all become healthy there will
be health and no disease, and again, if everything turns white, there will
be white, but no black. Again, since the fact that Socrates is ill is the
contrary of the fact that Socrates is well, and two contrary conditions
cannot both obtain in one and the same individual at the same time, both
these contraries could not exist at once: for if that Socrates was well
was a fact, then that Socrates was ill could not possibly be
one.
It is plain that contrary attributes must needs be present in subjects
which belong to the same species or genus. Disease and health require as
their subject the body of an animal; white and black require a body, without
further qualification; justice and injustice require as their subject the
human soul.
Moreover, it is necessary that pairs of contraries should in all
cases either belong to the same genus or belong to contrary genera or be
themselves genera. White and black belong to the same genus, colour; justice
and injustice, to contrary genera, virtue and vice; while good and evil
do not belong to genera, but are themselves actual genera, with terms under
them.
Part 12
There are four senses in which one thing can be said to be 'prior'
to another. Primarily and most properly the term has reference to time:
in this sense the word is used to indicate that one thing is older or more
ancient than another, for the expressions 'older' and 'more ancient' imply
greater length of time.
Secondly, one thing is said to be 'prior' to another when the sequence
of their being cannot be reversed. In this sense 'one' is 'prior' to 'two'.
For if 'two' exists, it follows directly that 'one' must exist, but if
'one' exists, it does not follow necessarily that 'two' exists: thus the
sequence subsisting cannot be reversed. It is agreed, then, that when the
sequence of two things cannot be reversed, then that one on which the other
depends is called 'prior' to that other.
In the third place, the term 'prior' is used with reference to
any order, as in the case of science and of oratory. For in sciences which
use demonstration there is that which is prior and that which is posterior
in order; in geometry, the elements are prior to the propositions; in reading
and writing, the letters of the alphabet are prior to the syllables. Similarly,
in the case of speeches, the exordium is prior in order to the
narrative.
Besides these senses of the word, there is a fourth. That which
is better and more honourable is said to have a natural priority. In common
parlance men speak of those whom they honour and love as 'coming first'
with them. This sense of the word is perhaps the most
far-fetched.
Such, then, are the different senses in which the term 'prior'
is used.
Yet it would seem that besides those mentioned there is yet another.
For in those things, the being of each of which implies that of the other,
that which is in any way the cause may reasonably be said to be by nature
'prior' to the effect. It is plain that there are instances of this. The
fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition
that he is, and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition
wherein we allege that he is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein
we allege that he is true, then he is. The true proposition, however, is
in no way the cause of the being of the man, but the fact of the man's
being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of the proposition,
for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the
man's being or not being.
Thus the word 'prior' may be used in five senses.
Part 13
The term 'simultaneous' is primarily and most appropriately applied
to those things the genesis of the one of which is simultaneous with that
of the other; for in such cases neither is prior or posterior to the other.
Such things are said to be simultaneous in point of time. Those things,
again, are 'simultaneous' in point of nature, the being of each of which
involves that of the other, while at the same time neither is the cause
of the other's being. This is the case with regard to the double and the
half, for these are reciprocally dependent, since, if there is a double,
there is also a half, and if there is a half, there is also a double, while
at the same time neither is the cause of the being of the
other.
Again, those species which are distinguished one from another and
opposed one to another within the same genus are said to be 'simultaneous'
in nature. I mean those species which are distinguished each from each
by one and the same method of division. Thus the 'winged' species is simultaneous
with the 'terrestrial' and the 'water' species. These are distinguished
within the same genus, and are opposed each to each, for the genus 'animal'
has the 'winged', the 'terrestrial', and the 'water' species, and no one
of these is prior or posterior to another; on the contrary, all such things
appear to be 'simultaneous' in nature. Each of these also, the terrestrial,
the winged, and the water species, can be divided again into subspecies.
Those species, then, also will be 'simultaneous' point of nature, which,
belonging to the same genus, are distinguished each from each by one and
the same method of differentiation.
But genera are prior to species, for the sequence of their being
cannot be reversed. If there is the species 'water-animal', there will
be the genus 'animal', but granted the being of the genus 'animal', it
does not follow necessarily that there will be the species
'water-animal'.
Those things, therefore, are said to be 'simultaneous' in nature,
the being of each of which involves that of the other, while at the same
time neither is in any way the cause of the other's being; those species,
also, which are distinguished each from each and opposed within the same
genus. Those things, moreover, are 'simultaneous' in the unqualified sense
of the word which come into being at the same time.
Part 14
There are six sorts of movement: generation, destruction, increase,
diminution, alteration, and change of place.
It is evident in all but one case that all these sorts of movement
are distinct each from each. Generation is distinct from destruction, increase
and change of place from diminution, and so on. But in the case of alteration
it may be argued that the process necessarily implies one or other of the
other five sorts of motion. This is not true, for we may say that all affections,
or nearly all, produce in us an alteration which is distinct from all other
sorts of motion, for that which is affected need not suffer either increase
or diminution or any of the other sorts of motion. Thus alteration is a
distinct sort of motion; for, if it were not, the thing altered would not
only be altered, but would forthwith necessarily suffer increase or diminution
or some one of the other sorts of motion in addition; which as a matter
of fact is not the case. Similarly that which was undergoing the process
of increase or was subject to some other sort of motion would, if alteration
were not a distinct form of motion, necessarily be subject to alteration
also. But there are some things which undergo increase but yet not alteration.
The square, for instance, if a gnomon is applied to it, undergoes increase
but not alteration, and so it is with all other figures of this sort. Alteration
and increase, therefore, are distinct.
Speaking generally, rest is the contrary of motion. But the different
forms of motion have their own contraries in other forms; thus destruction
is the contrary of generation, diminution of increase, rest in a place,
of change of place. As for this last, change in the reverse direction would
seem to be most truly its contrary; thus motion upwards is the contrary
of motion downwards and vice versa.
In the case of that sort of motion which yet remains, of those
that have been enumerated, it is not easy to state what is its contrary.
It appears to have no contrary, unless one should define the contrary here
also either as 'rest in its quality' or as 'change in the direction of
the contrary quality', just as we defined the contrary of change of place
either as rest in a place or as change in the reverse direction. For a
thing is altered when change of quality takes place; therefore either rest
in its quality or change in the direction of the contrary may be called
the contrary of this qualitative form of motion. In this way becoming white
is the contrary of becoming black; there is alteration in the contrary
direction, since a change of a qualitative nature takes
place.
Part 15
The term 'to have' is used in various senses. In the first place
it is used with reference to habit or disposition or any other quality,
for we are said to 'have' a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Then, again,
it has reference to quantity, as, for instance, in the case of a man's
height; for he is said to 'have' a height of three or four cubits. It is
used, moreover, with regard to apparel, a man being said to 'have' a coat
or tunic; or in respect of something which we have on a part of ourselves,
as a ring on the hand: or in respect of something which is a part of us,
as hand or foot. The term refers also to content, as in the case of a vessel
and wheat, or of a jar and wine; a jar is said to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure
wheat. The expression in such cases has reference to content. Or it refers
to that which has been acquired; we are said to 'have' a house or a field.
A man is also said to 'have' a wife, and a wife a husband, and this appears
to be the most remote meaning of the term, for by the use of it we mean
simply that the husband lives with the wife.
Other senses of the word might perhaps be found, but the most ordinary
ones have all been enumerated.
THE END
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