Aristotle
384-322 B.C.E. - Wrote in Greek
Topics
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
Topics
By Aristotle
Book I
Part 1
Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able
to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem
propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument,
avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. First, then, we must say what
reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical
reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before
us.
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid
down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them.
(a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premisses from which the reasoning
starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has
originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning,
on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are
generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed
on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to
the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the
why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command
belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are 'generally
accepted' which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the
philosophers-i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and
illustrious of them. Again (c), reasoning is 'contentious' if it starts
from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not really such,
or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to
be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally
accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which
we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as
happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the
nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even
to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious
reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called 'reasoning'
as well, but the other should be called 'contentious reasoning', but not
'reasoning', since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further
(d), besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings
that start from the premisses peculiar to the special sciences, as happens
(for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this
form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above;
the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true
and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the
definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by every
one or by the majority or by philosophers-that is to say, by all, or by
most, or by the most illustrious of them-but he conducts his reasoning
upon assumptions which, though appropriate to the science in question,
are not true; for he effects his mis-reasoning either by describing the
semicircles wrongly or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they
could not be drawn.
The foregoing must stand for an outline survey of the species of
reasoning. In general, in regard both to all that we have already discussed
and to those which we shall discuss later, we may remark that that amount
of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose to
give the exact definition of any of them; we merely want to describe them
in outline; we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line
of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort
of way.
Part 2
Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and
for what purposes the treatise is useful. They are three-intellectual training,
casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences. That it is useful as
a training is obvious on the face of it. The possession of a plan of inquiry
will enable us more easily to argue about the subject proposed. For purposes
of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up the
opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other
people's convictions but of their own, while we shift the ground of any
argument that they appear to us to state unsoundly. For the study of the
philosophical sciences it is useful, because the ability to raise searching
difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more easily
the truth and error about the several points that arise. It has a further
use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several
sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles
proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are
the prius of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held
on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task
belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is
a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all
inquiries.
Part 3
We shall be in perfect possession of the way to proceed when we
are in a position like that which we occupy in regard to rhetoric and medicine
and faculties of that kind: this means the doing of that which we choose
with the materials that are available. For it is not every method that
the rhetorician will employ to persuade, or the doctor to heal; still,
if he omits none of the available means, we shall say that his grasp of
the science is adequate.
Part 4
First, then, we must see of what parts our inquiry consists. Now
if we were to grasp (a) with reference to how many, and what kind of, things
arguments take place, and with what materials they start, and (h) how we
are to become well supplied with these, we should have sufficiently won
our goal. Now the materials with which arguments start are equal in number,
and are identical, with the subjects on which reasonings take place. For
arguments start with 'propositions', while the subjects on which reasonings
take place are 'problems'. Now every proposition and every problem indicates
either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident-for the differentia too,
applying as it does to a class (or genus), should be ranked together with
the genus. Since, however, of what is peculiar to anything part signifies
its essence, while part does not, let us divide the 'peculiar' into both
the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the essence a 'definition',
while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally
current about these things, and speak of it as a 'property'. What we have
said, then, makes it clear that according to our present division, the
elements turn out to be four, all told, namely either property or definition
or genus or accident. Do not let any one suppose us to mean that each of
these enunciated by itself constitutes a proposition or problem, but only
that it is from these that both problems and propositions are formed. The
difference between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn
of the phrase. For if it be put in this way, "'An animal that walks on
two feet" is the definition of man, is it not?' or '"Animal" is the genus
of man, is it not?' the result is a proposition: but if thus, 'Is "an animal
that walks on two feet" a definition of man or no?' [or 'Is "animal" his
genus or no?'] the result is a problem. Similarly too in other cases. Naturally,
then, problems and propositions are equal in number: for out of every proposition
you will make a problem if you change the turn of the
phrase.
Part 5
We must now say what are 'definition', 'property', 'genus', and
'accident'. A 'definition' is a phrase signifying a thing's essence. It
is rendered in the form either of a phrase in lieu of a term, or of a phrase
in lieu of another phrase; for it is sometimes possible to define the meaning
of a phrase as well. People whose rendering consists of a term only, try
it as they may, clearly do not render the definition of the thing in question,
because a definition is always a phrase of a certain kind. One may, however,
use the word 'definitory' also of such a remark as 'The "becoming" is "beautiful"',
and likewise also of the question, 'Are sensation and knowledge the same
or different?', for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with
questions of sameness and difference. In a word we may call 'definitory'
everything that falls under the same branch of inquiry as definitions;
and that all the above-mentioned examples are of this character is clear
on the face of them. For if we are able to argue that two things are the
same or are different, we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument
with lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have shown
that they are not the same we shall have demolished the definition. Observe,
please, that the converse of this last statement does not hold: for to
show that they are the same is not enough to establish a definition. To
show, however, that they are not the same is enough of itself to overthrow
it.
A 'property' is a predicate which does not indicate the essence
of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly
of it. Thus it is a property of man to-be-capable of learning grammar:
for if A be a man, then he is capable of learning grammar, and if he be
capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything a 'property'
which may possibly belong to something else, e.g. 'sleep' in the case of
man, even though at a certain time it may happen to belong to him alone.
That is to say, if any such thing were actually to be called a property,
it will be called not a 'property' absolutely, but a 'temporary' or a 'relative'
property: for 'being on the right hand side' is a temporary property, while
'two-footed' is in point of fact ascribed as a property in certain relations;
e.g. it is a property of man relatively to a horse and a dog. That nothing
which may belong to anything else than A is a convertible predicate of
A is clear: for it does not necessarily follow that if something is asleep
it is a man.
A 'genus' is what is predicated in the category of essence of a
number of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicates
in the category of essence all such things as it would be appropriate to
mention in reply to the question, 'What is the object before you?'; as,
for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it is appropriate
to say 'He is an animal'. The question, 'Is one thing in the same genus
as another or in a different one?' is also a 'generic' question; for a
question of that kind as well falls under the same branch of inquiry as
the genus: for having argued that 'animal' is the genus of man, and likewise
also of ox, we shall have argued that they are in the same genus; whereas
if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other, we shall
have argued that these things are not in the same genus.
An 'accident' is (i) something which, though it is none of the
foregoing-i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus yet belongs
to the thing: (something which may possibly either belong or not belong
to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the 'sitting posture' may
belong or not belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also 'whiteness',
for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white,
and at another not white. Of the definitions of accident the second is
the better: for if he adopts the first, any one is bound, if he is to understand
it, to know already what 'definition' and 'genus' and 'property' are, whereas
the second is sufficient of itself to tell us the essential meaning of
the term in question. To Accident are to be attached also all comparisons
of things together, when expressed in language that is drawn in any kind
of way from what happens (accidit) to be true of them; such as, for example,
the question, 'Is the honourable or the expedient preferable?' and 'Is
the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?', and
any other problem which may happen to be phrased in terms like these. For
in all such cases the question is 'to which of the two does the predicate
in question happen (accidit) to belong more closely?' It is clear on the
face of it that there is nothing to prevent an accident from becoming a
temporary or relative property. Thus the sitting posture is an accident,
but will be a temporary property, whenever a man is the only person sitting,
while if he be not the only one sitting, it is still a property relatively
to those who are not sitting. So then, there is nothing to prevent an accident
from becoming both a relative and a temporary property; but a property
absolutely it will never be.
Part 6
We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism
of a 'property' and 'genus' and 'accident' will be applicable to 'definitions'
as well. For when we have shown that the attribute in question fails to
belong only to the term defined, as we do also in the case of a property,
or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus, or
that any of the things mentioned in the phrase used does not belong, as
would be remarked also in the case of an accident, we shall have demolished
the definition; so that, to use the phrase previously employed,' all the
points we have enumerated might in a certain sense be called 'definitory'.
But we must not on this account expect to find a single line of inquiry
which will apply universally to them all: for this is not an easy thing
to find, and, even were one found, it would be very obscure indeed, and
of little service for the treatise before us. Rather, a special plan of
inquiry must be laid down for each of the classes we have distinguished,
and then, starting from the rules that are appropriate in each case, it
will probably be easier to make our way right through the task before us.
So then, as was said before,' we must outline a division of our subject,
and other questions we must relegate each to the particular branch to which
it most naturally belongs, speaking of them as 'definitory' and 'generic'
questions. The questions I mean have practically been already assigned
to their several branches.
Part 7
First of all we must define the number of senses borne by the term
'Sameness'. Sameness would be generally regarded as falling, roughly speaking,
into three divisions. We generally apply the term numerically or specifically
or generically-numerically in cases where there is more than one name but
only one thing, e.g. 'doublet' and 'cloak'; specifically, where there is
more than one thing, but they present no differences in respect of their
species, as one man and another, or one horse and another: for things like
this that fall under the same species are said to be 'specifically the
same'. Similarly, too, those things are called generically the same which
fall under the same genus, such as a horse and a man. It might appear that
the sense in which water from the same spring is called 'the same water'
is somehow different and unlike the senses mentioned above: but really
such a case as this ought to be ranked in the same class with the things
that in one way or another are called 'the same' in view of unity of species.
For all such things seem to be of one family and to resemble one another.
For the reaon why all water is said to be specifically the same as all
other water is because of a certain likeness it bears to it, and the only
difference in the case of water drawn from the same spring is this, that
the likeness is more emphatic: that is why we do not distinguish it from
the things that in one way or another are called 'the same' in view of
unity of species. It is generally supposed that the term 'the same' is
most used in a sense agreed on by every one when applied to what is numerically
one. But even so, it is apt to be rendered in more than one sense; its
most literal and primary use is found whenever the sameness is rendered
in reference to an alternative name or definition, as when a cloak is said
to be the same as a doublet, or an animal that walks on two feet is said
to be the same as a man: a second sense is when it is rendered in reference
to a property, as when what can acquire knowledge is called the same as
a man, and what naturally travels upward the same as fire: while a third
use is found when it is rendered in reference to some term drawn from Accident,
as when the creature who is sitting, or who is musical, is called the same
as Socrates. For all these uses mean to signify numerical unity. That what
I have just said is true may be best seen where one form of appellation
is substituted for another. For often when we give the order to call one
of the people who are sitting down, indicating him by name, we change our
description, whenever the person to whom we give the order happens not
to understand us; he will, we think, understand better from some accidental
feature; so we bid him call to us 'the man who is sitting' or 'who is conversing
over there'-clearly supposing ourselves to be indicating the same object
by its name and by its accident.
Part 8
Of 'sameness' then, as has been said,' three senses are to be distinguished.
Now one way to confirm that the elements mentioned above are those out
of which and through which and to which arguments proceed, is by induction:
for if any one were to survey propositions and problems one by one, it
would be seen that each was formed either from the definition of something
or from its property or from its genus or from its accident. Another way
to confirm it is through reasoning. For every predicate of a subject must
of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is
convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies
the essence, it is the definition; if not, it is a property: for this was
what a property is, viz. what is predicated convertibly, but does not signify
the essence. If, on the other hand, it is not predicated convertibly of
the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition
of the subject: and if it be one of those terms, then it will be the genus
or the differentia, inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae;
whereas, if it be not one of those terms, clearly it would be an accident,
for accident was said' to be what belongs as an attribute to a subject
without being either its definition or its genus or a
property.
Part 9
Next, then, we must distinguish between the classes of predicates
in which the four orders in question are found. These are ten in number:
Essence, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Position, State, Activity,
Passivity. For the accident and genus and property and definition of anything
will always be in one of these categories: for all the propositions found
through these signify either something's essence or its quality or quantity
or some one of the other types of predicate. It is clear, too, on the face
of it that the man who signifies something's essence signifies sometimes
a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes some one of the other types
of predicate. For when man is set before him and he says that what is set
there is 'a man' or 'an animal', he states its essence and signifies a
substance; but when a white colour is set before him and he says that what
is set there is 'white' or is 'a colour', he states its essence and signifies
a quality. Likewise, also, if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him
and he says that what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit, he will be
describing its essence and signifying a quantity. Likewise, also, in the
other cases: for each of these kinds of predicate, if either it be asserted
of itself, or its genus be asserted of it, signifies an essence: if, on
the other hand, one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind, it does
not signify an essence, but a quantity or a quality or one of the other
kinds of predicate. Such, then, and so many, are the subjects on which
arguments take place, and the materials with which they start. How we are
to acquire them, and by what means we are to become well supplied with
them, falls next to be told.
Part 10
First, then, a definition must be given of a 'dialectical proposition'
and a 'dialectical problem'. For it is not every proposition nor yet every
problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in his senses
would make a proposition of what no one holds, nor yet make a problem of
what is obvious to everybody or to most people: for the latter admits of
no doubt, while to the former no one would assent. Now a dialectical proposition
consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or
by the philosophers, i.e. either by all, or by most, or by the most notable
of these, provided it be not contrary to the general opinion; for a man
would probably assent to the view of the philosophers, if it be not contrary
to the opinions of most men. Dialectical propositions also include views
which are like those generally accepted; also propositions which contradict
the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted, and
also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts. Thus,
supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is
the same, it might probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception
of contraries is the same: also, supposing it to be a general opinion that
there is but one single science of grammar, it might pass for a general
opinion that there is but one science of flute-playing as well, whereas,
if it be a general opinion that there is more than one science of grammar,
it might pass for a general opinion that there is more than one science
of flute-playing as well: for all these seem to be alike and akin. Likewise,
also, propositions contradicting the contraries of general opinions will
pass as general opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought
to do good to one's friends, it will also be a general opinion that one
ought not to do them harm. Here, that one ought to do harm to one's friends
is contrary to the general view, and that one ought not to do them harm
is the contradictory of that contrary. Likewise also, if one ought to do
good to one's friends, one ought not to do good to one's enemies: this
too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the general view; the
contrary being that one ought to do good to one's enemies. Likewise, also,
in other cases. Also, on comparison, it will look like a general opinion
that the contrary predicate belongs to the contrary subject: e.g. if one
ought to do good to one's friends, one ought also to do evil to one's enemies.
it might appear also as if doing good to one's friends were a contrary
to doing evil to one's enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality
as well will be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries.
Clearly also, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical
propositions; for people are likely to assent to the views held by those
who have made a study of these things, e.g. on a question of medicine they
will agree with the doctor, and on a question of geometry with the geometrician;
and likewise also in other cases.
Part 11
A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes
either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either
by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It
must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion either
way, or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers, or the
philosophers to the masses, or each of them among themselves. For some
problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance, e.g.
whether pleasure is to be chosen or not, while some it is useful to know
merely with a view to knowledge, e.g. whether the universe is eternal or
not: others, again, are not useful in and by themselves for either of these
purposes, but yet help us in regard to some such problems; for there are
many things which we do not wish to know in and by themselves, but for
the sake of other things, in order that through them we may come to know
something else. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings
conflict (the difficulty then being whether so-and so is so or not, there
being convincing arguments for both views); others also in regard to which
we have no argument because they are so vast, and we find it difficult
to give our reasons, e.g. the question whether the universe is eternal
or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to
inquire.
Problems, then, and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid.
A 'thesis' is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts
with the general opinion; e.g. the view that contradiction is impossible,
as Antisthenes said; or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion;
or that Being is one, as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary
person expresses views contrary to men's usual opinions would be silly.
Or it may be a view about which we have a reasoned theory contrary to men's
usual opinions, e.g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need
not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician
who is a grammarian 'is' so without ever having 'come to be' so, or being
so eternally. For even if a man does not accept this view, he might do
so on the ground that it is reasonable.
Now a 'thesis' also is a problem, though a problem is not always
a thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about
them either way. That a thesis, however, also forms a problem, is clear:
for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass
of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis, or that the one
or the other class disagree among themselves, seeing that the thesis is
a supposition in conflict with general opinion. Practically all dialectical
problems indeed are now called 'theses'. But it should make no difference
whichever description is used; for our object in thus distinguishing them
has not been to create a terminology, but to recognize what differences
happen to be found between them.
Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only
one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or
perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour
the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment, while those who
are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. The subjects
should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration, nor yet
be too far removed from it: for the former cases admit of no doubt, while
the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the
trainer.
Part 12
Having drawn these definitions, we must distinguish how many species
there are of dialectical arguments. There is on the one hand Induction,
on the other Reasoning. Now what reasoning is has been said before: induction
is a passage from individuals to universals, e.g. the argument that supposing
the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer,
then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. Induction
is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use
of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men, though reasoning
is more forcible and effective against contradictious
people.
Part 13
The classes, then, of things about which, and of things out of
which, arguments are constructed, are to be distinguished in the way we
have said before. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with
reasonings are four: (1) the securing of propositions; (2) the power to
distinguish in how many senses particular expression is used; (3) the discovery
of the differences of things; (4) the investigation of likeness. The last
three, as well, are in a certain sense propositions: for it is possible
to make a proposition corresponding to each of them, e.g. (1) 'The desirable
may mean either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient'; and (2)
Sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be recovered again
after it has been lost, while the former cannot'; and (3) The relation
of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour'. The first
proposition depends upon the use of one term in several senses, the second
upon the differences of things, the third upon their
likenesses.
Part 14
Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding
to the number of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus
one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by
the philosophers, i.e. by all, or most, or the most notable of them; or
opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held; and, again,
all opinions that are in accordance with the arts. We must make propositions
also of the contradictories of opinions contrary to those that seem to
be generally held, as was laid down before. It is useful also to make them
by selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted, but also
those that are like these, e.g. 'The perception of contraries is the same'-the
knowledge of them being so-and 'we see by admission of something into ourselves,
not by an emission'; for so it is, too, in the case of the other senses;
for in hearing we admit something into ourselves; we do not emit; and we
taste in the same way. Likewise also in the other cases. Moreover, all
statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases, should be taken
as a principle or accepted position; for they are posited by those who
do not also see what exception there may be. We should select also from
the written handbooks of argument, and should draw up sketch-lists of them
upon each several kind of subject, putting them down under separate headings,
e.g. 'On Good', or 'On Life'-and that 'On Good' should deal with every
form of good, beginning with the category of essence. In the margin, too,
one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers, e.g. 'Empedocles
said that the elements of bodies were four': for any one might assent to
the saying of some generally accepted authority.
Of propositions and problems there are-to comprehend the matter
in outline-three divisions: for some are ethical propositions, some are
on natural philosophy, while some are logical. Propositions such as the
following are ethical, e.g. 'Ought one rather to obey one's parents or
the laws, if they disagree?'; such as this are logical, e.g. 'Is the knowledge
of opposites the same or not?'; while such as this are on natural philosophy,
e.g. 'Is the universe eternal or not?' Likewise also with problems. The
nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered
in a definition, but we have to try to recognize each of them by means
of the familiarity attained through induction, examining them in the light
of the illustrations given above.
For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according
to their truth, but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion.
All propositions should be taken in their most universal form; then, the
one should be made into many. E.g. 'The knowledge of opposites is the same';
next, 'The knowledge of contraries is the same', and that 'of relative
terms'. In the same way these two should again be divided, as long as division
is possible, e.g. the knowledge of 'good and evil', of 'white and black',
or 'cold and hot'. Likewise also in other cases.
Part 15
On the formation, then, of propositions, the above remarks are
enough. As regards the number of senses a term bears, we must not only
treat of those terms which bear different senses, but we must also try
to render their definitions; e.g. we must not merely say that justice and
courage are called 'good' in one sense, and that what conduces to vigour
and what conduces to health are called so in another, but also that the
former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves
have, the latter because they are productive of a certain result and not
because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. Similarly also in other
cases.
Whether a term bears a number of specific meanings or one only,
may be considered by the following means. First, look and see if its contrary
bears a number of meanings, whether the discrepancy between them be one
of kind or one of names. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed
even in the names; e.g. the contrary of 'sharp' in the case of a note is
'flat', while in the case of a solid edge it is 'dull'. Clearly, then,
the contrary of 'sharp' bears several meanings, and if so, also does 'sharp';
for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary
will be different. For 'sharp' will not be the same when contrary to 'dull'
and to 'flat', though 'sharp' is the contrary of each. Again Barhu ('flat',
'heavy') in the case of a note has 'sharp' as its contrary, but in the
case of a solid mass 'light', so that Barhu is used with a number of meanings,
inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. Likewise, also, 'fine' as applied
to a picture has 'ugly' as its contrary, but, as applied to a house, 'ramshackle';
so that 'fine' is an ambiguous term.
In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names
used, but a difference of kind between the meanings is at once obvious:
e.g. in the case of 'clear' and 'obscure': for sound is called 'clear'
and 'obscure', just as 'colour' is too. As regards the names, then, there
is no discrepancy, but the difference in kind between the meanings is at
once obvious: for colour is not called 'clear' in a like sense to sound.
This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same in
kind we have the same sensation, whereas we do not judge clearness by the
same sensation in the case of sound and of colour, but in the latter case
we judge by sight, in the former by hearing. Likewise also with 'sharp'
and 'dull' in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case
we judge by touch, but in the former by taste. For here again there is
no discrepancy in the names used, in the case either of the original terms
or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense
is 'dull'.
Moreover, see if one sense of a term has a contrary, while another
has absolutely none; e.g. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the
pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate
with the side has none, so that 'pleasure' is used in more than one sense.
To 'love' also, used of the frame of mind, has to 'hate' as its contrary,
while as used of the physical activity (kissing) it has none: clearly,
therefore, to 'love' is an ambiguous term. Further, see in regard to their
intermediates, if some meanings and their contraries have an intermediate,
others have none, or if both have one but not the same one, e.g. 'clear'
and 'obscure' in the case of colours have 'grey' as an intermediate, whereas
in the case of sound they have none, or, if they have, it is 'harsh', as
some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate. 'Clear', then, is an
ambiguous term, and likewise also 'obscure'. See, moreover, if some of
them have more than one intermediate, while others have but one, as is
the case with 'clear' and 'obscure', for in the case of colours there are
numbers of intermediates, whereas in regard to sound there is but one,
viz. 'harsh'.
Again, in the case of the contradictory opposite, look and see
if it bears more than one meaning. For if this bears more than one meaning,
then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning; e.g.
'to fail to see' a phrase with more than one meaning, viz. (1) to fail
to possess the power of sight, (2) to fail to put that power to active
use. But if this has more than one meaning, it follows necessarily that
'to see' also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite
to each sense of 'to fail to see'; e.g. the opposite of 'not to possess
the power of sight' is to possess it, while of 'not to put the power of
sight to active use', the opposite is to put it to active
use.
Moreover, examine the case of terms that denote the privation or
presence of a certain state: for if the one term bears more than one meaning,
then so will the remaining term: e.g. if 'to have sense' be used with more
than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body, then 'to be wanting
in sense' too will be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the
soul and to the body. That the opposition between the terms now in question
depends upon the privation or presence of a certain state is clear, since
animals naturally possess each kind of 'sense', both as applied to the
soul and as applied to the body.
Moreover, examine the inflected forms. For if 'justly' has more
than one meaning, then 'just', also, will be used with more than one meaning;
for there will be a meaning of 'just' to each of the meanings of 'justly';
e.g. if the word 'justly' be used of judging according to one's own opinion,
and also of judging as one ought, then 'just' also will be used in like
manner. In the same way also, if 'healthy' has more than one meaning, then
'healthily' also will be used with more than one meaning: e.g. if 'healthy'
describes both what produces health and what preserves health and what
betokens health, then 'healthily' also will be used to mean 'in such a
way as to produce' or 'preserve' or 'betoken' health. Likewise also in
other cases, whenever the original term bears more than one meaning, the
inflexion also that is formed from it will be used with more than one meaning,
and vice versa.
Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term,
and see if they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same,
then clearly the term is ambiguous: e.g. 'good' in the case of food means
'productive of pleasure', and in the case of medicine 'productive of health',
whereas as applied to the soul it means to be of a certain quality, e.g.
temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also, as applied to 'man'.
Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, as (e.g.) the good
that happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called
good. Often it signifies what is of certain quantity, e.g. as applied to
the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. So then the
term 'good' is ambiguous. In the same way also 'clear', as applied to a
body, signifies a colour, but in regard to a note it denotes what is 'easy
to hear'. 'Sharp', too, is in a closely similar case: for the same term
does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note
is a swift note, as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us, whereas
a sharp (acute) angle is one that is less than a right angle, while a sharp
dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point).
Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term,
and see if they are different without being subaltern, as (e.g.) 'donkey',
which denotes both the animal and the engine. For the definition of them
that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared
to be an animal of a certain kind, and the other to be an engine of a certain
kind. If, however, the genera be subaltern, there is no necessity for the
definitions to be different. Thus (e.g.) 'animal' is the genus of 'raven',
and so is 'bird'. Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird, we
also say that it is a certain kind of animal, so that both the genera are
predicated of it. Likewise also whenever we call the raven a 'flying biped
animal', we declare it to be a bird: in this way, then, as well, both the
genera are predicated of raven, and also their definition. But in the case
of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen, for whenever we
call a thing an 'engine', we do not call it an animal, nor vice
versa.
Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before you
are different without being subaltern, but also in the case of its contrary:
for if its contrary bears several senses, clearly the term before you does
so as well.
It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the
use of the term in combination, e.g. of a 'clear (lit. white) body' of
a 'clear note'. For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted,
the same expression ought to remain over. This does not happen in the case
of ambiguous terms, e.g. in the cases just mentioned. For the former will
be body possessing such and such a colour', while the latter will be 'a
note easy to hear'. Abstract, then, 'a body 'and' a note', and the remainder
in each case is not the same. It should, however, have been had the meaning
of 'clear' in each case been synonymous.
Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares,
and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e.g.)
any one describes what betokens and what produces health as 'related commensurably
to health', we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has
used the term 'commensurably' in each case, e.g. if in the latter case
it means that 'it is of the right amount to produce health', whereas in
the for it means that 'it is such as to betoken what kind of state
prevails'.
Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared as 'more or less'
or as 'in like manner', as is the case (e.g.) with a 'clear' (lit. white)
sound and a 'clear' garment, and a 'sharp' flavour and a 'sharp' note.
For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp 'in a like degree',
nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. 'Clear',
then, and 'sharp' are ambiguous. For synonyms are always comparable; for
they will always be used either in like manner, or else in a greater degree
in one case.
Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern
the differentiae also are different in kind, e.g. those of 'animal' and
'knowledge' (for the differentiae of these are different), look and see
if the meanings comprised under the same term are differentiae of genera
that are different without being subaltern, as e.g. 'sharp' is of a 'note'
and a 'solid'. For being 'sharp' differentiates note from note, and likewise
also one solid from another. 'Sharp', then, is an ambiguous term: for it
forms differentiae of genera that are different without being
subaltern.
Again, see if the actual meanings included under the same term
themselves have different differentiae, e.g. 'colour' in bodies and 'colour'
in tunes: for the differentiae of 'colour' in bodies are 'sight-piercing'
and 'sight compressing', whereas 'colour' in melodies has not the same
differentiae. Colour, then, is an ambiguous term; for things that are the
same have the same differentiae.
Moreover, since the species is never the differentia of anything,
look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species
and another a differentia, as (e.g.) clear' (lit. white) as applied to
a body is a species of colour, whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia;
for one note is differentiated from another by being
'clear'.
