Aristotle
384-322 B.C.E. - Wrote in Greek
On Dreams
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by J. I. Beare
Part 1
We must, in the next place, investigate the subject of the dream, and first
inquire to which of the faculties of the soul it presents itself, i.e.
whether the affection is one which pertains to the faculty of intelligence
or to that of sense-perception; for these are the only faculties within
us by which we acquire knowledge.
If, then, the exercise of the faculty of sight is actual seeing,
that of the auditory faculty, hearing, and, in general that of the faculty
of sense-perception, perceiving; and if there are some perceptions common
to the senses, such as figure, magnitude, motion, &c., while there are
others, as colour, sound, taste, peculiar [each to its own sense]; and
further, if all creatures, when the eyes are closed in sleep, are unable
to see, and the analogous statement is true of the other senses, so that
manifestly we perceive nothing when asleep; we may conclude that it is
not by sense-perception we perceive a dream.
But neither is it by opinion that we do so. For [in dreams] we
not only assert, e.g. that some object approaching is a man or a horse
which would be an exercise of opinion
, but that the object iswhite or beautiful, points on which opinion without
sense-perception asserts nothing either truly or falsely. It is, however,
a fact that the soul makes such assertions in sleep. We seem to see equally
well that the approaching figure is a man, and that it is white. [In dreams],
too, we think something else, over and above the dream presentation, just
as we do in waking moments when we perceive something; for we often also
reason about that which we perceive. So, too, in sleep we sometimes have
thoughts other than the mere phantasms immediately before our minds. This
would be manifest to any one who should attend and try, immediately on
arising from sleep, to remember [his dreaming experience]. There are cases
of persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe themselves
to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according to the mnemonic
rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides
the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage into its mnemonic
position. Hence it is plain that not every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere
dream-image, and that the further thinking which we perform then is due
to an exercise of the faculty of opinion.
So much at least is plain on all these points, viz. that the faculty
by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by
disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in sleep.
So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the facts of the
case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless, appears to them to be only
a foot wide. Now, whether the presentative faculty of the soul be identical
with, or different from, the faculty of sense-perception, in either case
the illusion does not occur without our actually seeing or [otherwise]
perceiving something. Even to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen
only to one who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he
supposes. But we have assumed that in sleep one neither sees, nor hears,
nor exercises any sense whatever. Perhaps we may regard it as true that
the dreamer sees nothing, yet as false that his faculty of sense-perception
is unaffected, the fact being that the sense of seeing and the other senses
may possibly be then in a certain way affected, while each of these affections,
as duly as when he is awake, gives its impulse in a certain manner to his
[primary] faculty of sense, though not in precisely the same manner as
when he is awake. Sometimes, too, opinion says [to dreamers] just as to
those who are awake, that the object seen is an illusion; at other times
it is inhibited, and becomes a mere follower of the
phantasm.
It is plain therefore that this affection, which we name 'dreaming',
is no mere exercise of opinion or intelligence, but yet is not an affection
of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were the latter
it would be possible [when asleep] to hear and see in the simple
sense.
How then, and in what manner, it takes place, is what we have to
examine. Let us assume, what is indeed clear enough, that the affection
[of dreaming] pertains to sense-perception as surely as sleep itself does.
For sleep does not pertain to one organ in animals and dreaming to another;
both pertain to the same organ.
But since we have, in our work On the Soul, treated of presentation,
and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of sense-perception,
though the essential notion of a faculty of presentation is different from
that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since presentation is the movement
set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while
a dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in
sleep-whether simply or in some particular way-is what we call a dream):
it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception,
but belongs to this faculty qua presentative.
Part 2
We can best obtain a scientific view of the nature of the dream
and the manner in which it originates by regarding it in the light of the
circumstances attending sleep. The objects of sense-perception corresponding
to each sensory organ produce sense-perception in us, and the affection
due to their operation is present in the organs of sense not only when
the perceptions are actualized, but even when they have
departed.
What happens in these cases may be compared with what happens in
the case of projectiles moving in space. For in the case of these the movement
continues even when that which set up the movement is no longer in contact
[with the things that are moved]. For that which set them in motion moves
a certain portion of air, and this, in turn, being moved excites motion
in another portion; and so, accordingly, it is in this way that [the bodies],
whether in air or in liquids, continue moving, until they come to a
standstill.
This we must likewise assume to happen in the case of qualitative
change; for that part which [for example] has been heated by something
hot, heats [in turn] the part next to it, and this propagates the affection
continuously onwards until the process has come round to its oint of origination.