Part 16
The presence, then, of a number of meanings in a term may be investigated
by these and like means. The differences which things present to each other
should be examined within the same genera, e.g. 'Wherein does justice differ
from courage, and wisdom from temperance?'-for all these belong to the
same genus; and also from one genus to another, provided they be not very
much too far apart, e.g. 'Wherein does sensation differ from knowledge?:
for in the case of genera that are very far apart, the differences are
entirely obvious.
Part 17
Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging
to different genera, the formulae being 'A:B = C:D' (e.g. as knowledge
stands to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the object
of sensation), and 'As A is in B, so is C in D' (e.g. as sight is in the
eye, so is reason in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea, so is windlessness
in the air). Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that
are far apart; for in the case of the rest, we shall be more easily able
to see in one glance the points of likeness. We should also look at things
which belong to the same genus, to see if any identical attribute belongs
to them all, e.g. to a man and a horse and a dog; for in so far as they
have any identical attribute, in so far they are alike.
Part 18
It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term
both for clearness' sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he
asserts, if it bas been made clear to him how many meanings it may have),
and also with a view to ensuring that our reasonings shall be in accordance
with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the term used. For as
long as it is not clear in how many senses a term is used, it is possible
that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon
the same thing: whereas when once it has been made clear how many meanings
there are, and also upon which of them the former directs his mind when
he makes his assertion, the questioner would then look ridiculous if he
failed to address his argument to this. It helps us also both to avoid
being misled and to mislead by false reasoning: for if we know the number
of meanings of a term, we shall certainly never be misled by false reasoning,
but shall know if the questioner fails to address his argument to the same
point; and when we ourselves put the questions we shall be able to mislead
him, if our answerer happens not to know the number of meanings of our
terms. This, however, is not possible in all cases, but only when of the
many senses some are true and others are false. This manner of argument,
however, does not belong properly to dialectic; dialecticians should therefore
by all means beware of this kind of verbal discussion, unless any one is
absolutely unable to discuss the subject before him in any other
way.
The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings
about sameness and difference, and also in recognizing what any particular
thing is. That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is
clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever between
the objects before us, we shall already have shown that they are not the
same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is, because we usually
distinguish the expression that is proper to the essence of each particular
thing by means of the differentiae that are proper to
it.
The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive
arguments and to hypothetical reasonings, and also with a view to the rendering
of definitions. It is useful for inductive arguments, because it is by
means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim
to bring the universal in evidence: for it is not easy to do this if we
do not know the points of likeness. It is useful for hypothetical reasonings
because it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one
is true also of the rest. If, then, with regard to any of them we are well
supplied with matter for a discussion, we shall secure a preliminary admission
that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the case before us:
then when we have shown the former we shall have shown, on the strength
of the hypothesis, the matter before us as well: for we have first made
the hypothesis that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the
case before us, and have then proved the point as regards these cases.
It is useful for the rendering of definitions because, if we are able to
see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it, we shall
be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object before us when
we define it: for of the common predicates that which is most definitely
in the category of essence is likely to be the genus. Likewise, also, in
the case of objects widely divergent, the examination of likeness is useful
for purposes of definition, e.g. the sameness of a calm at sea, and windlessness
in the air (each being a form of rest), and of a point on a line and the
unit in number-each being a starting point. If, then, we render as the
genus what is common to all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining
not inappropriately. Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in
this way: they declare the unit to be the startingpoint of number, and
the point the startingpoint of a line. It is clear, then, that they place
them in that which is common to both as their genus.
The means, then, whereby reasonings are effected, are these: the
commonplace rules, for the observance of which the aforesaid means are
useful, are as follows.
Topics
By Aristotle
Book II
Part 1
Of problems some are universal, others particular. Universal problems are
such as 'Every pleasure is good' and 'No pleasure is good'; particular
problems are such as 'Some pleasure is good' and 'Some pleasure is not
good'. The methods of establishing and overthrowing a view universally
are common to both kinds of problems; for when we have shown that a predicate
belongs in every case, we shall also have shown that it belongs in some
cases. Likewise, also, if we show that it does not belong in any case,
we shall also have shown that it does not belong in every case. First,
then, we must speak of the methods of overthrowing a view universally,
because such are common to both universal and particular problems, and
because people more usually introduce theses asserting a predicate than
denying it, while those who argue with them overthrow it. The conversion
of an appropriate name which is drawn from the element 'accident' is an
extremely precarious thing; for in the case of accidents and in no other
it is possible for something to be true conditionally and not universally.
Names drawn from the elements 'definition' and 'property' and 'genus' are
bound to be convertible; e.g. if 'to be an animal that walks on two feet
is an attribute of S', then it will be true by conversion to say that 'S
is an animal that walks on two feet'. Likewise, also, if drawn from the
genus; for if 'to be an animal is an attribute of S', then 'S is an animal'.
The same is true also in the case of a property; for if 'to be capable
of learning grammar is an attribute of S', then 'S will be capable of learning
grammar'. For none of these attributes can possibly belong or not belong
in part; they must either belong or not belong absolutely. In the case
of accidents, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent an attribute
(e.g. whiteness or justice) belonging in part, so that it is not enough
to show that whiteness or justice is an attribute of a man in order to
show that he is white or just; for it is open to dispute it and say that
he is white or just in part only. Conversion, then, is not a necessary
process in the case of accidents.
We must also define the errors that occur in problems. They are
of two kinds, caused either by false statement or by transgression of the
established diction. For those who make false statements, and say that
an attribute belongs to thing which does not belong to it, commit error;
and those who call objects by the names of other objects (e.g. calling
a planetree a 'man') transgress the established terminology.
Part 2
Now one commonplace rule is to look and see if a man has ascribed
as an accident what belongs in some other way. This mistake is most commonly
made in regard to the genera of things, e.g. if one were to say that white
happens (accidit) to be a colour-for being a colour does not happen by
accident to white, but colour is its genus. The assertor may of course
define it so in so many words, saying (e.g.) that 'Justice happens (accidit)
to be a virtue'; but often even without such definition it is obvious that
he has rendered the genus as an accident; e.g. suppose that one were to
say that whiteness is coloured or that walking is in motion. For a predicate
drawn from the genus is never ascribed to the species in an inflected form,
but always the genera are predicated of their species literally; for the
species take on both the name and the definition of their genera. A man
therefore who says that white is 'coloured' has not rendered 'coloured'
as its genus, seeing that he has used an inflected form, nor yet as its
property or as its definition: for the definition and property of a thing
belong to it and to nothing else, whereas many things besides white are
coloured, e.g. a log, a stone, a man, and a horse. Clearly then he renders
it as an accident.
Another rule is to examine all cases where a predicate has been
either asserted or denied universally to belong to something. Look at them
species by species, and not in their infinite multitude: for then the inquiry
will proceed more directly and in fewer steps. You should look and begin
with the most primary groups, and then proceed in order down to those that
are not further divisible: e.g. if a man has said that the knowledge of
opposites is the same, you should look and see whether it be so of relative
opposites and of contraries and of terms signifying the privation or presence
of certain states, and of contradictory terms. Then, if no clear result
be reached so far in these cases, you should again divide these until you
come to those that are not further divisible, and see (e.g.) whether it
be so of just deeds and unjust, or of the double and the half, or of blindness
and sight, or of being and not-being: for if in any case it be shown that
the knowledge of them is not the same we shall have demolished the problem.
Likewise, also, if the predicate belongs in no case. This rule is convertible
for both destructive and constructive purposes: for if, when we have suggested
a division, the predicate appears to hold in all or in a large number of
cases, we may then claim that the other should actually assert it universally,
or else bring a negative instance to show in what case it is not so: for
if he does neither of these things, a refusal to assert it will make him
look absurd.
Another rule is to make definitions both of an accident and of
its subject, either of both separately or else of one of them, and then
look and see if anything untrue has been assumed as true in the definitions.
Thus (e.g.) to see if it is possible to wrong a god, ask what is 'to wrong'?
For if it be 'to injure deliberately', clearly it is not possible for a
god to be wronged: for it is impossible that God should be injured. Again,
to see if the good man is jealous, ask who is the 'jealous' man and what
is 'jealousy'. For if 'jealousy' is pain at the apparent success of some
well-behaved person, clearly the good man is not jealous: for then he would
be bad. Again, to see if the indignant man is jealous, ask who each of
them is: for then it will be obvious whether the statement is true or false;
e.g. if he is 'jealous' who grieves at the successes of the good, and he
is 'indignant' who grieves at the successes of the evil, then clearly the
indignant man would not be jealous. A man should substitute definitions
also for the terms contained in his definitions, and not stop until he
comes to a familiar term: for often if the definition be rendered whole,
the point at issue is not cleared up, whereas if for one of the terms used
in the definition a definition be stated, it becomes
obvious.
Moreover, a man should make the problem into a proposition for
himself, and then bring a negative instance against it: for the negative
instance will be a ground of attack upon the assertion. This rule is very
nearly the same as the rule to look into cases where a predicate has been
attributed or denied universally: but it differs in the turn of the
argument.
Moreover, you should define what kind of things should be called
as most men call them, and what should not. For this is useful both for
establishing and for overthrowing a view: e.g. you should say that we ought
to use our terms to mean the same things as most people mean by them, but
when we ask what kind of things are or are not of such and such a kind,
we should not here go with the multitude: e.g. it is right to call 'healthy'
whatever tends to produce health, as do most men: but in saying whether
the object before us tends to produce health or not, we should adopt the
language no longer of the multitude but of the doctor.
Part 3
Moreover, if a term be used in several senses, and it has been
laid down that it is or that it is not an attribute of S, you should show
your case of one of its several senses, if you cannot show it of both.
This rule is to be observed in cases where the difference of meaning is
undetected; for supposing this to be obvious, then the other man will object
that the point which he himself questioned has not been discussed, but
only the other point. This commonplace rule is convertible for purposes
both of establishing and of overthrowing a view. For if we want to establish
a statement, we shall show that in one sense the attribute belongs, if
we cannot show it of both senses: whereas if we are overthrowing a statement,
we shall show that in one sense the attribute does not belong, if we cannot
show it of both senses. Of course, in overthrowing a statement there is
no need to start the discussion by securing any admission, either when
the statement asserts or when it denies the attribute universally: for
if we show that in any case whatever the attribute does not belong, we
shall have demolished the universal assertion of it, and likewise also
if we show that it belongs in a single case, we shall demolish the universal
denial of it. Whereas in establishing a statement we ought to secure a
preliminary admission that if it belongs in any case whatever, it belongs
universally, supposing this claim to be a plausible one. For it is not
enough to discuss a single instance in order to show that an attribute
belongs universally; e.g. to argue that if the soul of man be immortal,
then every soul is immortal, so that a previous admission must be secured
that if any soul whatever be immortal, then every soul is immortal. This
is not to be done in every case, but only whenever we are not easily able
to quote any single argument applying to all cases in common, as (e.g.)
the geometrician can argue that the triangle has its angles equal to two
right angles.
If, again, the variety of meanings of a term be obvious, distinguish
how many meanings it has before proceeding either to demolish or to establish
it: e.g. supposing 'the right' to mean 'the expedient' or 'the honourable',
you should try either to establish or to demolish both descriptions of
the subject in question; e.g. by showing that it is honourable and expedient,
or that it is neither honourable nor expedient. Supposing, however, that
it is impossible to show both, you should show the one, adding an indication
that it is true in the one sense and not in the other. The same rule applies
also when the number of senses into which it is divided is more than
two.
Again, consider those expressions whose meanings are many, but
differ not by way of ambiguity of a term, but in some other way: e.g. 'The
science of many things is one': here 'many things' may mean the end and
the means to that end, as (e.g.) medicine is the science both of producing
health and of dieting; or they may be both of them ends, as the science
of contraries is said to be the same (for of contraries the one is no more
an end than the other); or again they may be an essential and an accidental
attribute, as (e.g.) the essential fact that the triangle has its angles
equal to two right angles, and the accidental fact that the equilateral
figure has them so: for it is because of the accident of the equilateral
triangle happening to be a triangle that we know that it has its angles
equal to two right angles. If, then, it is not possible in any sense of
the term that the science of many things should be the same, it clearly
is altogether impossible that it should be so; or, if it is possible in
some sense, then clearly it is possible. Distinguish as many meanings as
are required: e.g. if we want to establish a view, we should bring forward
all such meanings as admit that view and should divide them only into those
meanings which also are required for the establishment of our case: whereas
if we want to overthrow a view, we should bring forward all that do not
admit that view, and leave the rest aside. We must deal also in these cases
as well with any uncertainty about the number of meanings involved. Further,
that one thing is, or is not, 'of' another should be established by means
of the same commonplace rules; e.g. that a particular science is of a particular
thing, treated either as an end or as a means to its end, or as accidentally
connected with it; or again that it is not 'of' it in any of the aforesaid
ways. The same rule holds true also of desire and all other terms that
have more than one object. For the 'desire of X' may mean the desire of
it as an end (e.g. the desire of health) or as a means to an end (e.g.
the desire of being doctored), or as a thing desired accidentally, as,
in the case of wine, the sweet-toothed person desires it not because it
is wine but because it is sweet. For essentially he desires the sweet,
and only accidentally the wine: for if it be dry, he no longer desires
it. His desire for it is therefore accidental. This rule is useful in dealing
with relative terms: for cases of this kind are generally cases of relative
terms.
Part 4
Moreover, it is well to alter a term into one more familiar, e.g.
to substitute 'clear' for 'exact' in describing a conception, and 'being
fussy' for 'being busy': for when the expression is made more familiar,
the thesis becomes easier to attack. This commonplace rule also is available
for both purposes alike, both for establishing and for overthrowing a
view.
In order to show that contrary attributes belong to the same thing,
look at its genus; e.g. if we want to show that rightness and wrongness
are possible in regard to perception, and to perceive is to judge, while
it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly, then in regard to perception
as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. In the present instance
the proof proceeds from the genus and relates to the species: for 'to judge'
is the genus of 'to -perceive'; for the man who perceives judges in a certain
way. But per contra it may proceed from the species to the genus: for all
the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well;
e.g. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good
disposition: for 'disposition' is the genus of knowledge. Now the former
commonplace argument is fallacious for purposes of establishing a view,
while the second is true. For there is no necessity that all the attributes
that belong to the genus should belong also to the species; for 'animal'
is flying and quadruped, but not so 'man'. All the attributes, on the other
hand, that belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus;
for if 'man' is good, then animal also is good. On the other hand, for
purposes of overthrowing a view, the former argument is true while the
latter is fallacious; for all the attributes which do not belong to the
genus do not belong to the species either; whereas all those that are wanting
to the species are not of necessity wanting to the genus.
Since those things of which the genus is predicated must also of
necessity have one of its species predicated of them, and since those things
that are possessed of the genus in question, or are described by terms
derived from that genus, must also of necessity be possessed of one of
its species or be described by terms derived from one of its species (e.g.
if to anything the term 'scientific knowledge' be applied, then also there
will be applied to it the term 'grammatical' or 'musical' knowledge, or
knowledge of one of the other sciences; and if any one possesses scientific
knowledge or is described by a term derived from 'science', then he will
also possess grammatical or musical knowledge or knowledge of one of the
other sciences, or will be described by a term derived from one of them,
e.g. as a 'grammarian' or a 'musician')-therefore if any expression be
asserted that is in any way derived from the genus (e.g. that the soul
is in motion), look and see whether it be possible for the soul to be moved
with any of the species of motion; whether (e.g.) it can grow or be destroyed
or come to be, and so forth with all the other species of motion. For if
it be not moved in any of these ways, clearly it does not move at all.
This commonplace rule is common for both purposes, both for overthrowing
and for establishing a view: for if the soul moves with one of the species
of motion, clearly it does move; while if it does not move with any of
the species of motion, clearly it does not move.
If you are not well equipped with an argument against the assertion,
look among the definitions, real or apparent, of the thing before you,
and if one is not enough, draw upon several. For it will be easier to attack
people when committed to a definition: for an attack is always more easily
made on definitions.
Moreover, look and see in regard to the thing in question, what
it is whose reality conditions the reality of the thing in question, or
what it is whose reality necessarily follows if the thing in question be
real: if you wish to establish a view inquire what there is on whose reality
the reality of the thing in question will follow (for if the former be
shown to be real, then the thing in question will also have been shown
to be real); while if you want to overthrow a view, ask what it is that
is real if the thing in question be real, for if we show that what follows
from the thing in question is unreal, we shall have demolished the thing
in question.
Moreover, look at the time involved, to see if there be any discrepancy
anywhere: e.g. suppose a man to have stated that what is being nourished
of necessity grows: for animals are always of necessity being nourished,
but they do not always grow. Likewise, also, if he has said that knowing
is remembering: for the one is concerned with past time, whereas the other
has to do also with the present and the future. For we are said to know
things present and future (e.g. that there will be an eclipse), whereas
it is impossible to remember anything save what is in the
past.
Part 5
Moreover, there is the sophistic turn of argument, whereby we draw
our opponent into the kind of statement against which we shall be well
supplied with lines of argument. This process is sometimes a real necessity,
sometimes an apparent necessity, sometimes neither an apparent nor a real
necessity. It is really necessary whenever the answerer has denied any
view that would be useful in attacking the thesis, and the questioner thereupon
addresses his arguments to the support of this view, and when moreover
the view in question happens to be one of a kind on which he has a good
stock of lines of argument. Likewise, also, it is really necessary whenever
he (the questioner) first, by an induction made by means of the view laid
down, arrives at a certain statement and then tries to demolish that statement:
for when once this has been demolished, the view originally laid down is
demolished as well. It is an apparent necessity, when the point to which
the discussion comes to be directed appears to be useful, and relevant
to the thesis, without being really so; whether it be that the man who
is standing up to the argument has refused to concede something, or whether
he (the questioner) has first reached it by a plausible induction based
upon the thesis and then tries to demolish it. The remaining case is when
the point to which the discussion comes to be directed is neither really
nor apparently necessary, and it is the answerer's luck to be confuted
on a mere side issue You should beware of the last of the aforesaid methods;
for it appears to be wholly disconnected from, and foreign to, the art
of dialectic. For this reason, moreover, the answerer should not lose his
temper, but assent to those statements that are of no use in attacking
the thesis, adding an indication whenever he assents although he does not
agree with the view. For, as a rule, it increases the confusion of questioners
if, after all propositions of this kind have been granted them, they can
then draw no conclusion.
Moreover, any one who has made any statement whatever has in a
certain sense made several statements, inasmuch as each statement has a
number of necessary consequences: e.g. the man who said 'X is a man' has
also said that it is an animal and that it is animate and a biped and capable
of acquiring reason and knowledge, so that by the demolition of any single
one of these consequences, of whatever kind, the original statement is
demolished as well. But you should beware here too of making a change to
a more difficult subject: for sometimes the consequence, and sometimes
the original thesis, is the easier to demolish.
Part 6
In regard to subjects which must have one and one only of two predicates,
as (e.g.) a man must have either a disease or health, supposing we are
well supplied as regards the one for arguing its presence or absence, we
shall be well equipped as regards the remaining one as well. This rule
is convertible for both purposes: for when we have shown that the one attribute
belongs, we shall have shown that the remaining one does not belong; while
if we show that the one does not belong, we shall have shown that the remaining
one does belong. Clearly then the rule is useful for both
purposes.
Moreover, you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term
in its literal meaning, with the implication that it is most fitting so
to take it rather than in its established meaning: e.g. the expression
'strong at heart' will suggest not the courageous man, according to the
use now established, but the man the state of whose heart is strong; just
as also the expression 'of a good hope' may be taken to mean the man who
hopes for good things. Likewise also 'well-starred' may be taken to mean
the man whose star is good, as Xenocrates says 'well-starred is he who
has a noble soul'.' For a man's star is his soul.
Some things occur of necessity, others usually, others however
it may chance; if therefore a necessary event has been asserted to occur
usually, or if a usual event (or, failing such an event itself, its contrary)
has been stated to occur of necessity, it always gives an opportunity for
attack. For if a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually, clearly
the speaker has denied an attribute to be universal which is universal,
and so has made a mistake: and so he has if he has declared the usual attribute
to be necessary: for then he declares it to belong universally when it
does not so belong. Likewise also if he has declared the contrary of what
is usual to be necessary. For the contrary of a usual attribute is always
a comparatively rare attribute: e.g. if men are usually bad, they are comparatively
seldom good, so that his mistake is even worse if he has declared them
to be good of necessity. The same is true also if he has declared a mere
matter of chance to happen of necessity or usually; for a chance event
happens neither of necessity nor usually. If the thing happens usually,
then even supposing his statement does not distinguish whether he meant
that it happens usually or that it happens necessarily, it is open to you
to discuss it on the assumption that he meant that it happens necessarily:
e.g. if he has stated without any distinction that disinherited persons
are bad, you may assume in discussing it that he means that they are so
necessarily.
Moreover, look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident
of itself, taking it to be a different thing because it has a different
name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy and delight and good
cheer: for all these are names of the same thing, to wit, Pleasure. If
then any one says that joyfulness is an accidental attribute of cheerfulness,
he would be declaring it to be an accidental attribute of
itself.
Part 7
Inasmuch as contraries can be conjoined with each other in six
ways, and four of these conjunctions constitute a contrariety, we must
grasp the subject of contraries, in order that it may help us both in demolishing
and in establishing a view. Well then, that the modes of conjunction are
six is clear: for either (1) each of the contrary verbs will be conjoined
to each of the contrary objects; and this gives two modes: e.g. to do good
to friends and to do evil to enemies, or per contra to do evil to friends
and to do good to enemies. Or else (2) both verbs may be attached to one
object; and this too gives two modes, e.g. to do good to friends and to
do evil to friends, or to do good to enemies and to do evil to enemies.
Or (3) a single verb may be attached to both objects: and this also gives
two modes; e.g. to do good to friends and to do good to enemies, or to
do evil to friends and evil to enemies.
The first two then of the aforesaid conjunctions do not constitute
any contrariety; for the doing of good to friends is not contrary to the
doing of evil to enemies: for both courses are desirable and belong to
the same disposition. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary to the
doing of good to enemies: for both of these are objectionable and belong
to the same disposition: and one objectionable thing is not generally thought
to be the contrary of another, unless the one be an expression denoting
an excess, and the other an expression denoting a defect: for an excess
is generally thought to belong to the class of objectionable things, and
likewise also a defect. But the other four all constitute a contrariety.
For to do good to friends is contrary to the doing of evil to friends:
for it proceeds from the contrary disposition, and the one is desirable,
and the other objectionable. The case is the same also in regard to the
other conjunctions: for in each combination the one course is desirable,
and the other objectionable, and the one belongs to a reasonable disposition
and the other to a bad. Clearly, then, from what has been said, the same
course has more than one contrary. For the doing of good to friends has
as its contrary both the doing of good to enemies and the doing of evil
to friends. Likewise, if we examine them in the same way, we shall find
that the contraries of each of the others also are two in number. Select
therefore whichever of the two contraries is useful in attacking the
thesis.
Moreover, if the accident of a thing have a contrary, see whether
it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question has been declared
to belong: for if the latter belongs the former could not belong; for it
is impossible that contrary predicates should belong at the same time to
the same thing.
Or again, look and see if anything has been said about something,
of such a kind that if it be true, contrary predicates must necessarily
belong to the thing: e.g. if he has said that the 'Ideas' exist in us.
For then the result will be that they are both in motion and at rest, and
moreover that they are objects both of sensation and of thought. For according
to the views of those who posit the existence of Ideas, those Ideas are
at rest and are objects of thought; while if they exist in us, it is impossible
that they should be unmoved: for when we move, it follows necessarily that
all that is in us moves with us as well. Clearly also they are objects
of sensation, if they exist in us: for it is through the sensation of sight
that we recognize the Form present in each individual.
Again, if there be posited an accident which has a contrary, look
and see if that which admits of the accident will admit of its contrary
as well: for the same thing admits of contraries. Thus (e.g.) if he has
asserted that hatred follows anger, hatred would in that case be in the
'spirited faculty': for that is where anger is. You should therefore look
and see if its contrary, to wit, friendship, be also in the 'spirited faculty':
for if not-if friendship is in the faculty of desire-then hatred could
not follow anger. Likewise also if he has asserted that the faculty of
desire is ignorant. For if it were capable of ignorance, it would be capable
of knowledge as well: and this is not generally held-I mean that the faculty
of desire is capable of knowledge. For purposes, then, of overthrowing
a view, as has been said, this rule should be observed: but for purposes
of establishing one, though the rule will not help you to assert that the
accident actually belongs, it will help you to assert that it may possibly
belong. For having shown that the thing in question will not admit of the
contrary of the accident asserted, we shall have shown that the accident
neither belongs nor can possibly belong; while on the other hand, if we
show that the contrary belongs, or that the thing is capable of the contrary,
we shall not indeed as yet have shown that the accident asserted does belong
as well; our proof will merely have gone to this point, that it is possible
for it to belong.
Part 8
Seeing that the modes of opposition are four in number, you should
look for arguments among the contradictories of your terms, converting
the order of their sequence, both when demolishing and when establishing
a view, and you should secure them by means of induction-such arguments
(e.g.) as that man be an animal, what is not an animal is not a man': and
likewise also in other instances of contradictories. For in those cases
the sequence is converse: for 'animal' follows upon 'man but 'not-animal'
does not follow upon 'not-man', but conversely 'not-man' upon 'not-animal'.
In all cases, therefore, a postulate of this sort should be made, (e.g.)
that 'If the honourable is pleasant, what is not pleasant is not honourable,
while if the latter be untrue, so is the former'. Likewise, also, 'If what
is not pleasant be not honourable, then what is honourable is pleasant'.
Clearly, then, the conversion of the sequence formed by contradiction of
the terms of the thesis is a method convertible for both
purposes.
Then look also at the case of the contraries of S and P in the
thesis, and see if the contrary of the one follows upon the contrary of
the other, either directly or conversely, both when you are demolishing
and when you are establishing a view: secure arguments of this kind as
well by means of induction, so far as may be required. Now the sequence
is direct in a case such as that of courage and cowardice: for upon the
one of them virtue follows, and vice upon the other; and upon the one it
follows that it is desirable, while upon the other it follows that it is
objectionable. The sequence, therefore, in the latter case also is direct;
for the desirable is the contrary of the objectionable. Likewise also in
other cases. The sequence is, on the other hand, converse in such a case
as this: Health follows upon vigour, but disease does not follow upon debility;
rather debility follows upon disease. In this case, then, clearly the sequence
is converse. Converse sequence is, however, rare in the case of contraries;
usually the sequence is direct. If, therefore, the contrary of the one
term does not follow upon the contrary of the other either directly or
conversely, clearly neither does the one term follow upon the other in
the statement made: whereas if the one followed the other in the case of
the contraries, it must of necessity do so as well in the original
statement.
You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of
a state in like manner to the case of contraries. Only, in the case of
such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence is always
bound to be direct: e.g. as sensation follows sight, while absence of sensation
follows blindness. For the opposition of sensation to absence of sensation
is an opposition of the presence to the privation of a state: for the one
of them is a state, and the other the privation of it.
The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner
to that of a state and its privation: for the sequence of these as well
is direct; e.g. if 3/1 is a multiple, then 1/3 is a fraction: for 3/1 is
relative to 1/3, and so is a multiple to a fraction. Again, if knowledge
be a conceiving, then also the object of knowledge is an object of conception;
and if sight be a sensation, then also the object of sight is an object
of sensation. An objection may be made that there is no necessity for the
sequence to take place, in the case of relative terms, in the way described:
for the object of sensation is an object of knowledge, whereas sensation
is not knowledge. The objection is, however, not generally received as
really true; for many people deny that there is knowledge of objects of
sensation. Moreover, the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary
purpose, e.g. to show that the object of sensation is not an object of
knowledge, on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge.
Part 9
Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms
of the terms in the thesis, both in demolishing and in establishing it.
By co-ordinates' are meant terms such as the following: 'Just deeds' and
the 'just man' are coordinates of 'justice', and 'courageous deeds' and
the 'courageous man' are co-ordinates of courage. Likewise also things
that tend to produce and to preserve anything are called co-ordinates of
that which they tend to produce and to preserve, as e.g. 'healthy habits'
are co-ordinates of 'health' and a 'vigorous constitutional' of a 'vigorous
constitution' and so forth also in other cases. 'Co-ordinate', then, usually
describes cases such as these, whereas 'inflected forms' are such as the
following: 'justly', 'courageously', 'healthily', and such as are formed
in this way. It is usually held that words when used in their inflected
forms as well are co-ordinates, as (e.g.) 'justly' in relation to justice,
and 'courageously' to courage; and then 'co-ordinate' describes all the
members of the same kindred series, e.g. 'justice', 'just', of a man or
an act, 'justly'. Clearly, then, when any one member, whatever its kind,
of the same kindred series is shown to be good or praiseworthy, then all
the rest as well come to be shown to be so: e.g. if 'justice' be something
praiseworthy, then so will 'just', of a man or thing, and 'justly' connote
something praiseworthy. Then 'justly' will be rendered also 'praiseworthily',
derived will by the same inflexion from 'the praiseworthy' whereby 'justly'
is derived from 'justice'.
Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned, but also in
the case of its contrary, for the contrary predicate: e.g. argue that good
is not necessarily pleasant; for neither is evil painful: or that, if the
latter be the case, so is the former. Also, if justice be knowledge, then
injustice is ignorance: and if 'justly' means 'knowingly' and 'skilfully',
then 'unjustly' means 'ignorantly' and 'unskilfully': whereas if the latter
be not true, neither is the former, as in the instance given just now:
for 'unjustly' is more likely to seem equivalent to 'skilfully' than to
'unskilfully'. This commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing
with the sequence of contraries; for all we are claiming now is that the
contrary of P shall follow the contrary of S.
Moreover, look at the modes of generation and destruction of a
thing, and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it, both in
demolishing and in establishing a view. For those things whose modes of
generation rank among good things, are themselves also good; and if they
themselves be good, so also are their modes of generation. If, on the other
hand, their modes of generation be evil, then they themselves also are
evil. In regard to modes of destruction the converse is true: for if the
modes of destruction rank as good things, then they themselves rank as
evil things; whereas if the modes of destruction count as evil, they themselves
count as good. The same argument applies also to things tending to produce
and destroy: for things whose productive causes are good, themselves also
rank as good; whereas if causes destructive of them are good, they themselves
rank as evil.
Part 10
Again, look at things which are like the subject in question, and
see if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more
than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight be to
see, then also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise also in the
case of other things, both those which are and those which are generally
held to be like. The rule in question is useful for both purposes; for
if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing, it is so with the
other like things as well, whereas if it be not so in the case of some
one of them, neither is it so in the case of the others. Look and see also
whether the cases are alike as regards a single thing and a number of things:
for sometimes there is a discrepancy. Thus, if to 'know' a thing be to
'think of' it, then also to 'know many things' is to 'be thinking of many
things'; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things
but not to be thinking of them. If, then, the latter proposition be not
true, neither was the former that dealt with a single thing, viz. that
to 'know' a thing is to 'think of' it.
Moreover, argue from greater and less degrees. In regard to greater
degrees there are four commonplace rules. One is: See whether a greater
degree of the predicate follows a greater degree of the subject: e.g. if
pleasure be good, see whether also a greater pleasure be a greater good:
and if to do a wrong be evil, see whether also to do a greater wrong is
a greater evil. Now this rule is of use for both purposes: for if an increase
of the accident follows an increase of the subject, as we have said, clearly
the accident belongs; while if it does not follow, the accident does not
belong. You should establish this by induction. Another rule is: If one
predicate be attributed to two subjects; then supposing it does not belong
to the subject to which it is the more likely to belong, neither does it
belong where it is less likely to belong; while if it does belong where
it is less likely to belong, then it belongs as well where it is more likely.
Again: If two predicates be attributed to one subject, then if the one
which is more generally thought to belong does not belong, neither does
the one that is less generally thought to belong; or, if the one that is
less generally thought to belong does belong, so also does the other. Moreover:
If two predicates be attributed to two subjects, then if the one which
is more usually thought to belong to the one subject does not belong, neither
does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject; or, if the
one which is less usually thought to belong to the one subject does belong,
so too does the remaining predicate to the remaining
subject.
Moreover, you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs,
or is generally supposed to belong, in a like degree, in three ways, viz.
those described in the last three rules given in regard to a greater degree.'
For supposing that one predicate belongs, or is supposed to belong, to
two subjects in a like degree, then if it does not belong to the one, neither
does it belong to the other; while if it belongs to the one, it belongs
to the remaining one as well. Or, supposing two predicates to belong in
a like degree to the same subject, then, if the one does not belong, neither
does the remaining one; while if the one does belong, the remaining one
belongs as well. The case is the same also if two predicates belong in
a like degree to two subjects; for if the one predicate does not belong
to the one subject, neither does the remaining predicate belong to the
remaining subject, while if the one predicate does belong to the one subject,
the remaining predicate belongs to the remaining subject as
well.
Part 11
You can argue, then, from greater or less or like degrees of truth
in the aforesaid number of ways. Moreover, you should argue from the addition
of one thing to another. If the addition of one thing to another makes
that other good or white, whereas formerly it was not white or good, then
the thing added will be white or good-it will possess the character it
imparts to the whole as well. Moreover, if an addition of something to
a given object intensifies the character which it had as given, then the
thing added will itself as well be of that character. Likewise, also, in
the case of other attributes. The rule is not applicable in all cases,
but only in those in which the excess described as an 'increased intensity'
is found to take place. The above rule is, however, not convertible for
overthrowing a view. For if the thing added does not make the other good,
it is not thereby made clear whether in itself it may not be good: for
the addition of good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good,
any more than the addition of white to black makes the whole
white.
Again, any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less degrees
belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good or of white
will not be attributed to what is not good or white: for a bad thing will
never be said to have a greater or less degree of goodness than another,
but always of badness. This rule is not convertible, either, for the purpose
of overthrowing a predication: for several predicates of which we cannot
speak of a greater degree belong absolutely: for the term 'man' is not
attributed in greater and less degrees, but a man is a man for all
that.
You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a given
respect, and at a given time and place: for if the predicate be possible
in some respect, it is possible also absolutely. Likewise, also, is what
is predicated at a given time or place: for what is absolutely impossible
is not possible either in any respect or at any place or time. An objection
may be raised that in a given respect people may be good by nature, e.g.
they may be generous or temperately inclined, while absolutely they are
not good by nature, because no one is prudent by nature. Likewise, also,
it is possible for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given
time, whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. In the same
way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow see and such a
diet, e.g. in infected areas, though it is not a good thing absolutely.
Moreover, in certain places it is possible to live singly and alone, but
absolutely it is not possible to exist singly and alone. In the same way
also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one's father, e.g.
among the Triballi, whereas, absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly
this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is
all the same wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable
among the Triballi themselves, just because they are Triballi. Again, at
certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g. when one is ill,
but it is not so absolutely. Or possibly this again may indicate a relativity
not to a certain time, but to a certain state of health: for it is all
the same whenever it occurs, if only one be in that state. A thing is 'absolutely'
so which without any addition you are prepared to say is honourable or
the contrary. Thus (e.g.) you will deny that to sacrifice one's father
is honourable: it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not therefore
honourable absolutely. On the other hand, to honour the gods you will declare
to be honourable without adding anything, because that is honourable absolutely.
So that whatever without any addition is generally accounted to be honourable
or dishonourable or anything else of that kind, will be said to be so
'absolutely'.
Topics
By Aristotle
Book III
Part 1
The question which is the more desirable, or the better, of two or more
things, should be examined upon the following lines: only first of all
it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making concerns not
things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great differences from
one another (for nobody raises any doubt whether happiness or wealth is
more desirable), but things that are nearly related and about which we
commonly discuss for which of the two we ought rather to vote, because
we do not see any advantage on either side as compared with the other.
Clearly, in such cases if we can show a single advantage, or more than
one, our judgement will record our assent that whichever side happens to
have the advantage is the more desirable.
First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable
than that which is less so: and so is that which is more likely to be chosen
by the prudent or by the good man or by the right law, or by men who are
good in any particular line, when they make their choice as such, or by
the experts in regard to any particular class of things; i.e. either whatever
most of them or what all of them would choose; e.g. in medicine or in carpentry
those things are more desirable which most, or all, doctors would choose;
or, in general, whatever most men or all men or all things would choose,
e.g. the good: for everything aims at the good. You should direct the argument
you intend to employ to whatever purpose you require. Of what is 'better'
or 'more desirable' the absolute standard is the verdict of the better
science, though relatively to a given individual the standard may be his
own particular science.
In the second place, that which is known as 'an x' is more desirable
than that which does not come within the genus 'x'-e.g. justice than a
just man; for the former falls within the genus 'good', whereas the other
does not, and the former is called 'a good', whereas the latter is not:
for nothing which does not happen to belong to the genus in question is
called by the generic name; e.g. a 'white man' is not 'a colour'. Likewise
also in other cases.
Also, that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that
which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more desirable than
gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself, the latter for something
else. Also, that which is desirable in itself is more desirable than what
is desirable per accidens; e.g. justice in our friends than justice in
our enemies: for the former is desirable in itself, the latter per accidens:
for we desire that our enemies should be just per accidens, in order that
they may do us no harm. This last principle is the same as the one that
precedes it, with, however, a different turn of expression. For we desire
justice in our friends for itself, even though it will make no difference
to us, and even though they be in India; whereas in our enemies we desire
it for something else, in order that they may do us no
harm.
Also, that which is in itself the cause of good is more desirable
than what is so per accidens, e.g. virtue than luck (for the former in
itself, and the latter per accidens, the cause of good things), and so
in other cases of the same kind. Likewise also in the case of the contrary;
for what is in itself the cause of evil is more objectionable than what
is so per accidens, e.g. vice and chance: for the one is bad in itself,
whereas chance is so per accidens.
Also, what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is good
for a particular person, e.g. recovery of health than a surgical operation;
for the former is good absolutely, the latter only for a particular person,
viz. the man who needs an operation. So too what is good by nature is more
desirable than the good that is not so by nature, e.g. justice than the
just man; for the one is good by nature, whereas in the other case the
goodness is acquired. Also the attribute is more desirable which belongs
to the better and more honourable subject, e.g. to a god rather than to
a man, and to the soul rather than to the body. So too the property of
the better thing is better than the property of the worse; e.g. the property
of God than the property of man: for whereas in respect of what is common
in both of them they do not differ at all from each other, in respect of
their properties the one surpasses the other. Also that is better which
is inherent in things better or prior or more honourable: thus (e.g.) health
is better than strength and beauty: for the former is inherent in the moist
and the dry, and the hot and the cold, in fact in all the primary constituents
of an animal, whereas the others are inherent in what is secondary, strength
being a feature of the sinews and bones, while beauty is generally supposed
to consist in a certain symmetry of the limbs. Also the end is generally
supposed to be more desirable than the means, and of two means, that which
lies nearer the end. In general, too, a means directed towards the end
of life is more desirable than a means to anything else, e.g. that which
contributes to happiness than that which contributes to prudence. Also
the competent is more desirable than the incompetent. Moreover, of two
productive agents that one is more desirable whose end is better; while
between a productive agent and an end we can decide by a proportional sum
whenever the excess of the one end over the other is greater than that
of the latter over its own productive means: e.g. supposing the excess
of happiness over health to be greater than that of health over what produces
health, then what produces happiness is better than health. For what produces
happiness exceeds what produces health just as much as happiness exceeds
health. But health exceeds what produces health by a smaller amount; ergo,
the excess of what produces happiness over what produces health is greater
than that of health over what produces health. Clearly, therefore, what
produces happiness is more desirable than health: for it exceeds the same
standard by a greater amount. Moreover, what is in itself nobler and more
precious and praiseworthy is more desirable than what is less so, e.g.
friendship than wealth, and justice than strength. For the former belong
in themselves to the class of things precious and praiseworthy, while the
latter do so not in themselves but for something else: for no one prizes
wealth for itself but always for something else, whereas we prize friendship
for itself, even though nothing else is likely to come to us from
it.
Part 2
Moreover, whenever two things are very much like one another, and
we cannot see any superiority in the one over the other of them, we should
look at them from the standpoint of their consequences. For the one which
is followed by the greater good is the more desirable: or, if the consequences
be evil, that is more desirable which is followed by the less evil. For
though both may be desirable, yet there may possibly be some unpleasant
consequence involved to turn the scale. Our survey from the point of view
of consequences lies in two directions, for there are prior consequences
and later consequences: e.g. if a man learns, it follows that he was ignorant
before and knows afterwards. As a rule, the later consequence is the better
to consider. You should take, therefore, whichever of the consequences
suits your purpose.
Moreover, a greater number of good things is more desirable than
a smaller, either absolutely or when the one is included in the other,
viz. the smaller number in the greater. An objection may be raised suppose
in some particular case the one is valued for the sake of the other; for
then the two together are not more desirable than the one; e.g. recovery
of health and health, than health alone, inasmuch as we desire recovery
of health for the sake of health. Also it is quite possible for what is
not good, together with what is, to be more desirable than a greater number
of good things, e.g. the combination of happiness and something else which
is not good may be more desirable than the combination of justice and courage.
Also, the same things are more valuable if accompanied than if unaccompanied
by pleasure, and likewise when free from pain than when attended with
pain.
Also, everything is more desirable at the season when it is of
greater consequence; e.g. freedom from pain in old age more than in youth:
for it is of greater consequence in old age. On the same principle also,
prudence is more desirable in old age; for no man chooses the young to
guide him, because he does not expect them to be prudent. With courage,
the converse is the case, for it is in youth that the active exercise of
courage is more imperatively required. Likewise also with temperance; for
the young are more troubled by their passions than are their
elders.
Also, that is more desirable which is more useful at every season
or at most seasons, e.g. justice and temperance rather than courage: for
they are always useful, while courage is only useful at times. Also, that
one of two things which if all possess, we do not need the other thing,
is more desirable than that which all may possess and still we want the
other one as well. Take the case of justice and courage; if everybody were
just, there would be no use for courage, whereas all might be courageous,
and still justice would be of use.
Moreover, judge by the destructions and losses and generations
and acquisitions and contraries of things: for things whose destruction
is more objectionable are themselves more desirable. Likewise also with
the losses and contraries of things; for a thing whose loss or whose contrary
is more objectionable is itself more desirable. With the generations or
acquisitions of things the opposite is the case: for things whose acquisition
or generation is more desirable are themselves also desirable. Another
commonplace rule is that what is nearer to the good is better and more
desirable, i.e. what more nearly resembles the good: thus justice is better
than a just man. Also, that which is more like than another thing to something
better than itself, as e.g. some say that Ajax was a better man than Odysseus
because he was more like Achilles. An objection may be raised to this that
it is not true: for it is quite possible that Ajax did not resemble Achilles
more nearly than Odysseus in the points which made Achilles the best of
them, and that Odysseus was a good man, though unlike Achilles. Look also
to see whether the resemblance be that of a caricature, like the resemblance
of a monkey to a man, whereas a horse bears none: for the monkey is not
the more handsome creature, despite its nearer resemblance to a man. Again,
in the case of two things, if one is more like the better thing while another
is more like the worse, then that is likely to be better which is more
like the better. This too, however, admits of an objection: for quite possibly
the one only slightly resembles the better, while the other strongly resembles
the worse, e.g. supposing the resemblance of Ajax to Achilles to be slight,
while that of Odysseus to Nestor is strong. Also it may be that the one
which is like the better type shows a degrading likeness, whereas the one
which is like the worse type improves upon it: witness the likeness of
a horse to a donkey, and that of a monkey to a man.
Another rule is that the more conspicuous good is more desirable
than the less conspicuous, and the more difficult than the easier: for
we appreciate better the possession of things that cannot be easily acquired.
Also the more personal possession is more desirable than the more widely
shared. Also, that which is more free from connexion with evil: for what
is not attended by any unpleasantness is more desirable than what is so
attended.
Moreover, if A be without qualification better than B, then also
the best of the members of A is better than the best of the members of
B; e.g. if Man be better than Horse, then also the best man is better than
the best horse. Also, if the best in A be better than the best in B, then
also A is better than B without qualification; e.g. if the best man be
better than the best horse, then also Man is better than Horse without
qualification.
Moreover, things which our friends can share are more desirable
than those they cannot. Also, things which we like rather to do to our
friend are more desirable than those we like to do to the man in the street,
e.g. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the semblance of them:
for we would rather really do good to our friends than seem to do so, whereas
towards the man in the street the converse is the case.
Also, superfluities are better than necessities, and are sometimes
more desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere life, and
good life is a superfluity, whereas mere life itself is a necessity. Sometimes,
though, what is better is not also more desirable: for there is no necessity
that because it is better it should also be more desirable: at least to
be a philosopher is better than to make money, but it is not more desirable
for a man who lacks the necessities of life. The expression 'superfluity'
applies whenever a man possesses the necessities of life and sets to work
to secure as well other noble acquisitions. Roughly speaking, perhaps,
necessities are more desirable, while superfluities are
better.
Also, what cannot be got from another is more desirable than what
can be got from another as well, as (e.g.) is the case of justice compared
with courage. Also, A is more desirable if A is desirable without B, but
not B without A: power (e.g.) is not desirable without prudence, but prudence
is desirable without power. Also, if of two things we repudiate the one
in order to be thought to possess the other, then that one is more desirable
which we wish to be thought to possess; thus (e.g.) we repudiate the love
of hard work in order that people may think us geniuses.
Moreover, that is more desirable in whose absence it is less blameworthy
for people to be vexed; and that is more desirable in whose absence it
is more blameworthy for a man not to be vexed.
Part 3
Moreover, of things that belong to the same species one which possesses
the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable than one which does
not. If both possess it, then the one which possesses it in a greater degree
is more desirable.
Moreover, if one thing makes good whatever it touches, while another
does not, the former is more desirable, just as also what makes things
warm is warmer than what does not. If both do so, then that one is more
desirable which does so in a greater degree, or if it render good the better
and more important object-if (e.g.), the one makes good the soul, and the
other the body.
Moreover, judge things by their inflexions and uses and actions
and works, and judge these by them: for they go with each other: e.g. if
'justly' means something more desirable than 'courageously', then also
justice means something more desirable than courage; and if justice be
more desirable than courage, then also 'justly' means something more desirable
than 'courageously'. Similarly also in the other cases.
Moreover, if one thing exceeds while the other falls short of the
same standard of good, the one which exceeds is the more desirable; or
if the one exceeds an even higher standard. Nay more, if there be two things
both preferable to something, the one which is more highly preferable to
it is more desirable than the less highly preferable. Moreover, when the
excess of a thing is more desirable than the excess of something else,
that thing is itself also more desirable than the other, as (e.g.) friendship
than money: for an excess of friendship is more desirable than an excess
of money. So also that of which a man would rather that it were his by
his own doing is more desirable than what he would rather get by another's
doing, e.g. friends than money. Moreover, judge by means of an addition,
and see if the addition of A to the same thing as B makes the whole more
desirable than does the addition of B. You must, however, beware of adducing
a case in which the common term uses, or in some other way helps the case
of, one of the things added to it, but not the other, as (e.g.) if you
took a saw and a sickle in combination with the art of carpentry: for in
the combination the saw is a more desirable thing, but it is not a more
desirable thing without qualification. Again, a thing is more desirable
if, when added to a lesser good, it makes the whole greater good. Likewise,
also, you should judge by means of subtraction: for the thing upon whose
subtraction the remainder is a lesser good may be taken to be a greater
good, whichever it be whose subtraction makes the remainder a lesser
good.
Also, if one thing be desirable for itself, and the other for the
look of it, the former is more desirable, as (e.g.) health than beauty.
A thing is defined as being desired for the look of it if, supposing no
one knew of it, you would not care to have it. Also, it is more desirable
both for itself and for the look of it, while the other thing is desirable
on the one ground alone. Also, whichever is the more precious for itself,
is also better and more desirable. A thing may be taken to be more precious
in itself which we choose rather for itself, without anything else being
likely to come of it.
Moreover, you should distinguish in how many senses 'desirable'
is used, and with a view to what ends, e.g. expediency or honour or pleasure.
For what is useful for all or most of them may be taken to be more desirable
than what is not useful in like manner. If the same characters belong to
both things you should look and see which possesses them more markedly,
i.e. which of the two is the more pleasant or more honourable or more expedient.
Again, that is more desirable which serves the better purpose, e.g. that
which serves to promote virtue more than that which serves to promote pleasure.
Likewise also in the case of objectionable things; for that is more objectionable
which stands more in the way of what is desirable, e.g. disease more than
ugliness: for disease is a greater hindrance both to pleasure and to being
good.
Moreover, argue by showing that the thing in question is in like
measure objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a character that
a man might well desire and object to it alike is less desirable than the
other which is desirable only.
Part 4
Comparisons of things together should therefore be conducted in
the manner prescribed. The same commonplace rules are useful also for showing
that anything is simply desirable or objectionable: for we have only to
subtract the excess of one thing over another. For if what is more precious
be more desirable, then also what is precious is desirable; and if what
is more useful be more desirable, then also what is useful is desirable.
Likewise, also, in the case of other things which admit of comparisons
of that kind. For in some cases in the very course of comparing the things
together we at once assert also that each of them, or the one of them,
is desirable, e.g. whenever we call the one good 'by nature' and the other
'not by nature': for dearly what is good by nature is
desirable.
Part 5
The commonplace rules relating to comparative degrees and amounts
ought to be taken in the most general possible form: for when so taken
they are likely to be useful in a larger number of instances. It is possible
to render some of the actual rules given above more universal by a slight
alteration of the expression, e.g. that what by nature exhibits such and
such a quality exhibits that quality in a greater degree than what exhibits
it not by nature. Also, if one thing does, and another does not, impart
such and such a quality to that which possesses it, or to which it belongs,
then whichever does impart it is of that quality in greater degree than
the one which does not impart it; and if both impart it, then that one
exhibits it in a greater degree which imparts it in a greater
degree.
Moreover, if in any character one thing exceeds and another falls
short of the same standard; also, if the one exceeds something which exceeds
a given standard, while the other does not reach that standard, then clearly
the first-named thing exhibits that character in a greater degree. Moreover,
you should judge by means of addition, and see if A when added to the same
thing as B imparts to the whole such and such a character in a more marked
degree than B, or if, when added to a thing which exhibits that character
in a less degree, it imparts that character to the whole in a greater degree.
Likewise, also, you may judge by means of subtraction: for a thing upon
whose subtraction the remainder exhibits such and such a character in a
less degree, itself exhibits that character in a greater degree. Also,
things exhibit such and such a character in a greater degree if more free
from admixture with their contraries; e.g. that is whiter which is more
free from admixture with black. Moreover, apart from the rules given above,
that has such and such a character in greater degree which admits in a
greater degree of the definition proper to the given character; e.g. if
the definition of 'white' be 'a colour which pierces the vision', then
that is whiter which is in a greater degree a colour that pierces the
vision.
Part 6
If the question be put in a particular and not in a universal form,
in the first place the universal constructive or destructive commonplace
rules that have been given may all be brought into use. For in demolishing
or establishing a thing universally we also show it in particular: for
if it be true of all, it is true also of some, and if untrue of all, it
is untrue of some. Especially handy and of general application are the
commonplace rules that are drawn from the opposites and co-ordinates and
inflexions of a thing: for public opinion grants alike the claim that if
all pleasure be good, then also all pain is evil, and the claim that if
some pleasure be good, then also some pain is evil. Moreover, if some form
of sensation be not a capacity, then also some form of failure of sensation
is not a failure of capacity. Also, if the object of conception is in some
cases an object of knowledge, then also some form of conceiving is knowledge.
Again, if what is unjust be in some cases good, then also what is just
is in some cases evil; and if what happens justly is in some cases evil,
then also what happens unjustly is in some cases good. Also, if what is
pleasant is in some cases objectionable, then pleasure is in some cases
an objectionable thing. On the same principle, also, if what is pleasant
is in some cases beneficial, then pleasure is in some cases a beneficial
thing. The case is the same also as regards the things that destroy, and
the processes of generation and destruction. For if anything that destroys
pleasure or knowledge be in some cases good, then we may take it that pleasure
or knowledge is in some cases an evil thing. Likewise, also, if the destruction
of knowledge be in some cases a good thing or its production an evil thing,
then knowledge will be in some cases an evil thing; e.g. if for a man to
forget his disgraceful conduct be a good thing, and to remember it be an
evil thing, then the knowledge of his disgraceful conduct may be taken
to be an evil thing. The same holds also in other cases: in all such cases
the premiss and the conclusion are equally likely to be
accepted.
Moreover you should judge by means of greater or smaller or like
degrees: for if some member of another genus exhibit such and such a character
in a more marked degree than your object, while no member of that genus
exhibits that character at all, then you may take it that neither does
the object in question exhibit it; e.g. if some form of knowledge be good
in a greater degree than pleasure, while no form of knowledge is good,
then you may take it that pleasure is not good either. Also, you should
judge by a smaller or like degree in the same way: for so you will find
it possible both to demolish and to establish a view, except that whereas
both are possible by means of like degrees, by means of a smaller degree
it is possible only to establish, not to overthrow. For if a certain form
of capacity be good in a like degree to knowledge, and a certain form of
capacity be good, then so also is knowledge; while if no form of capacity
be good, then neither is knowledge. If, too, a certain form of capacity
be good in a less degree than knowledge, and a certain form of capacity
be good, then so also is knowledge; but if no form of capacity be good,
there is no necessity that no form of knowledge either should be good.
Clearly, then, it is only possible to establish a view by means of a less
degree.
Not only by means of another genus can you overthrow a view, but
also by means of the same, if you take the most marked instance of the
character in question; e.g. if it be maintained that some form of knowledge
is good, then, suppose it to be shown that prudence is not good, neither
will any other kind be good, seeing that not even the kind upon which there
is most general agreement is so. Moreover, you should go to work by means
of an hypothesis; you should claim that the attribute, if it belongs or
does not belong in one case, does so in a like degree in all, e.g. that
if the soul of man be immortal, so are other souls as well, while if this
one be not so, neither are the others. If, then, it be maintained that
in some instance the attribute belongs, you must show that in some instance
it does not belong: for then it will follow, by reason of the hypothesis,
that it does not belong to any instance at all. If, on the other hand,
it be maintained that it does not belong in some instance, you must show
that it does belong in some instance, for in this way it will follow that
it belongs to all instances. It is clear that the maker of the hypothesis
universalizes the question, whereas it was stated in a particular form:
for he claims that the maker of a particular admission should make a universal
admission, inasmuch as he claims that if the attribute belongs in one instance,
it belongs also in all instances alike.