This must also happen in the organ wherein the exercise of sense-perception
takes place, since sense-perception, as realized in actual perceiving,
is a mode of qualitative change. This explains why the affection continues
in the sensory organs, both in their deeper and in their more superficial
parts, not merely while they are actually engaged in perceiving, but even
after they have ceased to do so. That they do this, indeed, is obvious
in cases where we continue for some time engaged in a particular form of
perception, for then, when we shift the scene of our perceptive activity,
the previous affection remains; for instance, when we have turned our gaze
from sunlight into darkness. For the result of this is that one sees nothing,
owing to the excited by the light still subsisting in our eyes. Also, when
we have looked steadily for a long while at one colour, e.g. at white or
green, that to which we next transfer our gaze appears to be of the same
colour. Again if, after having looked at the sun or some other brilliant
object, we close the eyes, then, if we watch carefully, it appears in a
right line with the direction of vision (whatever this may be), at first
in its own colour; then it changes to crimson, next to purple, until it
becomes black and disappears. And also when persons turn away from looking
at objects in motion, e.g. rivers, and especially those which flow very
rapidly, they find that the visual stimulations still present themselves,
for the things really at rest are then seen moving: persons become very
deaf after hearing loud noises, and after smelling very strong odours their
power of smelling is impaired; and similarly in other cases. These phenomena
manifestly take place in the way above described.
That the sensory organs are acutely sensitive to even a slight
qualitative difference [in their objects] is shown by what happens in the
case of mirrors; a subject to which, even taking it independently, one
might devote close consideration and inquiry. At the same time it becomes
plain from them that as the eye [in seeing] is affected [by the object
seen], so also it produces a certain effect upon it. If a woman chances
during her menstrual period to look into a highly polished mirror, the
surface of it will grow cloudy with a blood-coloured haze. It is very hard
to remove this stain from a new mirror, but easier to remove from an older
mirror. As we have said before, the cause of this lies in the fact that
in the act of sight there occurs not only a passion in the sense organ
acted on by the polished surface, but the organ, as an agent, also produces
an action, as is proper to a brilliant object. For sight is the property
of an organ possessing brilliance and colour. The eyes, therefore, have
their proper action as have other parts of the body. Because it is natural
to the eye to be filled with blood-vessels, a woman's eyes, during the
period of menstrual flux and inflammation, will undergo a change, although
her husband will not note this since his seed is of the same nature as
that of his wife. The surrounding atmosphere, through which operates the
action of sight, and which surrounds the mirror also, will undergo a change
of the same sort that occurred shortly before in the woman's eyes, and
hence the surface of the mirror is likewise affected. And as in the case
of a garment, the cleaner it is the more quickly it is soiled, so the same
holds true in the case of the mirror. For anything that is clean will show
quite clearly a stain that it chances to receive, and the cleanest object
shows up even the slightest stain. A bronze mirror, because of its shininess,
is especially sensitive to any sort of contact (the movement of the surrounding
air acts upon it like a rubbing or pressing or wiping); on that account,
therefore, what is clean will show up clearly the slightest touch on its
surface. It is hard to cleanse smudges off new mirrors because the stain
penetrates deeply and is suffused to all parts; it penetrates deeply because
the mirror is not a dense medium, and is suffused widely because of the
smoothness of the object. On the other hand, in the case of old mirrors,
stains do not remain because they do not penetrate deeply, but only smudge
the surface.
From this therefore it is plain that stimulatory motion is set
up even by slight differences, and that sense-perception is quick to respond
to it; and further that the organ which perceives colour is not only affected
by its object, but also reacts upon it. Further evidence to the same point
is afforded by what takes place in wines, and in the manufacture of unguents.
For both oil, when prepared, and wine become rapidly infected by the odours
of the things near them; they not only acquire the odours of the things
thrown into or mixed with them, but also those of the things which are
placed, or which grow, near the vessels containing them.
In order to answer our original question, let us now, therefore,
assume one proposition, which is clear from what precedes, viz. that even
when the external object of perception has departed, the impressions it
has made persist, and are themselves objects of perception: and [let us
assume], besides, that we are easily deceived respecting the operations
of sense-perception when we are excited by emotions, and different persons
according to their different emotions; for example, the coward when excited
by fear, the amorous person by amorous desire; so that, with but little
resemblance to go upon, the former thinks he sees his foes approaching,
the latter, that he sees the object of his desire; and the more deeply
one is under the influence of the emotion, the less similarity is required
to give rise to these illusory impressions. Thus too, both in fits of anger,
and also in all states of appetite, all men become easily deceived, and
more so the more their emotions are excited. This is the reason too why
persons in the delirium of fever sometimes think they see animals on their
chamber walls, an illusion arising from the faint resemblance to animals
of the markings thereon when put together in patterns; and this sometimes
corresponds with the emotional states of the sufferers, in such a way that,
if the latter be not very ill, they know well enough that it is an illusion;
but if the illness is more severe they actually move according to the appearances.