If the problem be indefinite, it is possible to overthrow a statement
in only one way; e.g. if a man has asserted that pleasure is good or is
not good, without any further definition. For if he meant that a particular
pleasure is good, you must show universally that no pleasure is good, if
the proposition in question is to be demolished. And likewise, also, if
he meant that some particular pleasure is not good you must show universally
that all pleasure is good: it is impossible to demolish it in any other
way. For if we show that some particular pleasure is not good or is good,
the proposition in question is not yet demolished. It is clear, then, that
it is possible to demolish an indefinite statement in one way only, whereas
it can be established in two ways: for whether we show universally that
all pleasure is good, or whether we show that a particular pleasure is
good, the proposition in question will have been proved. Likewise, also,
supposing we are required to argue that some particular pleasure is not
good, if we show that no pleasure is good or that a particular pleasure
is not good, we shall have produced an argument in both ways, both universally
and in particular, to show that some particular pleasure is not good. If,
on the other hand, the statement made be definite, it will be possible
to demolish it in two ways; e.g. if it be maintained that it is an attribute
of some particular pleasure to be good, while of some it is not: for whether
it be shown that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, is good, the proposition
in question will have been demolished. If, however, he has stated that
only one single pleasure is good, it is possible to demolish it in three
ways: for by showing that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, or that more
than one pleasure, is good, we shall have demolished the statement in question.
If the statement be made still more definite, e.g. that prudence alone
of the virtues is knowledge, there are four ways of demolishing it: for
if it be shown that all virtue is knowledge, or that no virtue is so, or
that some other virtue (e.g. justice) is so, or that prudence itself is
not knowledge, the proposition in question will have been
demolished.
It is useful also to take a look at individual instances, in cases
where some attribute has been said to belong or not to belong, as in the
case of universal questions. Moreover, you should take a glance among genera,
dividing them by their species until you come to those that are not further
divisible, as has been said before:' for whether the attribute is found
to belong in all cases or in none, you should, after adducing several instances,
claim that he should either admit your point universally, or else bring
an objection showing in what case it does not hold. Moreover, in cases
where it is possible to make the accident definite either specifically
or numerically, you should look and see whether perhaps none of them belongs,
showing e.g. that time is not moved, nor yet a movement, by enumerating
how many species there are of movement: for if none of these belong to
time, clearly it does not move, nor yet is a movement. Likewise, also,
you can show that the soul is not a number, by dividing all numbers into
either odd or even: for then, if the soul be neither odd nor even, clearly
it is not a number.
In regard then to Accident, you should set to work by means like
these, and in this manner.
Topics
By Aristotle
Book IV
Part 1
Next we must go on to examine questions relating to Genus and Property.
These are elements in the questions that relate to definitions, but dialecticians
seldom address their inquiries to these by themselves. If, then, a genus
be suggested for something that is, first take a look at all objects which
belong to the same genus as the thing mentioned, and see whether the genus
suggested is not predicated of one of them, as happens in the case of an
accident: e.g. if 'good' be laid down to be the genus of 'pleasure', see
whether some particular pleasure be not good: for, if so, clearly good'
is not the genus of pleasure: for the genus is predicated of all the members
of the same species. Secondly, see whether it be predicated not in the
category of essence, but as an accident, as 'white' is predicated of 'snow',
or 'self-moved' of the soul. For 'snow' is not a kind of 'white', and therefore
'white' is not the genus of snow, nor is the soul a kind of 'moving object':
its motion is an accident of it, as it often is of an animal to walk or
to be walking. Moreover, 'moving' does not seem to indicate the essence,
but rather a state of doing or of having something done to it. Likewise,
also, 'white': for it indicates not the essence of snow, but a certain
quality of it. So that neither of them is predicated in the category of
'essence'.
Especially you should take a look at the definition of Accident,
and see whether it fits the genus mentioned, as (e.g.) is also the case
in the instances just given. For it is possible for a thing to be and not
to be self-moved, and likewise, also, for it to be and not to be white.
So that neither of these attributes is the genus but an accident, since
we were saying that an accident is an attribute which can belong to a thing
and also not belong.
Moreover, see whether the genus and the species be not found in
the same division, but the one be a substance while the other is a quality,
or the one be a relative while the other is a quality, as (e.g.) 'slow'
and 'swan' are each a substance, while 'white' is not a substance but a
quality, so that 'white' is not the genus either of 'snow' or of 'swan'.
Again, knowledge' is a relative, while 'good' and 'noble' are each a quality,
so that good, or noble, is not the genus of knowledge. For the genera of
relatives ought themselves also to be relatives, as is the case with 'double':
for multiple', which is the genus of 'double', is itself also a relative.
To speak generally, the genus ought to fall under the same division as
the species: for if the species be a substance, so too should be the genus,
and if the species be a quality, so too the genus should be a quality;
e.g. if white be a quality, so too should colour be. Likewise, also, in
other cases.
Again, see whether it be necessary or possible for the genus to
partake of the object which has been placed in the genus. 'To partake'
is defined as 'to admit the definition of that which is partaken. Clearly,
therefore, the species partake of the genera, but not the genera of the
species: for the species admits the definition of the genus, whereas the
genus does not admit that of the species. You must look, therefore, and
see whether the genus rendered partakes or can possibly partake of the
species, e.g. if any one were to render anything as genus of 'being' or
of 'unity': for then the result will be that the genus partakes of the
species: for of everything that is, 'being' and 'unity' are predicated,
and therefore their definition as well.
Moreover, see if there be anything of which the species rendered
is true, while the genus is not so, e.g. supposing 'being' or 'object of
knowledge' were stated to be the genus of 'object of opinion'. For 'object
of opinion' will be a predicate of what does not exist; for many things
which do not exist are objects of opinion; whereas that 'being' or 'object
of knowledge' is not predicated of what does not exist is clear. So that
neither 'being' nor 'object of knowledge' is the genus of 'object of opinion':
for of the objects of which the species is predicated, the genus ought
to be predicated as well.
Again, see whether the object placed in the genus be quite unable
to partake of any of its species: for it is impossible that it should partake
of the genus if it do not partake of any of its species, except it be one
of the species reached by the first division: these do partake of the genus
alone. If, therefore, 'Motion' be stated as the genus of pleasure, you
should look and see if pleasure be neither locomotion nor alteration, nor
any of the rest of the given modes of motion: for clearly you may then
take it that it does not partake of any of the species, and therefore not
of the genus either, since what partakes of the genus must necessarily
partake of one of the species as well: so that pleasure could not be a
species of Motion, nor yet be one of the individual phenomena comprised
under the term 'motion'. For individuals as well partake in the genus and
the species, as (e.g.) an individual man partakes of both 'man' and
'animal'.
Moreover, see if the term placed in the genus has a wider denotation
than the genus, as (e.g.) 'object of opinion' has, as compared with 'being':
for both what is and what is not are objects of opinion, so that 'object
of opinion' could not be a species of being: for the genus is always of
wider denotation than the species. Again, see if the species and its genus
have an equal denotation; suppose, for instance, that of the attributes
which go with everything, one were to be stated as a species and the other
as its genus, as for example Being and Unity: for everything has being
and unity, so that neither is the genus of the other, since their denotation
is equal. Likewise, also, if the 'first' of a series and the 'beginning'
were to be placed one under the other: for the beginning is first and the
first is the beginning, so that either both expressions are identical or
at any rate neither is the genus of the other. The elementary principle
in regard to all such cases is that the genus has a wider denotation than
the species and its differentia: for the differentia as well has a narrower
denotation than the genus.
See also whether the genus mentioned fails, or might be generally
thought to fail, to apply to some object which is not specifically different
from the thing in question; or, if your argument be constructive, whether
it does so apply. For all things that are not specifically different have
the same genus. If, therefore, it be shown to apply to one, then clearly
it applies to all, and if it fails to apply to one, clearly it fails to
apply to any; e.g. if any one who assumes 'indivisible lines' were to say
that the 'indivisible' is their genus. For the aforesaid term is not the
genus of divisible lines, and these do not differ as regards their species
from indivisible: for straight lines are never different from each other
as regards their species.
Part 2
Look and see, also, if there be any other genus of the given species
which neither embraces the genus rendered nor yet falls under it, e.g.
suppose any one were to lay down that 'knowledge' is the genus of justice.
For virtue is its genus as well, and neither of these genera embraces the
remaining one, so that knowledge could not be the genus of justice: for
it is generally accepted that whenever one species falls under two genera,
the one is embraced by the other. Yet a principle of this kind gives rise
to a difficulty in some cases. For some people hold that prudence is both
virtue and knowledge, and that neither of its genera is embraced by the
other: although certainly not everybody admits that prudence is knowledge.
If, however, any one were to admit the truth of this assertion, yet it
would still be generally agreed to be necessary that the genera of the
same object must at any rate be subordinate either the one to the other
or both to the same, as actually is the case with virtue and knowledge.
For both fall under the same genus; for each of them is a state and a disposition.
You should look, therefore, and see whether neither of these things is
true of the genus rendered; for if the genera be subordinate neither the
one to the other nor both to the same, then what is rendered could not
be the true genus.
Look, also, at the genus of the genus rendered, and so continually
at the next higher genus, and see whether all are predicated of the species,
and predicated in the category of essence: for all the higher genera should
be predicated of the species in the category of essence. If, then, there
be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what is rendered is not the true genus.
[Again, see whether either the genus itself, or one of its higher genera,
partakes of the species: for the higher genus does not partake of any of
the lower.] If, then, you are overthrowing a view, follow the rule as given:
if establishing one, then-suppose that what has been named as genus be
admitted to belong to the species, only it be disputed whether it belongs
as genus-it is enough to show that one of its higher genera is predicated
of the species in the category of essence. For if one of them be predicated
in the category of essence, all of them, both higher and lower than this
one, if predicated at all of the species, will be predicated of it in the
category of essence: so that what has been rendered as genus is also predicated
in the category of essence. The premiss that when one genus is predicated
in the category of essence, all the rest, if predicated at all, will be
predicated in the category of essence, should be secured by induction.
Supposing, however, that it be disputed whether what has been rendered
as genus belongs at all, it is not enough to show that one of the higher
genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence: e.g. if
any one has rendered 'locomotion' as the genus of walking, it is not enough
to show that walking is 'motion' in order to show that it is 'locomotion',
seeing that there are other forms of motion as well; but one must show
in addition that walking does not partake of any of the species of motion
produced by the same division except locomotion. For of necessity what
partakes of the genus partakes also of one of the species produced by the
first division of the genus. If, therefore, walking does not partake either
of increase or decrease or of the other kinds of motion, clearly it would
partake of locomotion, so that locomotion would be the genus of
walking.
Again, look among the things of which the given species is predicated
as genus, and see if what is rendered as its genus be also predicated in
the category of essence of the very things of which the species is so predicated,
and likewise if all the genera higher than this genus are so predicated
as well. For if there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what has been
rendered is not the true genus: for had it been the genus, then both the
genera higher than it, and it itself, would all have been predicated in
the category of essence of those objects of which the species too is predicated
in the category of essence. If, then, you are overthrowing a view, it is
useful to see whether the genus fails to be predicated in the category
of essence of those things of which the species too is predicated. If establishing
a view, it is useful to see whether it is predicated in the category of
essence: for if so, the result will be that the genus and the species will
be predicated of the same object in the category of essence, so that the
same object falls under two genera: the genera must therefore of necessity
be subordinate one to the other, and therefore if it be shown that the
one we wish to establish as genus is not subordinate to the species, clearly
the species would be subordinate to it, so that you may take it as shown
that it is the genus.
Look, also, at the definitions of the genera, and see whether they
apply both to the given species and to the objects which partake of the
species. For of necessity the definitions of its genera must be predicated
of the species and of the objects which partake of the species: if, then,
there be anywhere a discrepancy, clearly what has been rendered is not
the genus.
Again, see if he has rendered the differentia as the genus, e.g.
'immortal' as the genus of 'God'. For 'immortal' is a differentia of 'living
being', seeing that of living beings some are mortal and others immortal.
Clearly, then, a bad mistake has been made; for the differentia of a thing
is never its genus. And that this is true is clear: for a thing's differentia
never signifies its essence, but rather some quality, as do 'walking' and
'biped'.
Also, see whether he has placed the differentia inside the genus,
e.g. by taking 'odd' as a number'. For 'odd' is a differentia of number,
not a species. Nor is the differentia generally thought to partake of the
genus: for what partakes of the genus is always either a species or an
individual, whereas the differentia is neither a species nor an individual.
Clearly, therefore, the differentia does not partake of the genus, so that
'odd' too is no species but a differentia, seeing that it does not partake
of the genus.
Moreover, see whether he has placed the genus inside the species,
e.g. by taking 'contact' to be a 'juncture', or 'mixture' a 'fusion', or,
as in Plato's definition,' 'locomotion' to be the same as 'carriage'. For
there is no necessity that contact should be juncture: rather, conversely,
juncture must be contact: for what is in contact is not always joined,
though what is joined is always in contact. Likewise, also, in the remaining
instances: for mixture is not always a 'fusion' (for to mix dry things
does not fuse them), nor is locomotion always 'carriage'. For walking is
not generally thought to be carriage: for 'carriage' is mostly used of
things that change one place for another involuntarily, as happens in the
case of inanimate things. Clearly, also, the species, in the instances
given, has a wider denotation than the genus, whereas it ought to be vice
versa. Again, see whether he has placed the differentia inside the species,
by taking (e.g.) 'immortal' to be 'a god'. For the result will be that
the species has an equal or wider denotation: and this cannot be, for always
the differentia has an equal or a wider denotation than the species. Moreover,
see whether he has placed the genus inside the differentia, by making 'colour'
(e.g.) to be a thing that 'pierces', or 'number' a thing that is 'odd'.
Also, see if he has mentioned the genus as differentia: for it is possible
for a man to bring forward a statement of this kind as well, e.g. that
'mixture' is the differentia of 'fusion', or that change of place' is the
differentia of 'carriage'. All such cases should be examined by means of
the same principles: for they depend upon common rules: for the genus should
have a wider denotation that its differentia, and also should not partake
of its differentia; whereas, if it be rendered in this manner, neither
of the aforesaid requirements can be satisfied: for the genus will both
have a narrower denotation than its differentia, and will partake of
it.
Again, if no differentia belonging to the genus be predicated of
the given species, neither will the genus be predicated of it; e.g. of
'soul' neither 'odd' nor 'even' is predicated: neither therefore is 'number'.
Moreover, see whether the species is naturally prior and abolishes the
genus along with itself: for the contrary is the general view. Moreover,
if it be possible for the genus stated, or for its differentia, to be absent
from the alleged species, e.g. for 'movement' to be absent from the 'soul',
or 'truth and falsehood' from 'opinion', then neither of the terms stated
could be its genus or its differentia: for the general view is that the
genus and the differentia accompany the species, as long as it
exists.
Part 3
Look and see, also, if what is placed in the genus partakes or
could possibly partake of any contrary of the genus: for in that case the
same thing will at the same time partake of contrary things, seeing that
the genus is never absent from it, while it partakes, or can possibly partake,
of the contrary genus as well. Moreover, see whether the species shares
in any character which it is utterly impossible for any member of the genus
to have. Thus (e.g.) if the soul has a share in life, while it is impossible
for any number to live, then the soul could not be a species of
number.
You should look and see, also, if the species be a homonym of the
genus, and employ as your elementary principles those already stated for
dealing with homonymity: for the genus and the species are
synonymous.
Seeing that of every genus there is more than one species, look
and see if it be impossible that there should be another species than the
given one belonging to the genus stated: for if there should be none, then
clearly what has been stated could not be a genus at
all.
Look and see, also, if he has rendered as genus a metaphorical
expression, describing (e.g. 'temperance' as a 'harmony': a 'harmony':
for a genus is always predicated of its species in its literal sense, whereas
'harmony' is predicated of temperance not in a literal sense but metaphorically:
for a harmony always consists in notes.
Moreover, if there be any contrary of the species, examine it.
The examination may take different forms; first of all see if the contrary
as well be found in the same genus as the species, supposing the genus
to have no contrary; for contraries ought to be found in the same genus,
if there be no contrary to the genus. Supposing, on the other hand, that
there is a contrary to the genus, see if the contrary of the species be
found in the contrary genus: for of necessity the contrary species must
be in the contrary genus, if there be any contrary to the genus. Each of
these points is made plain by means of induction. Again, see whether the
contrary of the species be not found in any genus at all, but be itself
a genus, e.g. 'good': for if this be not found in any genus, neither will
its contrary be found in any genus, but will itself be a genus, as happens
in the case of 'good' and 'evil': for neither of these is found in a genus,
but each of them is a genus. Moreover, see if both genus and species be
contrary to something, and one pair of contraries have an intermediary,
but not the other. For if the genera have an intermediary, so should their
species as well, and if the species have, so should their genera as well,
as is the case with (1) virtue and vice and (2) justice and injustice:
for each pair has an intermediary. An objection to this is that there is
no intermediary between health and disease, although there is one between
evil and good. Or see whether, though there be indeed an intermediary between
both pairs, i.e. both between the species and between the genera, yet it
be not similarly related, but in one case be a mere negation of the extremes,
whereas in the other case it is a subject. For the general view is that
the relation should be similar in both cases, as it is in the cases of
virtue and vice and of justice and injustice: for the intermediaries between
both are mere negations. Moreover, whenever the genus has no contrary,
look and see not merely whether the contrary of the species be found in
the same genus, but the intermediate as well: for the genus containing
the extremes contains the intermediates as well, as (e.g.) in the case
of white and black: for 'colour' is the genus both of these and of all
the intermediate colours as well. An objection may be raised that 'defect'
and 'excess' are found in the same genus (for both are in the genus 'evil'),
whereas moderate amount', the intermediate between them, is found not in
'evil' but in 'good'. Look and see also whether, while the genus has a
contrary, the species has none; for if the genus be contrary to anything,
so too is the species, as virtue to vice and justice to
injustice.
Likewise. also, if one were to look at other instances,
one would come to see clearly a fact like this. An objection may be raised
in the case of health and disease: for health in general is the contrary
of disease, whereas a particular disease, being a species of disease, e.g.
fever and ophthalmia and any other particular disease, has no
contrary.
If, therefore, you are demolishing a view, there are all these
ways in which you should make your examination: for if the aforesaid characters
do not belong to it, clearly what has been rendered is not the genus. If,
on the other hand, you are establishing a view, there are three ways: in
the first place, see whether the contrary of the species be found in the
genus stated, suppose the genus have no contrary: for if the contrary be
found in it, clearly the species in question is found in it as well. Moreover,
see if the intermediate species is found in the genus stated: for whatever
genus contains the intermediate contains the extremes as well. Again, if
the genus have a contrary, look and see whether also the contrary species
is found in the contrary genus: for if so, clearly also the species in
question is found in the genus in question.
Again, consider in the case of the inflexions and the co-ordinates
of species and genus, and see whether they follow likewise, both in demolishing
and in establishing a view. For whatever attribute belongs or does not
belong to one belongs or does not belong at the same time to all; e.g.
if justice be a particular form of knowledge, then also 'justly' is 'knowingly'
and the just man is a man of knowledge: whereas if any of these things
be not so, then neither is any of the rest of them.
Part 4
Again, consider the case of things that bear a like relation to
one another. Thus (e.g.) the relation of the pleasant to pleasure is like
that of the useful to the good: for in each case the one produces the other.
If therefore pleasure be a kind of 'good', then also the pleasant will
be a kind of 'useful': for clearly it may be taken to be productive of
good, seeing that pleasure is good. In the same way also consider the case
of processes of generation and destruction; if (e.g.) to build be to be
active, then to have built is to have been active, and if to learn be to
recollect, then also to have learnt is to have recollected, and if to be
decomposed be to be destroyed, then to have been decomposed is to have
been destroyed, and decomposition is a kind of destruction. Consider also
in the same way the case of things that generate or destroy, and of the
capacities and uses of things; and in general, both in demolishing and
in establishing an argument, you should examine things in the light of
any resemblance of whatever description, as we were saying in the case
of generation and destruction. For if what tends to destroy tends to decompose,
then also to be destroyed is to be decomposed: and if what tends to generate
tends to produce, then to be generated is to be produced, and generation
is production. Likewise, also, in the case of the capacities and uses of
things: for if a capacity be a disposition, then also to be capable of
something is to be disposed to it, and if the use of anything be an activity,
then to use it is to be active, and to have used it is to have been
active.
If the opposite of the species be a privation, there are two ways
of demolishing an argument, first of all by looking to see if the opposite
be found in the genus rendered: for either the privation is to be found
absolutely nowhere in the same genus, or at least not in the same ultimate
genus: e.g. if the ultimate genus containing sight be sensation, then blindness
will not be a sensation. Secondly, if there be a sensation. Secondly, if
there be a privation opposed to both genus and species, but the opposite
of the species be not found in the opposite of the genus, then neither
could the species rendered be in the genus rendered. If, then, you are
demolishing a view, you should follow the rule as stated; but if establishing
one there is but one way: for if the opposite species be found in the opposite
genus, then also the species in question would be found in the genus in
question: e.g. if 'blindness' be a form of 'insensibility', then 'sight'
is a form of 'sensation'.
Again, look at the negations of the genus and species and convert
the order of terms, according to the method described in the case of Accident:
e.g. if the pleasant be a kind of good, what is not good is not pleasant.
For were this no something not good as well would then be pleasant. That,
however, cannot be, for it is impossible, if 'good' be the genus of pleasant,
that anything not good should be pleasant: for of things of which the genus
is not predicated, none of the species is predicated either. Also, in establishing
a view, you should adopt the same method of examination: for if what is
not good be not pleasant, then what is pleasant is good, so that 'good'
is the genus of 'pleasant'.
If the species be a relative term, see whether the genus be a relative
term as well: for if the species be a relative term, so too is the genus,
as is the case with 'double' and 'multiple': for each is a relative term.
If, on the other hand, the genus be a relative term, there is no necessity
that the species should be so as well: for 'knowledge'is a relative term,
but not so 'grammar'. Or possibly not even the first statement would be
generally considered true: for virtue is a kind of 'noble' and a kind of
'good' thing, and yet, while 'virtue' is a relative term, 'good' and 'noble'
are not relatives but qualities. Again, see whether the species fails to
be used in the same relation when called by its own name, and when called
by the name of its genus: e.g. if the term 'double' be used to mean the
double of a 'half', then also the term 'multiple' ought to be used to mean
multiple of a 'half'. Otherwise 'multiple' could not be the genus of
'double'.
Moreover, see whether the term fail to be used in the same relation
both when called by the name of its genus, and also when called by those
of all the genera of its genus. For if the double be a multiple of a half,
then 'in excess of 'will also be used in relation to a 'half': and, in
general, the double will be called by the names of all the higher genera
in relation to a 'half'. An objection may be raised that there is no necessity
for a term to be used in the same relation when called by its own name
and when called by that of its genus: for 'knowledge' is called knowledge
'of an object', whereas it is called a 'state' and 'disposition' not of
an 'object' but of the 'soul'.
Again, see whether the genus and the species be used in the same
way in respect of the inflexions they take, e.g. datives and genitives
and all the rest. For as the species is used, so should the genus be as
well, as in the case of 'double' and its higher genera: for we say both
'double of' and 'multiple of' a thing. Likewise, also, in the case of 'knowledge':
for both knowledge' itself and its genera, e.g. 'disposition' and 'state',
are said to be 'of' something. An objection may be raised that in some
cases it is not so: for we say 'superior to' and 'contrary to' so and so,
whereas 'other', which is the genus of these terms, demands not 'to' but
'than': for the expression is 'other than' so and so.
Again, see whether terms used in like case relationships fail to
yield a like construction when converted, as do 'double' and 'multiple'.
For each of these terms takes a genitive both in itself and in its converted
form: for we say both a half of' and 'a fraction of' something. The case
is the same also as regards both 'knowledge' and 'conception': for these
take a genitive, and by conversion an 'object of knowledge' and an 'object
of conception' are both alike used with a dative. If, then, in any cases
the constructions after conversion be not alike, clearly the one term is
not the genus of the other.
Again, see whether the species and the genus fail to be used in
relation to an equal number of things: for the general view is that the
uses of both are alike and equal in number, as is the case with 'present'
and 'grant'. For a present' is of something or to some one, and also a
'grant' is of something and to some one: and 'grant' is the genus of 'present',
for a 'present' is a 'grant that need not be returned'. In some cases,
however, the number of relations in which the terms are used happens not
to be equal, for while 'double' is double of something, we speak of 'in
excess' or 'greater' in something, as well as of or than something: for
what is in excess or greater is always in excess in something, as well
as in excess of something. Hence the terms in question are not the genera
of 'double', inasmuch as they are not used in relation to an equal number
of things with the species. Or possibly it is not universally true that
species and genus are used in relation to an equal number of
things.
See, also, if the opposite of the species have the opposite of
the genus as its genus, e.g. whether, if 'multiple' be the genus of 'double',
'fraction' be also the genus of 'half'. For the opposite of the genus should
always be the genus of the opposite species. If, then, any one were to
assert that knowledge is a kind of sensation, then also the object of knowledge
will have to be a kind of object of sensation, whereas it is not: for an
object of knowledge is not always an object of sensation: for objects of
knowledge include some of the objects of intuition as well. Hence 'object
of sensation' is not the genus of 'object of knowledge': and if this be
so, neither is 'sensation' the genus of 'knowledge'.
Seeing that of relative terms some are of necessity found in, or
used of, the things in relation to which they happen at any time to be
used (e.g. 'disposition' and 'state' and 'balance'; for in nothing else
can the aforesaid terms possibly be found except in the things in relation
to which they are used), while others need not be found in the things in
relation to which they are used at any time, though they still may be (e.g.
if the term 'object of knowledge' be applied to the soul: for it is quite
possible that the knowledge of itself should be possessed by the soul itself,
but it is not necessary, for it is possible for this same knowledge to
be found in some one else), while for others, again, it is absolutely impossible
that they should be found in the things in relation to which they happen
at any time to be used (as e.g. that the contrary should be found in the
contrary or knowledge in the object of knowledge, unless the object of
knowledge happen to be a soul or a man)-you should look, therefore, and
see whether he places a term of one kind inside a genus that is not of
that kind, e.g. suppose he has said that 'memory' is the 'abiding of knowledge'.
For 'abiding' is always found in that which abides, and is used of that,
so that the abiding of knowledge also will be found in knowledge. Memory,
then, is found in knowledge, seeing that it is the abiding of knowledge.
But this is impossible, for memory is always found in the soul. The aforesaid
commonplace rule is common to the subject of Accident as well: for it is
all the same to say that 'abiding' is the genus of memory, or to allege
that it is an accident of it. For if in any way whatever memory be the
abiding of knowledge, the same argument in regard to it will
apply.
Part 5
Again, see if he has placed what is a 'state' inside the genus
'activity', or an activity inside the genus 'state', e.g. by defining 'sensation'
as 'movement communicated through the body': for sensation is a 'state',
whereas movement is an 'activity'. Likewise, also, if he has said that
memory is a 'state that is retentive of a conception', for memory is never
a state, but rather an activity.
They also make a bad mistake who rank a 'state' within the 'capacity'
that attends it, e.g. by defining 'good temper' as the 'control of anger',
and 'courage' and 'justice' as 'control of fears' and of 'gains': for the
terms 'courageous' and 'good-tempered' are applied to a man who is immune
from passion, whereas 'self-controlled' describes the man who is exposed
to passion and not led by it. Quite possibly, indeed, each of the former
is attended by a capacity such that, if he were exposed to passion, he
would control it and not be led by it: but, for all that, this is not what
is meant by being 'courageous' in the one case, and 'good tempered' in
the other; what is meant is an absolute immunity from any passions of that
kind at all.
Sometimes, also, people state any kind of attendant feature as
the genus, e.g. 'pain' as the genus of 'anger' and 'conception' as that
of conviction'. For both of the things in question follow in a certain
sense upon the given species, but neither of them is genus to it. For when
the angry man feels pain, the pain bas appeared in him earlier than the
anger: for his anger is not the cause of his pain, but his pain of his
anger, so that anger emphatically is not pain. By the same reasoning, neither
is conviction conception: for it is possible to have the same conception
even without being convinced of it, whereas this is impossible if conviction
be a species of conception: for it is impossible for a thing still to remain
the same if it be entirely transferred out of its species, just as neither
could the same animal at one time be, and at another not be, a man. If,
on the other hand, any one says that a man who has a conception must of
necessity be also convinced of it, then 'conception' and 'conviction' will
be used with an equal denotation, so that not even so could the former
be the genus of the latter: for the denotation of the genus should be
wider.
See, also, whether both naturally come to be anywhere in the same
thing: for what contains the species contains the genus as well: e.g. what
contains 'white' contains 'colour' as well, and what contains 'knowledge
of grammar' contains 'knowledge' as well. If, therefore, any one says that
'shame' is 'fear', or that 'anger' is 'pain', the result will be that genus
and species are not found in the same thing: for shame is found in the
'reasoning' faculty, whereas fear is in the 'spirited' faculty, and 'pain'
is found in the faculty of 'desires'. (for in this pleasure also is found),
whereas 'anger' is found in the 'spirited' faculty. Hence the terms rendered
are not the genera, seeing that they do not naturally come to be in the
same faculty as the species. Likewise, also, if 'friendship' be found in
the faculty of desires, you may take it that it is not a form of 'wishing':
for wishing is always found in the 'reasoning' faculty. This commonplace
rule is useful also in dealing with Accident: for the accident and that
of which it is an accident are both found in the same thing, so that if
they do not appear in the same thing, clearly it is not an
accident.
Again, see if the species partakes of the genus attributed only
in some particular respect: for it is the general view that the genus is
not thus imparted only in some particular respect: for a man is not an
animal in a particular respect, nor is grammar knowledge in a particular
respect only. Likewise also in other instances. Look, therefore, and see
if in the case of any of its species the genus be imparted only in a certain
respect; e.g. if 'animal' has been described as an 'object of perception'
or of 'sight'. For an animal is an object of perception or of sight in
a particular respect only; for it is in respect of its body that it is
perceived and seen, not in respect of its soul, so that-'object of sight'
and 'object of perception' could not be the genus of
'animal'.
Sometimes also people place the whole inside the part without detection,
defining (e.g.) 'animal' as an 'animate body'; whereas the part is not
predicated in any sense of the whole, so that 'body' could not be the genus
of animal, seeing that it is a part.
See also if he has put anything that is blameworthy or objectionable
into the class 'capacity' or 'capable', e.g. by defining a 'sophist' or
a 'slanderer', or a 'thief' as 'one who is capable of secretly thieving
other people's property'. For none of the aforesaid characters is so called
because he is 'capable' in one of these respects: for even God and the
good man are capable of doing bad things, but that is not their character:
for it is always in respect of their choice that bad men are so called.
Moreover, a capacity is always a desirable thing: for even the capacities
for doing bad things are desirable, and therefore it is we say that even
God and the good man possess them; for they are capable (we say) of doing
evil. So then 'capacity' can never be the genus of anything blameworthy.
Else, the result will be that what is blameworthy is sometimes desirable:
for there will be a certain form of capacity that is
blameworthy.
Also, see if he has put anything that is precious or desirable
for its own sake into the class 'capacity' or 'capable' or 'productive'
of anything. For capacity, and what is capable or productive of anything,
is always desirable for the sake of something else.
Or see if he has put anything that exists in two genera or more
into one of them only. For some things it is impossible to place in a single
genus, e.g. the 'cheat' and the 'slanderer': for neither he who has the
will without the capacity, nor he who has the capacity without the will,
is a slanderer or cheat, but he who has both of them. Hence he must be
put not into one genus, but into both the aforesaid
genera.
Moreover, people sometimes in converse order render genus as differentia,
and differentia as genus, defining (e.g.) astonishment as 'excess of wonderment'
and conviction as 'vehemence of conception'. For neither 'excess' nor 'vehemence'
is the genus, but the differentia: for astonishment is usually taken to
be an 'excessive wonderment', and conviction to be a 'vehement conception',
so that 'wonderment' and 'conception' are the genus, while 'excess' and
'vehemence' are the differentia. Moreover, if any one renders 'excess'
and 'vehemence' as genera, then inanimate things will be convinced and
astonished. For 'vehemence' and 'excess' of a thing are found in a thing
which is thus vehement and in excess. If, therefore, astonishment be excess
of wonderment the astonishment will be found in the wonderment, so that
'wonderment' will be astonished! Likewise, also, conviction will be found
in the conception, if it be 'vehemence of conception', so that the conception
will be convinced. Moreover, a man who renders an answer in this style
will in consequence find himself calling vehemence vehement and excess
excessive: for there is such a thing as a vehement conviction: if then
conviction be 'vehemence', there would be a 'vehement vehemence'. Likewise,
also, there is such a thing as excessive astonishment: if then astonishment
be an excess, there would be an 'excessive excess'. Whereas neither of
these things is generally believed, any more than that knowledge is a knower
or motion a moving thing.
Sometimes, too, people make the bad mistake of putting an affection
into that which is affected, as its genus, e.g. those who say that immortality
is everlasting life: for immortality seems to be a certain affection or
accidental feature of life. That this saying is true would appear clear
if any one were to admit that a man can pass from being mortal and become
immortal: for no one will assert that he takes another life, but that a
certain accidental feature or affection enters into this one as it is.
So then 'life' is not the genus of immortality.
Again, see if to an affection he has ascribed as genus the object
of which it is an affection, by defining (e.g.) wind as 'air in motion'.
Rather, wind is 'a movement of air': for the same air persists both when
it is in motion and when it is still. Hence wind is not 'air' at all: for
then there would also have been wind when the air was not in motion, seeing
that the same air which formed the wind persists. Likewise, also, in other
cases of the kind. Even, then, if we ought in this instance to admit the
point that wind is 'air in motion', yet we should accept a definition of
the kind, not about all those things of which the genus is not true, but
only in cases where the genus rendered is a true predicate. For in some
cases, e.g. 'mud' or 'snow', it is not generally held to be true. For people
tell you that snow is 'frozen water' and mud is earth mixed with moisture',
whereas snow is not water, nor mud earth, so that neither of the terms
rendered could be the genus: for the genus should be true of all its species.
Likewise neither is wine 'fermented water', as Empedocles speaks of 'water
fermented in wood';' for it simply is not water at all.
Part 6
Moreover, see whether the term rendered fail to be the genus of
anything at all; for then clearly it also fails to be the genus of the
species mentioned. Examine the point by seeing whether the objects that
partake of the genus fail to be specifically different from one another,
e.g. white objects: for these do not differ specifically from one another,
whereas of a genus the species are always different, so that 'white' could
not be the genus of anything.
Again, see whether he has named as genus or differentia some feature
that goes with everything: for the number of attributes that follow everything
is comparatively large: thus (e.g.) 'Being' and 'Unity' are among the number
of attributes that follow everything. If, therefore, he has rendered 'Being'
as a genus, clearly it would be the genus of everything, seeing that it
is predicated of everything; for the genus is never predicated of anything
except of its species. Hence Unity, inter alia, will be a species of Being.
The result, therefore, is that of all things of which the genus is predicated,
the species is predicated as well, seeing that Being and Unity are predicates
of absolutely everything, whereas the predication of the species ought
to be of narrower range. If, on the other hand, he has named as differentia
some attribute that follows everything, clearly the denotation of the differentia
will be equal to, or wider than, that of the genus. For if the genus, too,
be some attribute that follows everything, the denotation of the differentia
will be equal to its denotation, while if the genus do not follow everything,
it will be still wider.
Moreover, see if the description 'inherent in S' be used of the
genus rendered in relation to its species, as it is used of 'white' in
the case of snow, thus showing clearly that it could not be the genus:
for 'true of S' is the only description used of the genus in relation to
its species. Look and see also if the genus fails to be synonymous with
its species. For the genus is always predicated of its species
synonymously.
Moreover, beware, whenever both species and genus have a contrary,
and he places the better of the contraries inside the worse genus: for
the result will be that the remaining species will be found in the remaining
genus, seeing that contraries are found in contrary genera, so that the
better species will be found in the worse genus and the worse in the better:
whereas the usual view is that of the better species the genus too is better.
Also see if he has placed the species inside the worse and not inside the
better genus, when it is at the same time related in like manner to both,
as (e.g.) if he has defined the 'soul' as a 'form of motion' or 'a form
of moving thing'. For the same soul is usually thought to be a principle
alike of rest and of motion, so that, if rest is the better of the two,
this is the genus into which the soul should have been
put.
Moreover, judge by means of greater and less degrees: if overthrowing
a view, see whether the genus admits of a greater degree, whereas neither
the species itself does so, nor any term that is called after it: e.g.
if virtue admits of a greater degree, so too does justice and the just
man: for one man is called 'more just than another'. If, therefore, the
genus rendered admits of a greater degree, whereas neither the species
does so itself nor yet any term called after it, then what has been rendered
could not be the genus.
Again, if what is more generally, or as generally, thought to be
the genus be not so, clearly neither is the genus rendered. The commonplace
rule in question is useful especially in cases where the species appears
to have several predicates in the category of essence, and where no distinction
has been drawn between them, and we cannot say which of them is genus;
e.g. both 'pain' and the 'conception of a slight' are usually thought to
be predicates of 'anger in the category of essence: for the angry man is
both in pain and also conceives that he is slighted. The same mode of inquiry
may be applied also to the case of the species, by comparing it with some
other species: for if the one which is more generally, or as generally,
thought to be found in the genus rendered be not found therein, then clearly
neither could the species rendered be found therein.
In demolishing a view, therefore, you should follow the rule as
stated. In establishing one, on the other hand, the commonplace rule that
you should see if both the genus rendered and the species admit of a greater
degree will not serve: for even though both admit it, it is still possible
for one not to be the genus of the other. For both 'beautiful' and 'white'
admit of a greater degree, and neither is the genus of the other. On the
other hand, the comparison of the genera and of the species one with another
is of use: e.g. supposing A and B to have a like claim to be genus, then
if one be a genus, so also is the other. Likewise, also, if what has less
claim be a genus, so also is what has more claim: e.g. if 'capacity' have
more claim than 'virtue' to be the genus of self-control, and virtue be
the genus, so also is capacity. The same observations will apply also in
the case of the species. For instance, supposing A and B to have a like
claim to be a species of the genus in question, then if the one be a species,
so also is the other: and if that which is less generally thought to be
so be a species, so also is that which is more generally thought to be
so.
Moreover, to establish a view, you should look and see if the genus
is predicated in the category of essence of those things of which it has
been rendered as the genus, supposing the species rendered to be not one
single species but several different ones: for then clearly it will be
the genus. If, on the other, the species rendered be single, look and see
whether the genus be predicated in the category of essence of other species
as well: for then, again, the result will be that it is predicated of several
different species.
Since some people think that the differentia, too, is a predicate
of the various species in the category of essence, you should distinguish
the genus from the differentia by employing the aforesaid elementary principles-(a)
that the genus has a wider denotation than the differentia; (b) that in
rendering the essence of a thing it is more fitting to state the genus
than the differentia: for any one who says that 'man' is an 'animal' shows
what man is better than he who describes him as 'walking'; also (c) that
the differentia always signifies a quality of the genus, whereas the genus
does not do this of the differentia: for he who says 'walking' describes
an animal of a certain quality, whereas he who says 'animal' describes
an animal of a certain quality, whereas he who says 'animal' does not describe
a walking thing of a certain quality.
The differentia, then, should be distinguished from the genus in
this manner. Now seeing it is generally held that if what is musical, in
being musical, possesses knowledge in some respect, then also 'music' is
a particular kind of 'knowledge'; and also that if what walks is moved
in walking, then 'walking' is a particular kind of 'movement'; you should
therefore examine in the aforesaid manner any genus in which you want to
establish the existence of something; e.g. if you wish to prove that 'knowledge'
is a form of 'conviction', see whether the knower in knowing is convinced:
for then clearly knowledge would be a particular kind of conviction. You
should proceed in the same way also in regard to the other cases of this
kind.
Moreover, seeing that it is difficult to distinguish whatever always
follows along with a thing, and is not convertible with it, from its genus,
if A follows B universally, whereas B does not follow A universally-as
e.g. 'rest' always follows a 'calm' and 'divisibility' follows 'number',
but not conversely (for the divisible is not always a number, nor rest
a calm)-you may yourself assume in your treatment of them that the one
which always follows is the genus, whenever the other is not convertible
with it: if, on the other hand, some one else puts forward the proposition,
do not accept it universally. An objection to it is that 'not-being' always
follows what is 'coming to be' (for what is coming to be is not) and is
not convertible with it (for what is not is not always coming to be), and
that still 'not-being' is not the genus of 'coming to be': for 'not-being'
has not any species at all. Questions, then, in regard to Genus should
be investigated in the ways described.
Topics
By Aristotle
Book V
Part 1
The question whether the attribute stated is or is not a property, should
be examined by the following methods:
Any 'property' rendered is always either essential and permanent
or relative and temporary: e.g. it is an 'essential property' of man to
be 'by nature a civilized animal': a 'relative property' is one like that
of the soul in relation to the body, viz. that the one is fitted to command,
and the other to obey: a 'permanent property' is one like the property
which belongs to God, of being an 'immortal living being': a 'temporary
property' is one like the property which belongs to any particular man
of walking in the gymnasium.
[The rendering of a property 'relatively' gives rise either to
two problems or to four. For if he at the same time render this property
of one thing and deny it of another, only two problems arise, as in the
case of a statement that it is a property of a man, in relation to a horse,
to be a biped. For one might try both to show that a man is not a biped,
and also that a horse is a biped: in both ways the property would be upset.
If on the other hand he render one apiece of two attributes to each of
two things, and deny it in each case of the other, there will then be four
problems; as in the case of a statement that it is a property of a man
in relation to a horse for the former to be a biped and the latter a quadruped.
For then it is possible to try to show both that a man is not naturally
a biped, and that he is a quadruped, and also that the horse both is a
biped, and is not a quadruped. If you show any of these at all, the intended
attribute is demolished.]
An 'essential' property is one which is rendered of a thing in
comparison with everything else and distinguishes the said thing from everything
else, as does 'a mortal living being capable of receiving knowledge' in
the case of man. A 'relative' property is one which separates its subject
off not from everything else but only from a particular definite thing,
as does the property which virtue possesses, in comparison with knowledge,
viz. that the former is naturally produced in more than one faculty, whereas
the latter is produced in that of reason alone, and in those who have a
reasoning faculty. A 'permanent' property is one which is true at every
time, and never fails, like being' compounded of soul and body', in the
case of a living creature. A 'temporary' property is one which is true
at some particular time, and does not of necessity always follow; as, of
some particular man, that he walks in the market-place.
To render a property 'relatively' to something else means to state
the difference between them as it is found either universally and always,
or generally and in most cases: thus a difference that is found universally
and always, is one such as man possesses in comparison with a horse, viz.
being a biped: for a man is always and in every case a biped, whereas a
horse is never a biped at any time. On the other hand, a difference that
is found generally and in most cases, is one such as the faculty of reason
possesses in comparison with that of desire and spirit, in that the former
commands, while the latter obeys: for the reasoning faculty does not always
command, but sometimes also is under command, nor is that of desire and
spirit always under command, but also on occasion assumes the command,
whenever the soul of a man is vicious.
Of 'properties' the most 'arguable' are the essential and permanent
and the relative. For a relative property gives rise, as we said before,
to several questions: for of necessity the questions arising are either
two or four, or that arguments in regard to these are several. An essential
and a permanent property you can discuss in relation to many things, or
can observe in relation to many periods of time: if essential', discuss
it in comparison with many things: for the property ought to belong to
its subject in comparison with every single thing that is, so that if the
subject be not distinguished by it in comparison with everything else,
the property could not have been rendered correctly. So a permanent property
you should observe in relation to many periods of time; for if it does
not or did not, or is not going to, belong, it will not be a property.
On the other hand, about a temporary property we do not inquire further
than in regard to the time called 'the present'; and so arguments in regard
to it are not many; whereas an arguable' question is one in regard to which
it is possible for arguments both numerous and good to
arise.
The so-called 'relative' property, then, should be examined by
means of the commonplace arguments relating to Accident, to see whether
it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on the other hand, permanent
and essential properties should be considered by the following
methods.
Part 2
First, see whether the property has or has not been rendered correctly.
Of a rendering being incorrect or correct, one test is to see whether the
terms in which the property is stated are not or are more intelligible-for
destructive purposes, whether they are not so, and for constructive purposes,
whether they are so. Of the terms not being more intelligible, one test
is to see whether the property which he renders is altogether more unintelligible
than the subject whose property he has stated: for, if so, the property
will not have been stated correctly. For the object of getting a property
constituted is to be intelligible: the terms therefore in which it is rendered
should be more intelligible: for in that case it will be possible to conceive
it more adequately, e.g. any one who has stated that it is a property of
'fire' to 'bear a very close resemblance to the soul', uses the term 'soul',
which is less intelligible than 'fire'-for we know better what fire is
than what soul is-, and therefore a 'very close resemblance to the soul'
could not be correctly stated to be a property of fire. Another test is
to see whether the attribution of A (property) to B (subject) fails to
be more intelligible. For not only should the property be more intelligible
than its subject, but also it should be something whose attribution to
the particular subject is a more intelligible attribution. For he who does
not know whether it is an attribute of the particular subject at all, will
not know either whether it belongs to it alone, so that whichever of these
results happens, its character as a property becomes obscure. Thus (e.g.)
a man who has stated that it is a property of fire to be 'the primary element
wherein the soul is naturally found', has introduced a subject which is
less intelligible than 'fire', viz. whether the soul is found in it, and
whether it is found there primarily; and therefore to be 'the primary element
in which the soul is naturally found' could not be correctly stated to
be a property of 'fire'. On the other hand, for constructive purposes,
see whether the terms in which the property is stated are more intelligible,
and if they are more intelligible in each of the aforesaid ways. For then
the property will have been correctly stated in this respect: for of constructive
arguments, showing the correctness of a rendering, some will show the correctness
merely in this respect, while others will show it without qualification.
Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that the 'possession of sensation' is a
property of 'animal' has both used more intelligible terms and has rendered
the property more intelligible in each of the aforesaid senses; so that
to 'possess sensation' would in this respect have been correctly rendered
as a property of 'animal'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether any of the terms rendered
in the property is used in more than one sense, or whether the whole expression
too signifies more than one thing. For then the property will not have
been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) seeing that to 'being natural sentient'
signifies more than one thing, viz. (1) to possess sensation, (2) to use
one's sensation, being naturally sentient' could not be a correct statement
of a property of 'animal'. The reason why the term you use, or the whole
expression signifying the property, should not bear more than one meaning
is this, that an expression bearing more than one meaning makes the object
described obscure, because the man who is about to attempt an argument
is in doubt which of the various senses the expression bears: and this
will not do, for the object of rendering the property is that he may understand.
Moreover, in addition to this, it is inevitable that those who render a
property after this fashion should be somehow refuted whenever any one
addresses his syllogism to that one of the term's several meanings which
does not agree. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether
both all the terms and also the expression as a whole avoid bearing more
than one sense: for then the property will have been correctly stated in
this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'body' does not bear several meanings,
nor quickest to move upwards in space', nor yet the whole expression made
by putting them together, it would be correct in this respect to say that
it is a property of fire to be the 'body quickest to move upwards in
space'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the term of which he renders
the property is used in more than one sense, and no distinction has been
drawn as to which of them it is whose property he is stating: for then
the property will not have been correctly rendered. The reasons why this
is so are quite clear from what has been said above: for the same results
are bound to follow. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'the knowledge of this' signifies
many things for it means (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the
use of its knowledge by it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4)
the use of knowledge about it-no property of the 'knowledge of this' could
be rendered correctly unless he draw a distinction as to which of these
it is whose property he is rendering. For constructive purposes, a man
should see if the term of which he is rendering the property avoids bearing
many senses and is one and simple: for then the property will have been
correctly stated in this respect. Thus (e.g.) seeing that 'man' is used
in a single sense, 'naturally civilized animal' would be correctly stated
as a property of man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether the same term has been
repeated in the property. For people often do this undetected in rendering
'properties' also, just as they do in their 'definitions' as well: but
a property to which this has happened will not have been correctly stated:
for the repetition of it confuses the hearer; thus inevitably the meaning
becomes obscure, and further, such people are thought to babble. Repetition
of the same term is likely to happen in two ways; one is, when a man repeatedly
uses the same word, as would happen if any one were to render, as a property
of fire, 'the body which is the most rarefied of bodies' (for he has repeated
the word 'body'); the second is, if a man replaces words by their definitions,
as would happen if any one were to render, as a property of earth, 'the
substance which is by its nature most easily of all bodies borne downwards
in space', and were then to substitute 'substances of such and such a kind'
for the word 'bodies': for 'body' and 'a substance of such and such a kind'
mean one and the same thing. For he will have repeated the word 'substance',
and accordingly neither of the properties would be correctly stated. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids ever repeating
the same term; for then the property will in this respect have been correctly
rendered. Thus (e.g.) seeing that he who has stated 'animal capable of
acquiring knowledge' as a property of man has avoided repeating the same
term several times, the property would in this respect have been correctly
rendered of man.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered in
the property any such term as is a universal attribute. For one which does
not distinguish its subject from other things is useless, and it is the
business of the language Of 'properties', as also of the language of definitions,
to distinguish. In the case contemplated, therefore, the property will
not have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that
it is a property of knowledge to be a 'conception incontrovertible by argument,
because of its unity', has used in the property a term of that kind, viz.
'unity', which is a universal attribute; and therefore the property of
knowledge could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see whether he has avoided all terms that are common
to everything and used a term that distinguishes the subject from something:
for then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has said that it is a property of a 'living
creature' to 'have a soul' has used no term that is common to everything,
it would in this respect have been correctly stated to be a property of
a 'living creature' to 'have a soul'.
Next, for destructive purposes see whether he renders more than
one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso that he is stating
more than one: for then the property will not have been correctly stated.
For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further addition
beside the expression which shows the essence, so too in the case of properties
nothing further should be rendered beside the expression that constitutes
the property mentioned: for such an addition is made to no purpose. Thus
(e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of fire to be 'the most
rarefied and lightest body' has rendered more than one property (for each
term is a true predicate of fire alone); and so it could not be a correctly
stated property of fire to be 'the most rarefied and lightest body'. On
the other hand, for constructive purposes, see whether he has avoided rendering
more than one property of the same thing, and has rendered one only: for
then the property will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus
(e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a liquid to be a 'body
adaptable to every shape' has rendered as its property a single character
and not several, and so the property of 'liquid' would in this respect
have been correctly stated.
Part 3
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has employed either
the actual subject whose property he is rendering, or any of its species:
for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For the object
of rendering the property is that people may understand: now the subject
itself is just as unintelligible as it was to start with, while any one
of its species is posterior to it, and so is no more intelligible. Accordingly
it is impossible to understand anything further by the use of these terms.
Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is property of 'animal' to be
'the substance to which "man" belongs as a species' has employed one of
its species, and therefore the property could not have been correctly stated.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether he avoids introducing
either the subject itself or any of its species: for then the property
will in this respect have been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who
has stated that it is a property of a living creature to be 'compounded
of soul and body' has avoided introducing among the rest either the subject
itself or any of its species, and therefore in this respect the property
of a 'living creature' would have been correctly rendered.
You should inquire in the same way also in the case of other terms
that do or do not make the subject more intelligible: thus, for destructive
purposes, see whether he has employed anything either opposite to the subject
or, in general, anything simultaneous by nature with it or posterior to
it: for then the property will not have been correctly stated. For an opposite
is simultaneous by nature with its opposite, and what is simultaneous by
nature or is posterior to it does not make its subject more intelligible.
Thus (e.g.) any one who has said that it is a property of good to be 'the
most direct opposite of evil', has employed the opposite of good, and so
the property of good could not have been correctly rendered. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see whether he has avoided employing anything
either opposite to, or, in general, simultaneous by nature with the subject,
or posterior to it: for then the property will in this respect have been
correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property
of knowledge to be 'the most convincing conception' has avoided employing
anything either opposite to, or simultaneous by nature with, or posterior
to, the subject; and so the property of knowledge would in this respect
have been correctly stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered as
property something that does not always follow the subject but sometimes
ceases to be its property: for then the property will not have been correctly
described. For there is no necessity either that the name of the subject
must also be true of anything to which we find such an attribute belonging;
nor yet that the name of the subject will be untrue of anything to which
such an attribute is found not to belong. Moreover, in addition to this,
even after he has rendered the property it will not be clear whether it
belongs, seeing that it is the kind of attribute that may fall: and so
the property will not be clear. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it
is a property of animal 'sometimes to move and sometimes to stand still'
rendered the kind of property which sometimes is not a property, and so
the property could not have been correctly stated. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see whether he has rendered something that of necessity
must always be a property: for then the property will have been in this
respect correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a
property of virtue to be 'what makes its possessor good' has rendered as
property something that always follows, and so the property of virtue would
in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether in rendering the property
of the present time he has omitted to make a definite proviso that it is
the property of the present time which he is rendering: for else the property
will not have been correctly stated. For in the first place, any unusual
procedure always needs a definite proviso: and it is the usual procedure
for everybody to render as property some attribute that always follows.
In the second place, a man who omits to provide definitely whether it was
the property of the present time which he intended to state, is obscure:
and one should not give any occasion for adverse criticism. Thus (e.g.)
a man who has stated it as the property of a particular man 'to be sitting
with a particular man', states the property of the present time, and so
he cannot have rendered the property correctly, seeing that he has described
it without any definite proviso. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see whether, in rendering the property of the present time, he has,
in stating it, made a definite proviso that it is the property of the present
time that he is stating: for then the property will in this respect have
been correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property
of a particular man 'to be walking now', has made this distinction in his
statement, and so the property would have been correctly
stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered a property
of the kind whose appropriateness is not obvious except by sensation: for
then the property will not have been correctly stated. For every sensible
attribute, once it is taken beyond the sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain.