The cause of these occurrences is that the faculty in virtue of which the
controlling sense judges is not identical with that in virtue of which
presentations come before the mind. A proof of this is, that the sun presents
itself as only a foot in diameter, though often something else gainsays
the presentation. Again, when the fingers are crossed, the one object
placed
between them
is felt [by the touch] as two; but yet we denythat it is two; for sight
is more authoritative than touch. Yet, if touch stood alone, we should
actually have pronounced the one object to be two. The ground of such false
judgements is that any appearances whatever present themselves, not only
when its object stimulates a sense, but also when the sense by itself alone
is stimulated, provided only it be stimulated in the same manner as it
is by the object. For example, to persons sailing past the land seems to
move, when it is really the eye that is being moved by something else [the
moving ship.]
Part 3
From this it is manifest that the stimulatory movements based upon
sensory impressions, whether the latter are derived from external objects
or from causes within the body, present themselves not only when persons
are awake, but also then, when this affection which is called sleep has
come upon them, with even greater impressiveness. For by day, while the
senses and the intellect are working together, they (i.e. such movements)
are extruded from consciousness or obscured, just as a smaller is beside
a larger fire, or as small beside great pains or pleasures, though, as
soon as the latter have ceased, even those which are trifling emerge into
notice. But by night
i.e. in sleep
owing to the inaction of the particular senses, andtheir powerlessness
to realize themselves, which arises from the reflux of the hot from the
exterior parts to the interior, they
i.e. the above
'movements'
are borne in to the head quarters ofsense-perception, and there display
themselves as the disturbance (of waking life) subsides. We must suppose
that, like the little eddies which are being ever formed in rivers, so
the sensory movements are each a continuous process, often remaining like
what they were when first started, but often, too, broken into other forms
by collisions with obstacles. This [last mentioned point], moreover, gives
the reason why no dreams occur in sleep immediately after meals, or to
sleepers who are extremely young, e.g. to infants. The internal movement
in such cases is excessive, owing to the heat generated from the food.
Hence, just as in a liquid, if one vehemently disturbs it, sometimes no
reflected image appears, while at other times one appears, indeed, but
utterly distorted, so as to seem quite unlike its original; while, when
once the motion has ceased, the reflected images are clear and plain; in
the same manner during sleep the phantasms, or residuary movements, which
are based upon the sensory impressions, become sometimes quite obliterated
by the above described motion when too violent; while at other times the
sights are indeed seen, but confused and weird, and the dreams
which
then appear
are unhealthy, like those of persons who areatrabilious, or feverish, or
intoxicated with wine. For all such affections, being spirituous, cause
much commotion and disturbance. In sanguineous animals, in proportion as
the blood becomes calm, and as its purer are separated from its less pure
elements, the fact that the movement, based on impressions derived from
each of the organs of sense, is preserved in its integrity, renders the
dreams healthy, causes a [clear] image to present itself, and makes the
dreamer think, owing to the effects borne in from the organ of sight, that
he actually sees, and owing to those which come from the organ of hearing,
that he really hears; and so on with those also which proceed from the
other sensory organs. For it is owing to the fact that the movement which
reaches the primary organ of sense comes from them, that one even when
awake believes himself to see, or hear, or otherwise perceive; just as
it is from a belief that the organ of sight is being stimulated, though
in reality not so stimulated, that we sometimes erroneously declare ourselves
to see, or that, from the fact that touch announces two movements, we think
that the one object is two. For, as a rule, the governing sense affirms
the report of each particular sense, unless another particular sense, more
authoritative, makes a contradictory report. In every case an appearance
presents itself, but what appears does not in every case seem real, unless
when the deciding faculty is inhibited, or does not move with its proper
motion. Moreover, as we said that different men are subject to illusions,
each according to the different emotion present in him, so it is that the
sleeper, owing to sleep, and to the movements then going on in his sensory
organs, as well as to the other facts of the sensory process, [is liable
to illusion], so that the dream presentation, though but little like it,
appears as some actual given thing. For when one is asleep, in proportion
as most of the blood sinks inwards to its fountain [the heart], the internal
sensory
movements, some potential, others actual accompany itinwards. They are
so related [in general] that, if anything move the blood, some one sensory
movement will emerge from it, while if this perishes another will take