For it is not clear whether it still belongs, because it is evidenced only
by sensation. This principle will be true in the case of any attributes
that do not always and necessarily follow. Thus (e.g.) any one who has
stated that it is a property of the sun to be 'the brightest star that
moves over the earth', has used in describing the property an expression
of that kind, viz. 'to move over the earth', which is evidenced by sensation;
and so the sun's property could not have been correctly rendered: for it
will be uncertain, whenever the sun sets, whether it continues to move
over the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see whether he has rendered the property of a kind that
is not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible, must clearly belong
of necessity: for then the property will in this respect have been correctly
stated. Thus (e.g.) a man who has stated that it is a property of a surface
to be 'the primary thing that is coloured', has introduced amongst the
rest a sensible quality, 'to be coloured', but still a quality such as
manifestly always belongs, and so the property of 'surface' would in this
respect have been correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the
definition as a property: for then the property will not have been correctly
stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its essence. Thus
(e.g.) a man who has said that it is the property of man to be 'a walking,
biped animal' has rendered a property of man so as to signify his essence,
and so the property of man could not have been correctly rendered. For
constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property which
he has rendered forms a predicate convertible with its subject, without,
however, signifying its essence: for then the property will in this respect
have been correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that it is
a property of man to be a 'naturally civilized animal' has rendered the
property so as to be convertible with its subject, without, however, showing
its essence, and so the property of man' would in this respect have been
correctly rendered.
Next, for destructive purposes, see whether he has rendered the
property without having placed the subject within its essence. For of properties,
as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered should be the genus,
and then the rest of it should be appended immediately afterwards, and
should distinguish its subject from other things. Hence a property which
is not stated in this way could not have been correctly rendered. Thus
(e.g.) a man who has said that it is a property of a living creature to
'have a soul' has not placed 'living creature' within its essence, and
so the property of a living creature could not have been correctly stated.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether a man first places
within its essence the subject whose property he is rendering, and then
appends the rest: for then the property will in this respect have been
correctly rendered. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that is a property of
man to be an 'animal capable of receiving knowledge', has rendered the
property after placing the subject within its essence, and so the property
of 'man' would in this respect have been correctly rendered.
Part 4
The inquiry, then, whether the property has been correctly rendered
or no, should be made by these means. The question, on the other hand,
whether what is stated is or is not a property at all, you should examine
from the following points of view. For the commonplace arguments which
establish absolutely that the property is accurately stated will be the
same as those that constitute it a property at all: accordingly they will
be described in the course of them.
Firstly, then, for destructive purposes, take a look at each subject
of which he has rendered the property, and see (e.g.) if it fails to belong
to any of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular respect,
or to be a property of each of them in respect of that character of which
he has rendered the property: for then what is stated to be a property
will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is not true of
the geometrician that he 'cannot be deceived by an argument' (for a geometrician
is deceived when his figure is misdrawn), it could not be a property of
the man of science that he is not deceived by an argument. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see whether the property rendered be true
of every instance, and true in that particular respect: for then what is
stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus, for example, in as
much as the description 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' is true
of every man, and true of him qua man, it would be a property of man to
be 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge'. commonplace rule means-for
destructive purposes, see if the description fails to be true of that of
which the name is true; and if the name fails to be true of that of which
the description is true: for constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if the description too is predicated of that of which the name is predicated,
and if the name too is predicated of that of which the description is
predicated.]
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the description fails to
apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to apply
to that to which the description applies: for then what is stated to be
a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the description
'a living being that partakes of knowledge' is true of God, while 'man'
is not predicated of God, to be a living being that partakes of knowledge'
could not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see if the name as well be predicated of that of which the description
is predicated, and if the description as well be predicated of that of
which the name is predicated. For then what is stated not to be a property
will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the predicate 'living creature' is true
of that of which 'having a soul' is true, and 'having a soul' is true of
that of which the predicate 'living creature' is true; and so 'having a
soul would be a property of 'living creature'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered a subject
as a property of that which is described as 'in the subject': for then
what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as he who has rendered 'fire' as the property of 'the body with
the most rarefied particles', has rendered the subject as the property
of its predicate, 'fire' could not be a property of 'the body with the
most rarefied particles'. The reason why the subject will not be a property
of that which is found in the subject is this, that then the same thing
will be the property of a number of things that are specifically different.
For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates
that belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these,
if any one states the property in this way. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in the subject
as a property of the subject: for then what has been stated not to be a
property will be a property, if it be predicated only of the things of
which it has been stated to be the property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said
that it is a property of 'earth' to be 'specifically the heaviest body'
has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the
thing in question alone, and is said of it in the manner in which a property
is predicated, and so the property of earth would have been rightly
stated.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered the property
as partaken of: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a
property. For an attribute of which the subject partakes is a constituent
part of its essence: and an attribute of that kind would be a differentia
applying to some one species. E.g. inasmuch as he who has said that 'walking
on two feet' is property of man has rendered the property as partaken of,
'walking on two feet' could not be a property of 'man'. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property
as partaken of, or as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated
convertibly with it: for then what is stated not to be a property will
be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that to be 'naturally sentient'
is a property of 'animal' has rendered the property neither as partaken
of nor as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly
with it; and so to be 'naturally sentient' would be a property of
'animal'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property cannot possibly
belong simultaneously, but must belong either as posterior or as prior
to the attribute described in the name: for then what is stated to be a
property will not be a property either never, or not always. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as it is possible for the attribute 'walking through the market-place'
to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to the attribute 'man',
'walking through the market-place' could not be a property of 'man' either
never, or not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either
a definition or a differentia: for then what is stated not to be a property
will be a property. Thus (e.g.) the attribute 'an animal capable of receiving
knowledge' always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with the attribute
'man', and is neither differentia nor definition of its subject, and so
'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' would be a property of
'man'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to
be a property of things that are the same as the subject, so far as they
are the same: for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property.
Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of a 'proper object of
pursuit' to 'appear good to certain persons', it could not be a property
of the 'desirable' either to 'appear good to certain persons': for 'proper
object of pursuit' and 'desirable' mean the same. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something that
is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same. For then is stated
not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is
called a property of a man, in so far as he is a man, 'to have a tripartite
soul', it would also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a mortal,
to have a tripartite soul. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing
with Accident: for the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong
to the same things, in so far as they are the same.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that
are the same in kind as the subject fails to be always the same in kind
as the alleged property: for then neither will what is stated to be the
property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and
a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse
to stand by its own initiative, it could not be a property of a man to
move by his own initiative; for to stand and to move by his own initiative
are the same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as
each is an 'animal'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see
if of things that are the same in kind as the subject the property that
is the same as the alleged property is always true: for then what is stated
not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property
of man to be a 'walking biped,' it would also be a property of a bird to
be a 'flying biped': for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as
the one pair have the sameness of species that fall under the same genus,
being under the genus 'animal', while the other pair have that of differentiae
of the genus, viz. of 'animal'. This commonplace rule is deceptive whenever
one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while
the other belongs to many, as does 'walking quadruped'.
Inasmuch as 'same' and 'different' are terms used in several senses,
it is a job to render to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs
to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something
qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with
the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs to 'man'
will belong also to 'white man', if there be a white man, and one that
belongs to 'white man' will belong also to 'man'. One might, then, bring
captious criticism against the majority of properties, by representing
the subject as being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined
with its accident, saying, for example, that 'man' is one thing, and white
man' another, and moreover by representing as different a certain state
and what is called after that state. For an attribute that belongs to the
state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that
belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state:
e.g. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after his science,
it could not be a property of 'science' that it is 'incontrovertible by
argument'; for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by argument.
For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of
an accident is not absolutely different from the accident taken along with
its subject; though it is called 'another' thing because the mode of being
of the two is different: for it is not the same thing for a man to be a
man and for a white man to be a white man. Moreover, you should take a
look along at the inflections, and say that the description of the man
of science is wrong: one should say not 'it' but 'he is incontrovertible
by argument'; while the description of Science is wrong too: one should
say not 'it' but 'she is incontrovertible by argument'. For against an
objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at
nothing.
Part 5
Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render
an attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in his language in such
a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs: for then it would be
generally agreed that what has been stated to be a property is upset. Thus
(e.g.) the man who has said that 'biped' is a property of man intends to
render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his expression actually
indicates one that invariably belongs: accordingly, 'biped' could not be
a property of man: for not every man is possessed of two feet. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if he intends to render the property that
naturally belongs, and indicates it in that way in his language: for then
the property will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders
as a property of 'man' the phrase 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge'
both intends, and by his language indicates, the property that belongs
by nature, and so 'an animal capable of receiving knowledge' would not
be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of
man.
Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are
primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job
to render the property of such things. For if you render a property as
belonging to the subject that is so called after something else, then it
will be true of its primary subject as well; whereas if you state it of
its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that
is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders , coloured'
as the property of 'surface', 'coloured' will be true of body as well;
whereas if he render it of 'body', it will be predicated also of 'surface'.
Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the description
is true.
In the case of some properties it mostly happens that some error
is incurred because of a failure to define how as well as to what things
the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the
property of a thing something that belongs to it either naturally, as 'biped'
belongs to 'man', or actually, as 'having four fingers' belongs to a particular
man, or specifically, as 'consisting of most rarefied particles' belongs
to 'fire', or absolutely, as 'life' to 'living being', or one that belongs
to a thing only as called after something else, as 'wisdom' to the 'soul',
or on the other hand primarily, as 'wisdom' to the 'rational faculty',
or because the thing is in a certain state, as 'incontrovertible by argument'
belongs to a 'scientist' (for simply and solely by reason of his being
in a certain state will he be 'incontrovertible by argument'), or because
it is the state possessed by something, as 'incontrovertible by argument'
belongs to 'science', or because it is partaken of, as 'sensation' belongs
to 'animal' (for other things as well have sensation, e.g. man, but they
have it because they already partake of 'animal'), or because it partakes
of something else, as 'life' belongs to a particular kind of 'living being'.
Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to add the word 'naturally',
because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which
it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it belongs to a man to have two feet: so
too he errs if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering
what actually belongs, because one day that attribute will not be what
it now is, e.g. the man's possession of four fingers. So he errs if he
has not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily, or
that he calls it so after something else, because then its name too will
not be true of that of which the description is true, as is the case with
'coloured', whether rendered as a property of 'surface' or of 'body'. So
he errs if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to
a thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because it is a
state possessed by something; because then it will not be a property. For,
supposing he renders the property to something as being a state possessed,
it will belong to what possesses that state; while supposing he renders
it to what possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed,
as did 'incontrovertible by argument' when stated as a property of 'science'
or of the 'scientist'. So he errs if he has not indicated beforehand that
the property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of by,
something; because then the property will belong to certain other things
as well. For if he renders it because its subject is partaken of, it will
belong to the things which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because
its subject partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken
of, as (e.g.) if he were to state 'life' to be a property of a 'particular
kind of living being', or just of 'living being. So he errs if he has not
expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically, because
then it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term
of which he states the property: for the superlative belongs only to one
of them, e.g. 'lightest' as applied to 'fire'. Sometimes, too, a man may
even add the word 'specifically', and still make a mistake. For the things
in question should all be of one species, whenever the word 'specifically'
is added: and in some cases this does not occur, as it does not, in fact,
in the case of fire. For fire is not all of one species; for live coals
and flame and light are each of them 'fire', but are of different species.
The reason why, whenever 'specifically' is added, there should not be any
species other than the one mentioned, is this, that if there be, then the
property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others
in a less degree, as happens with 'consisting of most rarefied particles'
in the case of fire: for 'light' consists of more rarefied particles than
live coals and flame. And this should not happen unless the name too be
predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is truer;
otherwise the rule that where the description is truer the name too should
be truer is not fulfilled. Moreover, in addition to this, the same attribute
will be the property both of the term which has it absolutely and of that
element therein which has it in the highest degree, as is the condition
of the property 'consisting of most rarefied particles' in the case of
'fire': for this same attribute will be the property of 'light' as well:
for it is 'light' that 'consists of the most rarefied particles'. If, then,
any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it; for oneself,
one should not give occasion for this objection, but should define in what
manner one states the property at the actual time of making the
statement.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as
a property of itself: for then what has been stated to be a property will
not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its own essence, and
what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.)
he who has said that 'becoming' is a property of 'beautiful' has rendered
the term as a property of itself (for 'beautiful' and 'becoming' are the
same); and so 'becoming' could not be a property of 'beautiful'. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing as
a property of itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate: for then
what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus he who has
stated 'animate substance' as a property of 'living-creature' has not stated
'living-creature' as a property of itself, but has rendered a convertible
predicate, so that 'animate substance' would be a property of
'living-creature'.
Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should
look and see, for destructive purposes, if the property of the whole be
not true of the part, or if that of the part be not predicated of the whole:
for then what has been stated to be the property will not be a property.
In some cases it happens that this is so: for sometimes in rendering a
property in the case of things that consist of like parts a man may have
his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may address himself to what is
predicated of the part: and then in neither case will it have been rightly
rendered. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said
that it is a property of the 'sea' to be 'the largest volume of salt water',
has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but has
rendered an attribute of such a kind as is not true of the part (for a
particular sea is not 'the largest volume of salt water'); and so the largest
volume of salt water' could not be a property of the 'sea'. Now take one
referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of
'air' to be 'breathable' has stated the property of something that consists
of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of some
air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the whole of the air is
not breathable); and so 'breathable' could not be a property of 'air'.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, while it is
true of each of the things with similar parts, it is on the other hand
a property of them taken as a collective whole: for then what has been
stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) while it is
true of earth everywhere that it naturally falls downwards, it is a property
of the various particular pieces of earth taken as 'the Earth', so that
it would be a property of 'earth' 'naturally to fall
downwards'.
Part 6
Next, look from the point of view of the respective opposites,
and first (a) from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive purposes,
if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a property of the contrary
subject. For then neither will the contrary of the first be a property
of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as injustice is contrary
to justice, and the lowest evil to the highest good, but 'to be the highest
good' is not a property of 'justice', therefore 'to be the lowest evil'
could not be a property of 'injustice'. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the contrary: for then
also the contrary of the first will be the property of the contrary of
the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to good, and objectionable
to desirable, and 'desirable' is a property of 'good', 'objectionable'
would be a property of 'evil'.
Secondly (h) look from the point of view of relative opposites
and see, for destructive purposes, if the correlative of the term rendered
fails to be a property of the correlative of the subject: for then neither
will the correlative of the first be a property of the correlative of the
second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'double' is relative to 'half', and 'in
excess' to 'exceeded', while 'in excess' is not a property of 'double',
exceeded' could not be a property of 'half'. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if the correlative of the alleged property is a
property of the subject's correlative: for then also the correlative of
the first will be a property of the correlative of the second: e.g. inasmuch
as 'double' is relative to 'half', and the proportion 1:2 is relative to
the proportion 2:1, while it is a property of 'double' to be 'in the proportion
of 2 to 1', it would be a property of 'half' to be 'in the proportion of
1 to 2'.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if an attribute described
in terms of a state (X) fails to be a property of the given state (Y):
for then neither will the attribute described in terms of the privation
(of X) be a property of the privation (of Y). Also if, on the other hand,
an attribute described in terms of the privation (of X) be not a property
of the given privation (of Y), neither will the attribute described in
terms of the state (X) be a property of the state (Y). Thus, for example,
inasmuch as it is not predicated as a property of 'deafness' to be a 'lack
of sensation', neither could it be a property of 'hearing' to be a 'sensation'.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if an attribute described
in terms of a state (X) is a property of the given state (Y): for then
also the attribute that is described in terms of the privation (of X) will
be a property of the privation (of Y). Also, if an attribute described
in terms of a privation (of X) be a property of the privation (of Y), then
also the attribute that is described in terms of the state (X) will be
a property of the state (Y). Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to see' is a property
of 'sight', inasmuch as we have sight, 'failure to see' would be a property
of 'blindness', inasmuch as we have not got the sight we should naturally
have.
Next, look from the point of view of positive and negative terms;
and first (a) from the point of view of the predicates taken by themselves.
This common-place rule is useful only for a destructive purpose. Thus (e.g.)
see if the positive term or the attribute described in terms of it is a
property of the subject: for then the negative term or the attribute described
in terms of it will not be a property of the subject. Also if, on the other
hand, the negative term or the attribute described in terms of it is a
property of the subject, then the positive term or the attribute described
in terms of it will not be a property of the subject: e.g. inasmuch as
'animate' is a property of 'living creature', 'inanimate' could not be
a property of 'living creature'.
Secondly (b) look from the point of view of the predicates, positive
or negative, and their respective subjects; and see, for destructive purposes,
if the positive term falls to be a property of the positive subject: for
then neither will the negative term be a property of the negative subject.
Also, if the negative term fails to be a property of the negative subject,
neither will the positive term be a property of the positive subject. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as 'animal' is not a property of 'man', neither could 'not-animal'
be a property of 'not-man'. Also if 'not-animal' seems not to be a property
of 'not-man', neither will 'animal' be a property of 'man'. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if the positive term is a property of
the positive subject: for then the negative term will be a property of
the negative subject as well. Also if the negative term be a property of
the negative subject, the positive will be a property of the positive as
well. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of 'not-living being' 'not
to live', it would be a property of 'living being' 'to live': also if it
seems to be a property of 'living being' 'to live', it will also seem to
be a property of 'not-living being' 'not to live'.
Thirdly (c) look from the point of view of the subjects taken by
themselves, and see, for destructive purposes, if the property rendered
is a property of the positive subject: for then the same term will not
be a property of the negative subject as well. Also, if the term rendered
be a property of the negative subject, it will not be a property of the
positive. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'animate' is a property of 'living creature',
'animate' could not be a property of 'not-living creature'. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, if the term rendered fails to be a property
of the affirmative subject it would be a property of the negative. This
commonplace rule is, however, deceptive: for a positive term is not a property
of a negative, or a negative of a positive. For a positive term does not
belong at all to a negative, while a negative term, though it belongs to
a positive, does not belong as a property.
Next, look from the point of view of the coordinate members of
a division, and see, for destructive purposes, if none of the co-ordinate
members (parallel with the property rendered) be a property of any of the
remaining set of co-ordinate members (parallel with the subject): for then
neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated
to be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible living being' is not
a property of any of the other living beings, 'intelligible living being'
could not be a property of God. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see if some one or other of the remaining co-ordinate members (parallel
with the property rendered) be a property of each of these co-ordinate
members (parallel with the subject): for then the remaining one too will
be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is a property of 'wisdom' to be essentially
'the natural virtue of the rational faculty', then, taking each of the
other virtues as well in this way, it would be a property of 'temperance'
to be essentially 'the natural virtue of the faculty of
desire'.
Next, look from the point of view of the inflexions, and see, for
destructive purposes, if the inflexion of the property rendered fails to
be a property of the inflexion of the subject: for then neither will the
other inflexion be a property of the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch
as 'beautifully' is not a property of 'justly', neither could 'beautiful'
be a property of 'just'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if the inflexion of the property rendered is a property of the inflexion
of the subject: for then also the other inflexion will be a property of
the other inflexion. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'walking biped' is a property
of man, it would also be any one's property 'as a man' to be described
'as a walking biped'. Not only in the case of the actual term mentioned
should one look at the inflexions, but also in the case of its opposites,
just as has been laid down in the case of the former commonplace rules
as well.' Thus, for destructive purposes, see if the inflexion of the opposite
of the property rendered fails to be the property of the inflexion of the
opposite of the subject: for then neither will the inflexion of the other
opposite be a property of the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.)
inasmuch as 'well' is not a property of 'justly', neither could 'badly'
be a property of 'unjustly'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if the inflexion of the opposite of the property originally suggested
is a property of the inflexion of the opposite of the original subject:
for then also the inflexion of the other opposite will be a property of
the inflexion of the other opposite. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'best' is
a property of 'the good', 'worst' also will be a property of 'the
evil'.
Part 7
Next, look from the point of view of things that are in a like
relation, and see, for destructive purposes, if what is in a relation like
that of the property rendered fails to be a property of what is in a relation
like that of the subject: for then neither will what is in a relation like
that of the first be a property of what is in a relation like that of the
second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as the relation of the builder towards the
production of a house is like that of the doctor towards the production
of health, and it is not a property of a doctor to produce health, it could
not be a property of a builder to produce a house. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if what is in a relation like that of the property
rendered is a property of what is in a relation like that of the subject:
for then also what is in a relation like that of the first will be a property
of what is in a relation like that of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch
as the relation of a doctor towards the possession of ability to produce
health is like that of a trainer towards the possession of ability to produce
vigour, and it is a property of a trainer to possess the ability to produce
vigour, it would be a property of a doctor to possess the ability to produce
health.
Next look from the point of view of things that are identically
related, and see, for destructive purposes, if the predicate that is identically
related towards two subjects fails to be a property of the subject which
is identically related to it as the subject in question; for then neither
will the predicate that is identically related to both subjects be a property
of the subject which is identically related to it as the first. If, on
the other hand, the predicate which is identically related to two subjects
is the property of the subject which is identically related to it as the
subject in question, then it will not be a property of that of which it
has been stated to be a property. (e.g.) inasmuch as prudence is identically
related to both the noble and the base, since it is knowledge of each of
them, and it is not a property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble,
it could not be a property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. If,
on the other hand, it is a property of prudence to be the knowledge of
the noble, it could not be a property of it to be the knowledge of the
base.] For it is impossible for the same thing to be a property of more
than one subject. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace
rule is of no use: for what is 'identically related' is a single predicate
in process of comparison with more than one subject.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if the predicate qualified
by the verb 'to be' fails to be a property of the subject qualified by
the verb 'to be': for then neither will the destruction of the one be a
property of the other qualified by the verb 'to be destroyed', nor will
the 'becoming'the one be a property of the other qualified by the verb
'to become'. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is not a property of 'man' to be
an animal, neither could it be a property of becoming a man to become an
animal; nor could the destruction of an animal be a property of the destruction
of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from 'becoming'
to 'being' and 'being destroyed', and from 'being destroyed' to 'being'
and to 'becoming' exactly as they have just been given from 'being' to
'becoming' and 'being destroyed'. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see if the subject set down as qualified by the verb 'to be' has
the predicate set down as so qualified, as its property: for then also
the subject qualified by the very 'to become' will have the predicate qualified
by 'to become' as its property, and the subject qualified by the verb to
be destroyed' will have as its property the predicate rendered with this
qualification. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is a property of man to
be a mortal, it would be a property of becoming a man to become a mortal,
and the destruction of a mortal would be a property of the destruction
of a man. In the same way one should derive arguments also from 'becoming'
and 'being destroyed' both to 'being' and to the conclusions that follow
from them, exactly as was directed also for the purpose of
destruction.
Next take a look at the 'idea' of the subject stated, and see,
for destructive purposes, if the suggested property fails to belong to
the 'idea' in question, or fails to belong to it in virtue of that character
which causes it to bear the description of which the property was rendered:
for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'being motionless' does not belong to 'man-himself'
qua 'man', but qua 'idea', it could not be a property of 'man' to be motionless.
For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the property in question
belongs to the idea, and belongs to it in that respect in virtue of which
there is predicated of it that character of which the predicate in question
has been stated not to be a property: for then what has been stated not
to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it belongs
to 'living-creature-itself' to be compounded of soul and body, and further
this belongs to it qua 'living-creature', it would be a property of 'living-creature'
to be compounded of soul and body.
Part 8
Next look from the point of view of greater and less degrees, and
first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is more-P fails to be a
property of what is more-S: for then neither will what is less-P be a property
of what is less-S, nor least-P of least-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor P
simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as being more highly coloured
is not a property of what is more a body, neither could being less highly
coloured be a property of what is less a body, nor being coloured be a
property of body at all. For constructive purposes, on the other hand,
see if what is more-P is a property of what is more-S: for then also what
is less-P will be a property of what is less S, and least-P of least-S,
and most-P of most-S, and P simply of S simply. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher degree of life,
a lower degree of sensation also would be a property of a lower degree
of life, and the highest of the highest and the lowest of the lowest degree,
and sensation simply of life simply.
Also you should look at the argument from a simple predication
to the same qualified types of predication, and see, for destructive purposes,
if P simply fails to be a property of S simply; for then neither will more-P
be a property of more-S, nor less-P of less-S, nor most-P of most-S, nor
least-P of least-S. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'virtuous' is not a property
of 'man', neither could 'more virtuous' be a property of what is 'more
human'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if P simply is
a property of S simply: for then more P also will be a property of more-S,
and less-P of less-S, and least-P of least-S, and most-P of most-S. Thus
(e.g.) a tendency to move upwards by nature is a property of fire, and
so also a greater tendency to move upwards by nature would be a property
of what is more fiery. In the same way too one should look at all these
matters from the point of view of the others as well.
Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if the more likely property
fails to be a property of the more likely subject: for then neither will
the less likely property be a property of the less likely subject. Thus
(e.g.) inasmuch as 'perceiving' is more likely to be a property of 'animal'
than 'knowing' of 'man', and 'perceiving' is not a property of 'animal',
'knowing' could not be a property of 'man'. For constructive purposes,
on the other hand, see if the less likely property is a property of the
less likely subject; for then too the more likely property will be a property
of the more likely subject. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to be naturally civilized'
is less likely to be a property of man than 'to live' of an animal, and
it is a property of man to be naturally civilized, it would be a property
of animal to live.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if the predicate fails
to be a property of that of which it is more likely to be a property: for
then neither will it be a property of that of which it is less likely to
be a property: while if it is a property of the former, it will not be
a property of the latter. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to be coloured' is more
likely to be a property of a 'surface' than of a 'body', and it is not
a property of a surface, 'to be coloured' could not be a property of 'body';
while if it is a property of a 'surface', it could not be a property of
a 'body'. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, this commonplace
rule is not of any use: for it is impossible for the same thing to be a
property of more than one thing.
Fourthly (d) for destructive purposes, see if what is more likely
to be a property of a given subject fails to be its property: for then
neither will what is less likely to be a property of it be its property.
Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'sensible' is more likely than 'divisible' to be
a property of 'animal', and 'sensible' is not a property of animal, 'divisible'
could not be a property of animal. For constructive purposes, on the other
hand, see if what is less likely to be a property of it is a property;
for then what is more likely to be a property of it will be a property
as well. Thus, for example, inasmuch as 'sensation' is less likely to be
a property of 'animal' than life', and 'sensation' is a property of animal,
'life' would be a property of animal.
Next, look from the point of view of the attributes that belong
in a like manner, and first (a) for destructive purposes, see if what is
as much a property fails to be a property of that of which it is as much
a property: for then neither will that which is as much a property as it
be a property of that of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch
as 'desiring' is as much a property of the faculty of desire as reasoning'
is a property of the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property
of the faculty of desire, reasoning could not be a property of the faculty
of reason. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if what is
as much a property is a property of that of which it is as much a property:
for then also what is as much a property as it will be a property of that
of which it is as much a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is as much
a property of 'the faculty of reason' to be 'the primary seat of wisdom'
as it is of 'the faculty of desire' to be 'the primary seat of temperance',
and it is a property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of
wisdom, it would be a property of the faculty of desire to be the primary
seat of temperance.
Secondly (b) for destructive purposes, see if what is as much a
property of anything fails to be a property of it: for then neither will
what is as much a property be a property of it. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
'seeing' is as much a property of man as 'hearing', and 'seeing' is not
a property of man, 'hearing' could not be a property of man. For constructive
purposes, on the other hand, see if what is as much a property of it is
its property: for then what is as much a property of it as the former will
be its property as well. Thus (e.g.) it is as much a property of the soul
to be the primary possessor of a part that desires as of a part that reasons,
and it is a property of the soul to be the primary possessor of a part
that desires, and so it be a property of the soul to be the primary possessor
of a part that reasons.
Thirdly (c) for destructive purposes, see if it fails to be a property
of that of which it is as much a property: for then neither will it be
a property of that of which it is as much a property as of the former,
while if it be a property of the former, it will not be a property of the
other. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as 'to burn' is as much a property of 'flame'
as of 'live coals', and 'to burn' is not a property of flame, 'to burn'
could not be a property of live coals: while if it is a property of flame,
it could not be a property of live coals. For constructive purposes, on
the other hand, this commonplace rule is of no use.
The rule based on things that are in a like relation' differs from
the rule based on attributes that belong in a like manner,' because the
former point is secured by analogy, not from reflection on the belonging
of any attribute, while the latter is judged by a comparison based on the
fact that an attribute belongs.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if in rendering the property
potentially, he has also through that potentiality rendered the property
relatively to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question
cannot belong to what does not exist: for then what is stated to be a property
will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that 'breathable' is
a property of 'air' has, on the one hand, rendered the property potentially
(for that is 'breathable' which is such as can be breathed), and on the
other hand has also rendered the property relatively to what does not exist:-for
while air may exist, even though there exist no animal so constituted as
to breathe the air, it is not possible to breathe it if no animal exist:
so that it will not, either, be a property of air to be such as can be
breathed at a time when there exists no animal such as to breathe it and
so it follows that 'breathable' could not be a property of
air.
For constructive purposes, see if in rendering the property potentially
he renders the property either relatively to something that exists, or
to something that does not exist, when the potentiality in question can
belong to what does not exist: for then what has been stated not to be
a property will be a property. Thus e.g.) he who renders it as a property
of 'being' to be 'capable of being acted upon or of acting', in rendering
the property potentially, has rendered the property relatively to something
that exists: for when 'being' exists, it will also be capable of being
acted upon or of acting in a certain way: so that to be 'capable of being
acted upon or of acting' would be a property of 'being'.
Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated the property
in the superlative: for then what has been stated to be a property will
not be a property. For people who render the property in that way find
that of the object of which the description is true, the name is not true
as well: for though the object perish the description will continue in
being none the less; for it belongs most nearly to something that is in
being. An example would be supposing any one were to render 'the lightest
body' as a property of 'fire': for, though fire perish, there eh re will
still be some form of body that is the lightest, so that 'the lightest
body' could not be a property of fire. For constructive purposes, on the
other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property in the superlative:
for then the property will in this respect have been property of man has
not rendered the property correctly stated. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he
in the superlative, the property would in who states 'a naturally civilized
animal' as a this respect have been correctly stated.
Topics
By Aristotle
Book VI
Part 1
The discussion of Definitions falls into five parts. For you have to show
either (1) that it is not true at all to apply the expression as well to
that to which the term is applied (for the definition of Man ought to be
true of every man); or (2) that though the object has a genus, he has failed
to put the object defined into the genus, or to put it into the appropriate
genus (for the framer of a definition should first place the object in
its genus, and then append its differences: for of all the elements of
the definition the genus is usually supposed to be the principal mark of
the essence of what is defined): or (3) that the expression is not peculiar
to the object (for, as we said above as well, a definition ought to be
peculiar): or else (4) see if, though he has observed all the aforesaid
cautions, he has yet failed to define the object, that is, to express its
essence. (5) It remains, apart from the foregoing, to see if he has defined
it, but defined it incorrectly.
Whether, then, the expression be not also true of that of which
the term is true you should proceed to examine according to the commonplace
rules that relate to Accident. For there too the question is always 'Is
so and so true or untrue?': for whenever we argue that an accident belongs,
we declare it to be true, while whenever we argue that it does not belong,
we declare it to be untrue. If, again, he has failed to place the object
in the appropriate genus, or if the expression be not peculiar to the object,
we must go on to examine the case according to the commonplace rules that
relate to genus and property.
It remains, then, to prescribe how to investigate whether the object
has been either not defined at all, or else defined incorrectly. First,
then, we must proceed to examine if it has been defined incorrectly: for
with anything it is easier to do it than to do it correctly. Clearly, then,
more mistakes are made in the latter task on account of its greater difficulty.
Accordingly the attack becomes easier in the latter case than in the
former.
Incorrectness falls into two branches: (1) first, the use of obscure
language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest
possible, seeing that the whole purpose of rendering it is to make something
known); (secondly, if the expression used be longer than is necessary:
for all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. Again, each of
the aforesaid branches is divided into a number of others.
Part 2
One commonplace rule, then, in regard to obscurity is, See if the
meaning intended by the definition involves an ambiguity with any other,
e.g. 'Becoming is a passage into being', or 'Health is the balance of hot
and cold elements'. Here 'passage' and 'balance' are ambiguous terms: it
is accordingly not clear which of the several possible senses of the term
he intends to convey. Likewise also, if the term defined be used in different
senses and he has spoken without distinguishing between them: for then
it is not clear to which of them the definition rendered applies, and one
can then bring a captious objection on the ground that the definition does
not apply to all the things whose definition he has rendered: and this
kind of thing is particularly easy in the case where the definer does not
see the ambiguity of his terms. Or, again, the questioner may himself distinguish
the various senses of the term rendered in the definition, and then institute
his argument against each: for if the expression used be not adequate to
the subject in any of its senses, it is clear that he cannot have defined
it in any sense aright.
Another rule is, See if he has used a metaphorical expression,
as, for instance, if he has defined knowledge as 'unsupplantable', or the
earth as a 'nurse', or temperance as a 'harmony'. For a metaphorical expression
is always obscure. It is possible, also, to argue sophistically against
the user of a metaphorical expression as though he had used it in its literal
sense: for the definition stated will not apply to the term defined, e.g.
in the case of temperance: for harmony is always found between notes. Moreover,
if harmony be the genus of temperance, then the same object will occur
in two genera of which neither contains the other: for harmony does not
contain virtue, nor virtue harmony. Again, see if he uses terms that are
unfamiliar, as when Plato describes the eye as 'brow-shaded', or a certain
spider as poison-fanged', or the marrow as 'boneformed'. For an unusual
phrase is always obscure.
Sometimes a phrase is used neither ambiguously, nor yet metaphorically,
nor yet literally, as when the law is said to be the 'measure' or 'image'
of the things that are by nature just. Such phrases are worse than metaphor;
for the latter does make its meaning to some extent clear because of the
likeness involved; for those who use metaphors do so always in view of
some likeness: whereas this kind of phrase makes nothing clear; for there
is no likeness to justify the description 'measure' or 'image', as applied
to the law, nor is the law ordinarily so called in a literal sense. So
then, if a man says that the law is literally a 'measure' or an 'image',
he speaks falsely: for an image is something produced by imitation, and
this is not found in the case of the law. If, on the other hand, he does
not mean the term literally, it is clear that he has used an unclear expression,
and one that is worse than any sort of metaphorical
expression.
Moreover, see if from the expression used the definition of the
contrary be not clear; for definitions that have been correctly rendered
also indicate their contraries as well. Or, again, see if, when it is merely
stated by itself, it is not evident what it defines: just as in the works
of the old painters, unless there were an inscription, the figures used
to be unrecognizable.
Part 3
If, then, the definition be not clear, you should proceed to examine
on lines such as these. If, on the other hand, he has phrased the definition
redundantly, first of all look and see whether he has used any attribute
that belongs universally, either to real objects in general, or to all
that fall under the same genus as the object defined: for the mention of
this is sure to be redundant. For the genus ought to divide the object
from things in general, and the differentia from any of the things contained
in the same genus. Now any term that belongs to everything separates off
the given object from absolutely nothing, while any that belongs to all
the things that fall under the same genus does not separate it off from
the things contained in the same genus. Any addition, then, of that kind
will be pointless.
Or see if, though the additional matter may be peculiar to the
given term, yet even when it is struck out the rest of the expression too
is peculiar and makes clear the essence of the term. Thus, in the definition
of man, the addition 'capable of receiving knowledge' is superfluous; for
strike it out, and still the expression is peculiar and makes clear his
essence. Speaking generally, everything is superfluous upon whose removal
the remainder still makes the term that is being defined clear. Such, for
instance, would also be the definition of the soul, assuming it to be stated
as a 'self-moving number'; for the soul is just 'the self-moving', as Plato
defined it. Or perhaps the expression used, though appropriate, yet does
not declare the essence, if the word 'number' be eliminated. Which of the
two is the real state of the case it is difficult to determine clearly:
the right way to treat the matter in all cases is to be guided by convenience.
Thus (e.g.) it is said that the definition of phlegm is the 'undigested
moisture that comes first off food'. Here the addition of the word 'undigested'
is superfluous, seeing that 'the first' is one and not many, so that even
when undigested' is left out the definition will still be peculiar to the
subject: for it is impossible that both phlegm and also something else
should both be the first to arise from the food. Or perhaps the phlegm
is not absolutely the first thing to come off the food, but only the first
of the undigested matters, so that the addition 'undigested' is required;
for stated the other way the definition would not be true unless the phlegm
comes first of all.
Moreover, see if anything contained in the definition fails to
apply to everything that falls under the same species: for this sort of
definition is worse than those which include an attribute belonging to
all things universally. For in that case, if the remainder of the expression
be peculiar, the whole too will be peculiar: for absolutely always, if
to something peculiar anything whatever that is true be added, the whole
too becomes peculiar. Whereas if any part of the expression do not apply
to everything that falls under the same species, it is impossible that
the expression as a whole should be peculiar: for it will not be predicated
convertibly with the object; e.g. 'a walking biped animal six feet high':
for an expression of that kind is not predicated convertibly with the term,
because the attribute 'six feet high' does not belong to everything that
falls under the same species.
Again, see if he has said the same thing more than once, saying
(e.g.) 'desire' is a 'conation for the pleasant'. For 'desire' is always
'for the pleasant', so that what is the same as desire will also be 'for
the pleasant'. Accordingly our definition of desire becomes 'conation-for-the-pleasant':
for the word 'desire' is the exact equivalent of the words 'conation for-the-pleasant',
so that both alike will be 'for the pleasant'. Or perhaps there is no absurdity
in this; for consider this instance:-Man is a biped': therefore, what is
the same as man is a biped: but 'a walking biped animal' is the same as
man, and therefore walking biped animal is a biped'. But this involves
no real absurdity. For 'biped' is not a predicate of 'walking animal':
if it were, then we should certainly have 'biped' predicated twice of the
same thing; but as a matter of fact the subject said to be a biped is'a
walking biped animal', so that the word 'biped' is only used as a predicate
once. Likewise also in the case of 'desire' as well: for it is not 'conation'
that is said to be 'for the pleasant', but rather the whole idea, so that
there too the predication is only made once. Absurdity results, not when
the same word is uttered twice, but when the same thing is more than once
predicated of a subject; e.g. if he says, like Xenocrates, that wisdom
defines and contemplates reality:' for definition is a certain type of
contemplation, so that by adding the words 'and contemplates' over again
he says the same thing twice over. Likewise, too, those fail who say that
'cooling' is 'the privation of natural heat'. For all privation is a privation
of some natural attribute, so that the addition of the word 'natural' is
superfluous: it would have been enough to say 'privation of heat', for
the word 'privation' shows of itself that the heat meant is natural
heat.
Again, see if a universal have been mentioned and then a particular
case of it be added as well, e.g. 'Equity is a remission of what is expedient
and just'; for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore
included in the latter term: its mention is therefore redundant, an addition
of the particular after the universal has been already stated. So also,
if he defines 'medicine' as 'knowledge of what makes for health in animals
and men', or 'the law' as 'the image of what is by nature noble and just';
for what is just is a branch of what is noble, so that he says the same
thing more than once.
Part 4
Whether, then, a man defines a thing correctly or incorrectly you
should proceed to examine on these and similar lines. But whether he has
mentioned and defined its essence or no, should be examined as follows:
First of all, see if he has failed to make the definition through terms
that are prior and more intelligible. For the reason why the definition
is rendered is to make known the term stated, and we make things known
by taking not any random terms, but such as are prior and more intelligible,
as is done in demonstrations (for so it is with all teaching and learning);
accordingly, it is clear that a man who does not define through terms of
this kind has not defined at all. Otherwise, there will be more than one
definition of the same thing: for clearly he who defines through terms
that are prior and more intelligible has also framed a definition, and
a better one, so that both would then be definitions of the same object.
This sort of view, however, does not generally find acceptance: for of
each real object the essence is single: if, then, there are to be a number
of definitions of the same thing, the essence of the object will be the
same as it is represented to be in each of the definitions, and these representations
are not the same, inasmuch as the definitions are different. Clearly, then,
any one who has not defined a thing through terms that are prior and more
intelligible has not defined it at all.
The statement that a definition has not been made through more
intelligible terms may be understood in two senses, either supposing that
its terms are absolutely less intelligible, or supposing that they are
less intelligible to us: for either sense is possible. Thus absolutely
the prior is more intelligible than the posterior, a point, for instance,
than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid; just as also
a unit is more intelligible than a number; for it is the prius and starting-point
of all number. Likewise, also, a letter is more intelligible than a syllable.
Whereas to us it sometimes happens that the converse is the case: for the
solid falls under perception most of all-more than a plane-and a plane
more than a line, and a line more than a point; for most people learn things
like the former earlier than the latter; for any ordinary intelligence
can grasp them, whereas the others require an exact and exceptional
understanding.
Absolutely, then, it is better to try to make what is posterior
known through what is prior, inasmuch as such a way of procedure is more
scientific. Of course, in dealing with persons who cannot recognize things
through terms of that kind, it may perhaps be necessary to frame the expression
through terms that are intelligible to them. Among definitions of this
kind are those of a point, a line, and a plane, all of which explain the
prior by the posterior; for they say that a point is the limit of a line,
a line of a plane, a plane of a solid. One must, however, not fail to observe
that those who define in this way cannot show the essential nature of the
term they define, unless it so happens that the same thing is more intelligible
both to us and also absolutely, since a correct definition must define
a thing through its genus and its differentiae, and these belong to the
order of things which are absolutely more intelligible than, and prior
to, the species. For annul the genus and differentia, and the species too
is annulled, so that these are prior to the species. They are also more
intelligible; for if the species be known, the genus and differentia must
of necessity be known as well (for any one who knows what a man is knows
also what 'animal' and 'walking' are), whereas if the genus or the differentia
be known it does not follow of necessity that the species is known as well:
thus the species is less intelligible. Moreover, those who say that such
definitions, viz. those which proceed from what is intelligible to this,
that, or the other man, are really and truly definitions, will have to
say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing. For,
as it happens, different things are more intelligible to different people,
not the same things to all; and so a different definition would have to
be rendered to each several person, if the definition is to be constructed
from what is more intelligible to particular individuals. Moreover, to
the same people different things are more intelligible at different times;
first of all the objects of sense; then, as they become more sharpwitted,
the converse; so that those who hold that a definition ought to be rendered
through what is more intelligible to particular individuals would not have
to render the same definition at all times even to the same person. It
is clear, then, that the right way to define is not through terms of that
kind, but through what is absolutely more intelligible: for only in this
way could the definition come always to be one and the same. Perhaps, also,
what is absolutely intelligible is what is intelligible, not to all, but
to those who are in a sound state of understanding, just as what is absolutely
healthy is what is healthy to those in a sound state of body. All such
points as this ought to be made very precise, and made use of in the course
of discussion as occasion requires. The demolition of a definition will
most surely win a general approval if the definer happens to have framed
his expression neither from what is absolutely more intelligible nor yet
from what is so to us.
One form, then, of the failure to work through more intelligible
terms is the exhibition of the prior through the posterior, as we remarked
before.' Another form occurs if we find that the definition has been rendered
of what is at rest and definite through what is indefinite and in motion:
for what is still and definite is prior to what is indefinite and in
motion.
Of the failure to use terms that are prior there are three
forms:
(1) The first is when an opposite has been defined through its opposite,
e.g.i. good through evil: for opposites are always simultaneous by nature.
Some people think, also, that both are objects of the same science, so
that the one is not even more intelligible than the other. One must, however,
observe that it is perhaps not possible to define some things in any other
way, e.g. the double without the half, and all the terms that are essentially
relative: for in all such cases the essential being is the same as a certain
relation to something, so that it is impossible to understand the one term
without the other, and accordingly in the definition of the one the other
too must be embraced. One ought to learn up all such points as these, and
use them as occasion may seem to require.
(2) Another is-if he has used the term defined itself. This passes
unobserved when the actual name of the object is not used, e.g. supposing
any one had defined the sun as a star that appears by day'. For in bringing
in 'day' he brings in the sun. To detect errors of this sort, exchange
the word for its definition, e.g. the definition of 'day' as the 'passage
of the sun over the earth'. Clearly, whoever has said 'the passage of the
sun over the earth' has said 'the sun', so that in bringing in the 'day'
he has brought in the sun.
(3) Again, see if he has defined one coordinate member of a division
by another, e.g. 'an odd number' as 'that which is greater by one than
an even number'. For the co-ordinate members of a division that are derived
from the same genus are simultaneous by nature and 'odd' and 'even' are
such terms: for both are differentiae of number.
Likewise also, see if he has defined a superior through a subordinate
term, e.g. 'An "even number" is "a number divisible into halves"', or '"the
good" is a "state of virtue" '. For 'half' is derived from 'two', and 'two'
is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good, so that the latter terms
are subordinate to the former. Moreover, in using the subordinate term
one is bound to use the other as well: for whoever employs the term 'virtue'
employs the term 'good', seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good:
likewise, also, whoever employs the term 'half' employs the term 'even',
for to be 'divided in half' means to be divided into two, and two is
even.
Part 5
Generally speaking, then, one commonplace rule relates to the failure
to frame the expression by means of terms that are prior and more intelligible:
and of this the subdivisions are those specified above. A second is, see
whether, though the object is in a genus, it has not been placed in a genus.
This sort of error is always found where the essence of the object does
not stand first in the expression, e.g. the definition of 'body' as 'that
which has three dimensions', or the definition of 'man', supposing any
one to give it, as 'that which knows how to count': for it is not stated
what it is that has three dimensions, or what it is that knows how to count:
whereas the genus is meant to indicate just this, and is submitted first
of the terms in the definition.
Moreover, see if, while the term to be defined is used in relation
to many things, he has failed to render it in relation to all of them;
as (e.g.) if he define 'grammar' as the 'knowledge how to write from dictation':
for he ought also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. For
in rendering it as 'knowledge of writing' has no more defined it than by
rendering it as 'knowledge of reading': neither in fact has succeeded,
but only he who mentions both these things, since it is impossible that
there should be more than one definition of the same thing. It is only,
however, in some cases that what has been said corresponds to the actual
state of things: in some it does not, e.g. all those terms which are not
used essentially in relation to both things: as medicine is said to deal
with the production of disease and health; for it is said essentially to
do the latter, but the former only by accident: for it is absolutely alien
to medicine to produce disease. Here, then, the man who renders medicine
as relative to both of these things has not defined it any better than
he who mentions the one only. In fact he has done it perhaps worse, for
any one else besides the doctor is capable of producing
disease.
Moreover, in a case where the term to be defined is used in relation
to several things, see if he has rendered it as relative to the worse rather
than to the better; for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally
thought to be relative to the best.
Again, if the thing in question be not placed in its own proper
genus, one must examine it according to the elementary rules in regard
to genera, as has been said before.'
Moreover, see if he uses language which transgresses the genera
of the things he defines, defining, e.g. justice as a 'state that produces
equality' or 'distributes what is equal': for by defining it so he passes
outside the sphere of virtue, and so by leaving out the genus of justice
he fails to express its essence: for the essence of a thing must in each
case bring in its genus. It is the same thing if the object be not put
into its nearest genus; for the man who puts it into the nearest one has
stated all the higher genera, seeing that all the higher genera are predicated
of the lower. Either, then, it ought to be put into its nearest genus,
or else to the higher genus all the differentiae ought to be appended whereby
the nearest genus is defined. For then he would not have left out anything:
but would merely have mentioned the subordinate genus by an expression
instead of by name. On the other hand, he who mentions merely the higher
genus by itself, does not state the subordinate genus as well: in saying
'plant' a man does not specify 'a tree'.
Part 6
Again, in regard to the differentiae, we must examine in like manner
whether the differentiae, too, that he has stated be those of the genus.
For if a man has not defined the object by the differentiae peculiar to
it, or has mentioned something such as is utterly incapable of being a
differentia of anything, e.g. 'animal' or 'substance', clearly he has not
defined it at all: for the aforesaid terms do not differentiate anything
at all. Further, we must see whether the differentia stated possesses anything
that is co-ordinate with it in a division; for, if not, clearly the one
stated could not be a differentia of the genus. For a genus is always divided
by differentiae that are co-ordinate members of a division, as, for instance,
by the terms 'walking', 'flying', 'aquatic', and 'biped'. Or see if, though
the contrasted differentia exists, it yet is not true of the genus, for
then, clearly, neither of them could be a differentia of the genus; for
differentiae that are co-ordinates in a division with the differentia of
a thing are all true of the genus to which the thing belongs. Likewise,
also, see if, though it be true, yet the addition of it to the genus fails
to make a species. For then, clearly, this could not be a specific differentia
of the genus: for a specific differentia, if added to the genus, always
makes a species. If, however, this be no true differentia, no more is the
one adduced, seeing that it is a co-ordinate member of a division with
this.
Moreover, see if he divides the genus by a negation, as those do
who define line as 'length without breadth': for this means simply that
it has not any breadth. The genus will then be found to partake of its
own species: for, since of everything either an affirmation or its negation
is true, length must always either lack breadth or possess it, so that
'length' as well, i.e. the genus of 'line', will be either with or without
breadth. But 'length without breadth' is the definition of a species, as
also is 'length with breadth': for 'without breadth' and 'with breadth'
are differentiae, and the genus and differentia constitute the definition
of the species. Hence the genus would admit of the definition of its species.
Likewise, also, it will admit of the definition of the differentia, seeing
that one or the other of the aforesaid differentiae is of necessity predicated
of the genus. The usefulness of this principle is found in meeting those
who assert the existence of 'Ideas': for if absolute length exist, how
will it be predicable of the genus that it has breadth or that it lacks
it? For one assertion or the other will have to be true of 'length' universally,
if it is to be true of the genus at all: and this is contrary to the fact:
for there exist both lengths which have, and lengths which have not, breadth.
Hence the only people against whom the rule can be employed are those who
assert that a genus is always numerically one; and this is what is done
by those who assert the real existence of the 'Ideas'; for they allege
that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus.
It may be that in some cases the definer is obliged to employ a
negation as well, e.g. in defining privations. For 'blind' means a thing
which cannot see when its nature is to see. There is no difference between
dividing the genus by a negation, and dividing it by such an affirmation
as is bound to have a negation as its co-ordinate in a division, e.g. supposing
he had defined something as 'length possessed of breadth'; for co-ordinate
in the division with that which is possessed of breadth is that which possesses
no breadth and that only, so that again the genus is divided by a
negation.
Again, see if he rendered the species as a differentia, as do those
who define 'contumely' as 'insolence accompanied by jeering'; for jeering
is a kind of insolence, i.e. it is a species and not a
differentia.
Moreover, see if he has stated the genus as the differentia, e.g.
'Virtue is a good or noble state: for 'good' is the genus of 'virtue'.
Or possibly 'good' here is not the genus but the differentia, on the principle
that the same thing cannot be in two genera of which neither contains the
other: for 'good' does not include 'state', nor vice versa: for not every
state is good nor every good a 'state'. Both, then, could not be genera,
and consequently, if 'state' is the genus of virtue, clearly 'good' cannot
be its genus: it must rather be the differentia'. Moreover, 'a state' indicates
the essence of virtue, whereas 'good' indicates not the essence but a quality:
and to indicate a quality is generally held to be the function of the differentia.
See, further, whether the differentia rendered indicates an individual
rather than a quality: for the general view is that the differentia always
expresses a quality.
Look and see, further, whether the differentia belongs only by
accident to the object defined. For the differentia is never an accidental
attribute, any more than the genus is: for the differentia of a thing cannot
both belong and not belong to it.
Moreover, if either the differentia or the species, or any of the
things which are under the species, is predicable of the genus, then he
could not have defined the term. For none of the aforesaid can possibly
be predicated of the genus, seeing that the genus is the term with the
widest range of all. Again, see if the genus be predicated of the differentia;
for the general view is that the genus is predicated, not of the differentia,
but of the objects of which the differentia is predicated. Animal (e.g.)
is predicated of 'man' or 'ox' or other walking animals, not of the actual
differentia itself which we predicate of the species. For if 'animal' is
to be predicated of each of its differentiae, then 'animal' would be predicated
of the species several times over; for the differentiae are predicates
of the species. Moreover, the differentiae will be all either species or
individuals, if they are animals; for every animal is either a species
or an individual.
Likewise you must inquire also if the species or any of the objects
that come under it is predicated of the differentia: for this is impossible,
seeing that the differentia is a term with a wider range than the various
species. Moreover, if any of the species be predicated of it, the result
will be that the differentia is a species: if, for instance, 'man' be predicated,
the differentia is clearly the human race. Again, see if the differentia
fails to be prior to the species: for the differentia ought to be posterior
to the genus, but prior to the species.
Look and see also if the differentia mentioned belongs to a different
genus, neither contained in nor containing the genus in question. For the
general view is that the same differentia cannot be used of two non-subaltern
genera. Else the result will be that the same species as well will be in
two non-subaltern genera: for each of the differentiae imports its own
genus, e.g. 'walking' and 'biped' import with them the genus 'animal'.
If, then, each of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia
is true, it clearly follows that the species must be in two non-subaltern
genera. Or perhaps it is not impossible for the same differentia to be
used of two non-subaltern genera, and we ought to add the words 'except
they both be subordinate members of the same genus'. Thus 'walking animal'
and 'flying animal' are non-subaltern genera, and 'biped' is the differentia
of both. The words 'except they both be subordinate members of the same
genus' ought therefore to be added; for both these are subordinate to 'animal'.
From this possibility, that the same differentia may be used of two non-subaltern
genera, it is clear also that there is no necessity for the differentia
to carry with it the whole of the genus to which it belongs, but only the
one or the other of its limbs together with the genera that are higher
than this, as 'biped' carries with it either 'flying' or 'walking
animal'.
See, too, if he has rendered 'existence in' something as the differentia
of a thing's essence: for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate
between one essence and another. Hence, too, people condemn those who divide
animals by means of the terms 'walking' and 'aquatic', on the ground that
'walking' and 'aquatic' indicate mere locality. Or possibly in this case
the censure is undeserved; for 'aquatic' does not mean 'in' anything; nor
does it denote a locality, but a certain quality: for even if the thing
be on the dry land, still it is aquatic: and likewise a land-animal, even
though it be in the water, will still be a and not an aquatic-animal. But
all the same, if ever the differentia does denote existence in something,
clearly he will have made a bad mistake.