its place; while to one another also they are related in the same way as
the artificial frogs in water which severally rise [in fixed succesion]
to the surface in the order in which the salt [which keeps them down] becomes
dissolved. The residuary movements are like these: they are within the
soul potentially, but actualize themselves only when the impediment to
their doing so has been relaxed; and according as they are thus set free,
they begin to move in the blood which remains in the sensory organs, and
which is now but scanty, while they possess verisimilitude after the manner
of cloud-shapes, which in their rapid metamorphoses one compares now to
human beings and a moment afterwards to centaurs. Each of them is however,
as has been said, the remnant of a sensory impression taken when sense
was actualizing itself; and when this, the true impression, has departed,
its remnant is still immanent, and it is correct to say of it, that though
not actually Koriskos, it is like Koriskos. For when the person was actually
perceiving, his controlling and judging sensory faculty did not call it
Koriskos, but, prompted by this [impression], called the genuine person
yonder Koriskos. Accordingly, this sensory impulse, which, when actually
perceiving, it [the controlling faculty] describes (unless completely inhibited
by the blood), it now [in dreams] when quasi-perceiving, receives from
the movements persisting in the sense-organs, and mistakes it-an impulse
that is merely like the true [objective] impression-for the true impression
itself, while the effect of sleep is so great that it causes this mistake
to pass unnoticed. Accordingly, just as if a finger be inserted beneath
the eyeball without being observed, one object will not only present two
visual images, but will create an opinion of its being two objects; while
if it [the finger] be observed, the presentation will be the same, but
the same opinion will not be formed of it; exactly so it is in states of
sleep: if the sleeper perceives that he is asleep, and is conscious of
the sleeping state during which the perception comes before his mind, it
presents itself still, but something within him speaks to this effect:
'the image of Koriskos presents itself, but the real Koriskos is not present';
for often, when one is asleep, there is something in consciousness which
declares that what then presents itself is but a dream. If, however, he
is not aware of being asleep, there is nothing which will contradict the
testimony of the bare presentation.
That what we here urge is true, i.e. that there are such presentative
movements in the sensory organs, any one may convince himself, if he attends
to and tries to remember the affections we experience when sinking into
slumber or when being awakened. He will sometimes, in the moment of awakening,
surprise the images which present themselves to him in sleep, and find
that they are really but movements lurking in the organs of sense. And
indeed some very young persons, if it is dark, though looking with wide
open eyes, see multitudes of phantom figures moving before them, so that
they often cover up their heads in terror.
From all this, then, the conclusion to be drawn is, that the dream
is a sort of presentation, and, more particularly, one which occurs in
sleep; since the phantoms just mentioned are not dreams, nor is any other
a dream which presents itself when the sense-perceptions are in a state
of freedom. Nor is every presentation which occurs in sleep necessarily
a dream. For in the first place, some persons [when asleep] actually, in
a certain way, perceive sounds, light, savour, and contact; feebly, however,
and, as it were, remotely. For there have been cases in which persons while
asleep, but with the eyes partly open, saw faintly in their sleep (as they
supposed) the light of a lamp, and afterwards, on being awakened, straightway
recognized it as the actual light of a real lamp; while, in other cases,
persons who faintly heard the crowing of cocks or the barking of dogs identified
these clearly with the real sounds as soon as they awoke. Some persons,
too, return answers to questions put to them in sleep. For it is quite
possible that, of waking or sleeping, while the one is present in the ordinary
sense, the other also should be present in a certain way. But none of these
occurrences should be called a dream. Nor should the true thoughts, as
distinct from the mere presentations, which occur in sleep [be called dreams].
The dream proper is a presentation based on the movement of sense impressions,
when such presentation occurs during sleep, taking sleep in the strict
sense of the term.
There are cases of persons who in their whole lives have never
had a dream, while others dream when considerably advanced in years, having
never dreamed before. The cause of their not having dreams appears somewhat
like that which operates in the case of infants, and
that which
operates
immediately after meals. It is intelligibleenough that no dream-presentation
should occur to persons whose natural constitution is such that in them
copious evaporation is borne upwards, which, when borne back downwards,
causes a large quantity of motion. But it is not surprising that, as age
advances, a dream should at length appear to them. Indeed, it is inevitable
that, as a change is wrought in them in proportion to age or emotional
experience, this reversal [from non-dreaming to dreaming] should occur
also.
THE END
|