Again, see if he has rendered an affection as the differentia:
for every affection, if intensified, subverts the essence of the thing,
while the differentia is not of that kind: for the differentia is generally
considered rather to preserve that which it differentiates; and it is absolutely
impossible for a thing to exist without its own special differentia: for
if there be no 'walking', there will be no 'man'. In fact, we may lay down
absolutely that a thing cannot have as its differentia anything in respect
of which it is subject to alteration: for all things of that kind, if intensified,
destroy its essence. If, then, a man has rendered any differentia of this
kind, he has made a mistake: for we undergo absolutely no alteration in
respect of our differentiae.
Again, see if he has failed to render the differentia of a relative
term relatively to something else; for the differentiae of relative terms
are themselves relative, as in the case also of knowledge. This is classed
as speculative, practical and productive; and each of these denotes a relation:
for it speculates upon something, and produces something and does
something.
Look and see also if the definer renders each relative term relatively
to its natural purpose: for while in some cases the particular relative
term can be used in relation to its natural purpose only and to nothing
else, some can be used in relation to something else as well. Thus sight
can only be used for seeing, but a strigil can also be used to dip up water.
Still, if any one were to define a strigil as an instrument for dipping
water, he has made a mistake: for that is not its natural function. The
definition of a thing's natural function is 'that for which it would be
used by the prudent man, acting as such, and by the science that deals
specially with that thing'.
Or see if, whenever a term happens to be used in a number of relations,
he has failed to introduce it in its primary relation: e.g. by defining
'wisdom' as the virtue of 'man' or of the 'soul,' rather than of the 'reasoning
faculty': for 'wisdom' is the virtue primarily of the reasoning faculty:
for it is in virtue of this that both the man and his soul are said to
be wise.
Moreover, if the thing of which the term defined has been stated
to be an affection or disposition, or whatever it may be, be unable to
admit it, the definer has made a mistake. For every disposition and every
affection is formed naturally in that of which it is an affection or disposition,
as knowledge, too, is formed in the soul, being a disposition of soul.
Sometimes, however, people make bad mistakes in matters of this sort, e.g.
all those who say that 'sleep' is a 'failure of sensation', or that 'perplexity'
is a state of 'equality between contrary reasonings', or that 'pain' is
a 'violent disruption of parts that are naturally conjoined'. For sleep
is not an attribute of sensation, whereas it ought to be, if it is a failure
of sensation. Likewise, perplexity is not an attribute of opposite reasonings,
nor pain of parts naturally conjoined: for then inanimate things will be
in pain, since pain will be present in them. Similar in character, too,
is the definition of 'health', say, as a 'balance of hot and cold elements':
for then health will be necessarily exhibited by the hot and cold elements:
for balance of anything is an attribute inherent in those things of which
it is the balance, so that health would be an attribute of them. Moreover,
people who define in this way put effect for cause, or cause for effect.
For the disruption of parts naturally conjoined is not pain, but only a
cause of pain: nor again is a failure of sensation sleep, but the one is
the cause of the other: for either we go to sleep because sensation fails,
or sensation fails because we go to sleep. Likewise also an equality between
contrary reasonings would be generally considered to be a cause of perplexity:
for it is when we reflect on both sides of a question and find everything
alike to be in keeping with either course that we are perplexed which of
the two we are to do.
Moreover, with regard to all periods of time look and see whether
there be any discrepancy between the differentia and the thing defined:
e.g. supposing the 'immortal' to be defined as a 'living thing immune at
present from destruction'. For a living thing that is immune 'at present'
from destruction will be immortal 'at present'. Possibly, indeed, in this
case this result does not follow, owing to the ambiguity of the words 'immune
at present from destruction': for it may mean either that the thing has
not been destroyed at present, or that it cannot be destroyed at present,
or that at present it is such that it never can be destroyed. Whenever,
then, we say that a living thing is at present immune from destruction,
we mean that it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never to
be destroyed: and this is equivalent to saying that it is immortal, so
that it is not meant that it is immortal only at present. Still, if ever
it does happen that what has been rendered according to the definition
belongs in the present only or past, whereas what is meant by the word
does not so belong, then the two could not be the same. So, then, this
commonplace rule ought to be followed, as we have said.
Part 7
You should look and see also whether the term being defined is
applied in consideration of something other than the definition rendered.
Suppose (e.g.) a definition of 'justice' as the 'ability to distribute
what is equal'. This would not be right, for 'just' describes rather the
man who chooses, than the man who is able to distribute what is equal:
so that justice could not be an ability to distribute what is equal: for
then also the most just man would be the man with the most ability to distribute
what is equal.
Moreover, see if the thing admits of degrees, whereas what is rendered
according to the definition does not, or, vice versa, what is rendered
according to the definition admits of degrees while the thing does not.
For either both must admit them or else neither, if indeed what is rendered
according to the definition is the same as the thing. Moreover, see if,
while both of them admit of degrees, they yet do not both become greater
together: e.g. suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: for
he who is more intensely in love has not a more intense desire for intercourse,
so that both do not become intensified at once: they certainly should,
however, had they been the same thing.
Moreover, suppose two things to be before you, see if the term
to be defined applies more particularly to the one to which the content
of the definition is less applicable. Take, for instance, the definition
of 'fire' as the 'body that consists of the most rarefied particles'. For
'fire' denotes flame rather than light, but flame is less the body that
consists of the most rarefied particles than is light: whereas both ought
to be more applicable to the same thing, if they had been the same. Again,
see if the one expression applies alike to both the objects before you,
while the other does not apply to both alike, but more particularly to
one of them.
Moreover, see if he renders the definition relative to two things
taken separately: thus, the beautiful' is 'what is pleasant to the eyes
or to the ears": or 'the real' is 'what is capable of being acted upon
or of acting'. For then the same thing will be both beautiful and not beautiful,
and likewise will be both real and not real. For 'pleasant to the ears'
will be the same as 'beautiful', so that 'not pleasant to the ears' will
be the same as 'not beautiful': for of identical things the opposites,
too, are identical, and the opposite of 'beautiful' is 'not beautiful',
while of 'pleasant to the ears' the opposite is not pleasant to the cars':
clearly, then, 'not pleasant to the ears' is the same thing as 'not beautiful'.
If, therefore, something be pleasant to the eyes but not to the ears, it
will be both beautiful and not beautiful. In like manner we shall show
also that the same thing is both real and unreal.
Moreover, of both genera and differentiae and all the other terms
rendered in definitions you should frame definitions in lieu of the terms,
and then see if there be any discrepancy between them.
Part 8
If the term defined be relative, either in itself or in respect
of its genus, see whether the definition fails to mention that to which
the term, either in itself or in respect of its genus, is relative, e.g.
if he has defined 'knowledge' as an 'incontrovertible conception' or 'wishing'
as 'painless conation'. For of everything relative the essence is relative
to something else, seeing that the being of every relative term is identical
with being in a certain relation to something. He ought, therefore, to
have said that knowledge is 'conception of a knowable' and that wishing
is 'conation for a good'. Likewise, also, if he has defined 'grammar' as
'knowledge of letters': whereas in the definition there ought to be rendered
either the thing to which the term itself is relative, or that, whatever
it is, to which its genus is relative. Or see if a relative term has been
described not in relation to its end, the end in anything being whatever
is best in it or gives its purpose to the rest. Certainly it is what is
best or final that should be stated, e.g. that desire is not for the pleasant
but for pleasure: for this is our purpose in choosing what is pleasant
as well.
Look and see also if that in relation to which he has rendered
the term be a process or an activity: for nothing of that kind is an end,
for the completion of the activity or process is the end rather than the
process or activity itself. Or perhaps this rule is not true in all cases,
for almost everybody prefers the present experience of pleasure to its
cessation, so that they would count the activity as the end rather than
its completion.
Again see in some cases if he has failed to distinguish the quantity
or quality or place or other differentiae of an object; e.g. the quality
and quantity of the honour the striving for which makes a man ambitious:
for all men strive for honour, so that it is not enough to define the ambitious
man as him who strives for honour, but the aforesaid differentiae must
be added. Likewise, also, in defining the covetous man the quantity of
money he aims at, or in the case of the incontinent man the quality of
the pleasures, should be stated. For it is not the man who gives way to
any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent, but only he who
gives way to a certain kind of pleasure. Or again, people sometimes define
night as a 'shadow on the earth', or an earthquake as a movement of the
earth', or a cloud as 'condensation of the air', or a wind as a 'movement
of the air'; whereas they ought to specify as well quantity, quality, place,
and cause. Likewise, also, in other cases of the kind: for by omitting
any differentiae whatever he fails to state the essence of the term. One
should always attack deficiency. For a movement of the earth does not constitute
an earthquake, nor a movement of the air a wind, irrespective of its manner
and the amount involved.
Moreover, in the case of conations, and in any other cases where
it applies, see if the word 'apparent' is left out, e.g. 'wishing is a
conation after the good', or 'desire is a conation after the pleasant'-instead
of saying 'the apparently good', or 'pleasant'. For often those who exhibit
the conation do not perceive what is good or pleasant, so that their aim
need not be really good or pleasant, but only apparently so. They ought,
therefore, to have rendered the definition also accordingly. On the other
hand, any one who maintains the existence of Ideas ought to be brought
face to face with his Ideas, even though he does render the word in question:
for there can be no Idea of anything merely apparent: the general view
is that an Idea is always spoken of in relation to an Idea: thus absolute
desire is for the absolutely pleasant, and absolute wishing is for the
absolutely good; they therefore cannot be for an apparent good or an apparently
pleasant: for the existence of an absolutely-apparently-good or pleasant
would be an absurdity.
Part 9
Moreover, if the definition be of the state of anything, look at
what is in the state, while if it be of what is in the state, look at the
state: and likewise also in other cases of the kind. Thus if the pleasant
be identical with the beneficial, then, too, the man who is pleased is
benefited. Speaking generally, in definitions of this sort it happens that
what the definer defines is in a sense more than one thing: for in defining
knowledge, a man in a sense defines ignorance as well, and likewise also
what has knowledge and what lacks it, and what it is to know and to be
ignorant. For if the first be made clear, the others become in a certain
sense clear as well. We have, then, to be on our guard in all such cases
against discrepancy, using the elementary principles drawn from consideration
of contraries and of coordinates.
Moreover, in the case of relative terms, see if the species is
rendered as relative to a species of that to which the genus is rendered
as relative, e.g. supposing belief to be relative to some object of belief,
see whether a particular belief is made relative to some particular object
of belief: and, if a multiple be relative to a fraction, see whether a
particular multiple be made relative to a particular fraction. For if it
be not so rendered, clearly a mistake has been made.
See, also, if the opposite of the term has the opposite definition,
whether (e.g.) the definition of 'half' is the opposite of that of 'double':
for if 'double' is 'that which exceeds another by an equal amount to that
other', 'half' is 'that which is exceeded by an amount equal to itself'.
In the same way, too, with contraries. For to the contrary term will apply
the definition that is contrary in some one of the ways in which contraries
are conjoined. Thus (e.g.) if 'useful'='productive of good', 'injurious'=productive
of evil' or 'destructive of good', for one or the other of thee is bound
to be contrary to the term originally used. Suppose, then, neither of these
things to be the contrary of the term originally used, then clearly neither
of the definitions rendered later could be the definition of the contrary
of the term originally defined: and therefore the definition originally
rendered of the original term has not been rightly rendered either. Seeing,
moreover, that of contraries, the one is sometimes a word forced to denote
the privation of the other, as (e.g.) inequality is generally held to be
the privation of equality (for 'unequal' merely describes things that are
not equal'), it is therefore clear that that contrary whose form denotes
the privation must of necessity be defined through the other; whereas the
other cannot then be defined through the one whose form denotes the privation;
for else we should find that each is being interpreted by the other. We
must in the case of contrary terms keep an eye on this mistake, e.g. supposing
any one were to define equality as the contrary of inequality: for then
he is defining it through the term which denotes privation of it. Moreover,
a man who so defines is bound to use in his definition the very term he
is defining; and this becomes clear, if for the word we substitute its
definition. For to say 'inequality' is the same as to say 'privation of
equality'. Therefore equality so defined will be 'the contrary of the privation
of equality', so that he would have used the very word to be defined. Suppose,
however, that neither of the contraries be so formed as to denote privation,
but yet the definition of it be rendered in a manner like the above, e.g.
suppose 'good' to be defined as 'the contrary of evil', then, since it
is clear that 'evil' too will be 'the contrary of good' (for the definition
of things that are contrary in this must be rendered in a like manner),
the result again is that he uses the very term being defined: for 'good'
is inherent in the definition of 'evil'. If, then, 'good' be the contrary
of evil, and evil be nothing other than the 'contrary of good', then 'good'
will be the 'contrary of the contrary of good'. Clearly, then, he has used
the very word to be defined.
Moreover, see if in rendering a term formed to denote privation,
he has failed to render the term of which it is the privation, e.g. the
state, or contrary, or whatever it may be whose privation it is: also if
he has omitted to add either any term at all in which the privation is
naturally formed, or else that in which it is naturally formed primarily,
e.g. whether in defining 'ignorance' a privation he has failed to say that
it is the privation of 'knowledge'; or has failed to add in what it is
naturally formed, or, though he has added this, has failed to render the
thing in which it is primarily formed, placing it (e.g.) in 'man' or in
'the soul', and not in the 'reasoning faculty': for if in any of these
respects he fails, he has made a mistake. Likewise, also, if he has failed
to say that 'blindness' is the 'privation of sight in an eye': for a proper
rendering of its essence must state both of what it is the privation and
what it is that is deprived.
Examine further whether he has defined by the expression 'a privation'
a term that is not used to denote a privation: thus a mistake of this sort
also would be generally thought to be incurred in the case of 'error' by
any one who is not using it as a merely negative term. For what is generally
thought to be in error is not that which has no knowledge, but rather that
which has been deceived, and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate
things or of children as 'erring'. 'Error', then, is not used to denote
a mere privation of knowledge.
Part 10
Moreover, see whether the like inflexions in the definition apply
to the like inflexions of the term; e.g. if 'beneficial' means 'productive
of health', does 'beneficially' mean productively of health' and a 'benefactor'
a 'producer of health'?
Look too and see whether the definition given will apply to the
Idea as well. For in some cases it will not do so; e.g. in the Platonic
definition where he adds the word 'mortal' in his definitions of living
creatures: for the Idea (e.g. the absolute Man) is not mortal, so that
the definition will not fit the Idea. So always wherever the words 'capable
of acting on' or 'capable of being acted upon' are added, the definition
and the Idea are absolutely bound to be discrepant: for those who assert
the existence of Ideas hold that they are incapable of being acted upon,
or of motion. In dealing with these people even arguments of this kind
are useful.
Further, see if he has rendered a single common definition of terms
that are used ambiguously. For terms whose definition corresponding their
common name is one and the same, are synonymous; if, then, the definition
applies in a like manner to the whole range of the ambiguous term, it is
not true of any one of the objects described by the term. This is, moreover,
what happens to Dionysius' definition of 'life' when stated as 'a movement
of a creature sustained by nutriment, congenitally present with it': for
this is found in plants as much as in animals, whereas 'life' is generally
understood to mean not one kind of thing only, but to be one thing in animals
and another in plants. It is possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous
term and is always used to describe one thing only, and therefore to render
the definition in this way on purpose: or it may quite well happen that
a man may see the ambiguous character of the word, and wish to render the
definition of the one sense only, and yet fail to see that he has rendered
a definition common to both senses instead of one peculiar to the sense
he intends. In either case, whichever course he pursues, he is equally
at fault. Since ambiguous terms sometimes pass unobserved, it is best in
questioning to treat such terms as though they were synonymous (for the
definition of the one sense will not apply to the other, so that the answerer
will be generally thought not to have defined it correctly, for to a synonymous
term the definition should apply in its full range), whereas in answering
you should yourself distinguish between the senses. Further, as some answerers
call 'ambiguous' what is really synonymous, whenever the definition rendered
fails to apply universally, and, vice versa, call synonymous what is really
ambiguous supposing their definition applies to both senses of the term,
one should secure a preliminary admission on such points, or else prove
beforehand that so-and-so is ambiguous or synonymous, as the case may be:
for people are more ready to agree when they do not foresee what the consequence
will be. If, however, no admission has been made, and the man asserts that
what is really synonymous is ambiguous because the definition he has rendered
will not apply to the second sense as well, see if the definition of this
second meaning applies also to the other meanings: for if so, this meaning
must clearly be synonymous with those others. Otherwise, there will be
more than one definition of those other meanings, for there are applicable
to them two distinct definitions in explanation of the term, viz. the one
previously rendered and also the later one. Again, if any one were to define
a term used in several senses, and, finding that his definition does not
apply to them all, were to contend not that the term is ambiguous, but
that even the term does not properly apply to all those senses, just because
his definition will not do so either, then one may retort to such a man
that though in some things one must not use the language of the people,
yet in a question of terminology one is bound to employ the received and
traditional usage and not to upset matters of that sort.
Part 11
Suppose now that a definition has been rendered of some complex
term, take away the definition of one of the elements in the complex, and
see if also the rest of the definition defines the rest of it: if not,
it is clear that neither does the whole definition define the whole complex.
Suppose, e.g. that some one has defined a 'finite straight line' as 'the
limit of a finite plane, such that its centre is in a line with its extremes';
if now the definition of a finite line' be the 'limit of a finite plane',
the rest (viz. 'such that its centre is in a line with its extremes') ought
to be a definition of straight'. But an infinite straight line has neither
centre nor extremes and yet is straight so that this remainder does not
define the remainder of the term.
Moreover, if the term defined be a compound notion, see if the
definition rendered be equimembral with the term defined. A definition
is said to be equimembral with the term defined when the number of the
elements compounded in the latter is the same as the number of nouns and
verbs in the definition. For the exchange in such cases is bound to be
merely one of term for term, in the case of some if not of all, seeing
that there are no more terms used now than formerly; whereas in a definition
terms ought to be rendered by phrases, if possible in every case, or if
not, in the majority. For at that rate, simple objects too could be defined
by merely calling them by a different name, e.g. 'cloak' instead of
'doublet'.
The mistake is even worse, if actually a less well known term be
substituted, e.g. 'pellucid mortal' for 'white man': for it is no definition,
and moreover is less intelligible when put in that form.
Look and see also whether, in the exchange of words, the sense
fails still to be the same. Take, for instance, the explanation of 'speculative
knowledge' as 'speculative conception': for conception is not the same
as knowledge-as it certainly ought to be if the whole is to be the same
too: for though the word 'speculative' is common to both expressions, yet
the remainder is different.
Moreover, see if in replacing one of the terms by something else
he has exchanged the genus and not the differentia, as in the example just
given: for 'speculative' is a less familiar term than knowledge; for the
one is the genus and the other the differentia, and the genus is always
the most familiar term of all; so that it is not this, but the differentia,
that ought to have been changed, seeing that it is the less familiar. It
might be held that this criticism is ridiculous: because there is no reason
why the most familiar term should not describe the differentia, and not
the genus; in which case, clearly, the term to be altered would also be
that denoting the genus and not the differentia. If, however, a man is
substituting for a term not merely another term but a phrase, clearly it
is of the differentia rather than of the genus that a definition should
be rendered, seeing that the object of rendering the definition is to make
the subject familiar; for the differentia is less familiar than the
genus.
If he has rendered the definition of the differentia, see whether
the definition rendered is common to it and something else as well: e.g.
whenever he says that an odd number is a 'number with a middle', further
definition is required of how it has a middle: for the word 'number' is
common to both expressions, and it is the word 'odd' for which the phrase
has been substituted. Now both a line and a body have a middle, yet they
are not 'odd'; so that this could not be a definition of 'odd'. If, on
the other hand, the phrase 'with a middle' be used in several senses, the
sense here intended requires to be defined. So that this will either discredit
the definition or prove that it is no definition at
all.
Part 12
Again, see if the term of which he renders the definition is a
reality, whereas what is contained in the definition is not, e.g. Suppose
'white' to be defined as 'colour mingled with fire': for what is bodiless
cannot be mingled with body, so that 'colour' 'mingled with fire' could
not exist, whereas 'white' does exist.
Moreover, those who in the case of relative terms do not distinguish
to what the object is related, but have described it only so as to include
it among too large a number of things, are wrong either wholly or in part;
e.g. suppose some one to have defined 'medicine' as a science of Reality'.
For if medicine be not a science of anything that is real, the definition
is clearly altogether false; while if it be a science of some real thing,
but not of another, it is partly false; for it ought to hold of all reality,
if it is said to be of Reality essentially and not accidentally: as is
the case with other relative terms: for every object of knowledge is a
term relative to knowledge: likewise, also, with other relative terms,
inasmuch as all such are convertible. Moreover, if the right way to render
account of a thing be to render it as it is not in itself but accidentally,
then each and every relative term would be used in relation not to one
thing but to a number of things. For there is no reason why the same thing
should not be both real and white and good, so that it would be a correct
rendering to render the object in relation to any one whatsoever of these,
if to render what it is accidentally be a correct way to render it. It
is, moreover, impossible that a definition of this sort should be peculiar
to the term rendered: for not only but the majority of the other sciences
too, have for their object some real thing, so that each will be a science
of reality. Clearly, then, such a definition does not define any science
at all; for a definition ought to be peculiar to its own term, not
general.
Sometimes, again, people define not the thing but only the thing
in a good or perfect condition. Such is the definition of a rhetorician
as 'one who can always see what will persuade in the given circumstances,
and omit nothing'; or of a thief, as 'one who pilfers in secret': for clearly,
if they each do this, then the one will be a good rhetorician, and the
other a good thief: whereas it is not the actual pilfering in secret, but
the wish to do it, that constitutes the thief.
Again, see if he has rendered what is desirable for its own sake
as desirable for what it produces or does, or as in any way desirable because
of something else, e.g. by saying that justice is 'what preserves the laws'
or that wisdom is 'what produces happiness'; for what produces or preserves
something else is one of the things desirable for something else. It might
be said that it is possible for what is desirable in itself to be desirable
for something else as well: but still to define what is desirable in itself
in such a way is none the less wrong: for the essence contains par excellence
what is best in anything, and it is better for a thing to be desirable
in itself than to be desirable for something else, so that this is rather
what the definition too ought to have indicated.
Part 13
See also whether in defining anything a man has defined it as an
'A and B', or as a 'product of A and B' or as an 'A+B'. If he defines it
as and B', the definition will be true of both and yet of neither of them;
suppose, e.g. justice to be defined as 'temperance and courage.' For if
of two persons each has one of the two only, both and yet neither will
be just: for both together have justice, and yet each singly fails to have
it. Even if the situation here described does not so far appear very absurd
because of the occurrence of this kind of thing in other cases also (for
it is quite possible for two men to have a mina between them, though neither
of them has it by himself), yet least that they should have contrary attributes
surely seems quite absurd; and yet this will follow if the one be temperate
and yet a coward, and the other, though brave, be a profligate; for then
both will exhibit both justice and injustice: for if justice be temperance
and bravery, then injustice will be cowardice and profligacy. In general,
too, all the ways of showing that the whole is not the same as the sum
of its parts are useful in meeting the type just described; for a man who
defines in this way seems to assert that the parts are the same as the
whole. The arguments are particularly appropriate in cases where the process
of putting the parts together is obvious, as in a house and other things
of that sort: for there, clearly, you may have the parts and yet not have
the whole, so that parts and whole cannot be the same.
If, however, he has said that the term being defined is not 'A
and B' but the 'product of A and B', look and see in the first place if
A and B cannot in the nature of things have a single product: for some
things are so related to one another that nothing can come of them, e.g.
a line and a number. Moreover, see if the term that has been defined is
in the nature of things found primarily in some single subject, whereas
the things which he has said produce it are not found primarily in any
single subject, but each in a separate one. If so, clearly that term could
not be the product of these things: for the whole is bound to be in the
same things wherein its parts are, so that the whole will then be found
primarily not in one subject only, but in a number of them. If, on the
other hand, both parts and whole are found primarily in some single subject,
see if that medium is not the same, but one thing in the case of the whole
and another in that of the parts. Again, see whether the parts perish together
with the whole: for it ought to happen, vice versa, that the whole perishes
when the parts perish; when the whole perishes, there is no necessity that
the parts should perish too. Or again, see if the whole be good or evil,
and the parts neither, or, vice versa, if the parts be good or evil and
the whole neither. For it is impossible either for a neutral thing to produce
something good or bad, or for things good or bad to produce a neutral thing.
Or again, see if the one thing is more distinctly good than the other is
evil, and yet the product be no more good than evil, e.g. suppose shamelessness
be defined as 'the product of courage and false opinion': here the goodness
of courage exceeds the evil of false opinion; accordingly the product of
these ought to have corresponded to this excess, and to be either good
without qualification, or at least more good than evil. Or it may be that
this does not necessarily follow, unless each be in itself good or bad;
for many things that are productive are not good in themselves, but only
in combination; or, per contra, they are good taken singly, and bad or
neutral in combination. What has just been said is most clearly illustrated
in the case of things that make for health or sickness; for some drugs
are such that each taken alone is good, but if they are both administered
in a mixture, bad.
Again, see whether the whole, as produced from a better and worse,
fails to be worse than the better and better than the worse element. This
again, however, need not necessarily be the case, unless the elements compounded
be in themselves good; if they are not, the whole may very well not be
good, as in the cases just instanced.
Moreover, see if the whole be synonymous with one of the elements:
for it ought not to be, any more than in the case of syllables: for the
syllable is not synonymous with any of the letters of which it is made
up.
Moreover, see if he has failed to state the manner of their composition:
for the mere mention of its elements is not enough to make the thing intelligible.
For the essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is a product
of so-and-so, but that it is a product of them compounded in such and such
a way, just as in the case of a house: for here the materials do not make
a house irrespective of the way they are put together.
If a man has defined an object as 'A+B', the first thing to be
said is that 'A+B' means the same either as 'A and B', or as the 'product
of A and B.' for 'honey+water' means either the honey and the water, or
the 'drink made of honey and water'. If, then, he admits that 'A+B' is
+ B' is the same as either of these two things, the same criticisms will
apply as have already been given for meeting each of them. Moreover, distinguish
between the different senses in which one thing may be said to be '+' another,
and see if there is none of them in which A could be said to exist '+ B.'
Thus e.g. supposing the expression to mean that they exist either in some
identical thing capable of containing them (as e.g. justice and courage
are found in the soul), or else in the same place or in the same time,
and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question, clearly the definition
rendered could not hold of anything, as there is no possible way in which
A can exist B'. If, however, among the various senses above distinguished,
it be true that A and B are each found in the same time as the other, look
and see if possibly the two are not used in the same relation. Thus e.g.
suppose courage to have been defined as 'daring with right reasoning':
here it is possible that the person exhibits daring in robbery, and right
reasoning in regard to the means of health: but he may have 'the former
quality+the latter' at the same time, and not as yet be courageous! Moreover,
even though both be used in the same relation as well, e.g. in relation
to medical treatment (for a man may exhibit both daring and right reasoning
in respect of medical treatment), still, none the less, not even this combination
of 'the one+the other 'makes him 'courageous'. For the two must not relate
to any casual object that is the same, any more than each to a different
object; rather, they must relate to the function of courage, e.g. meeting
the perils of war, or whatever is more properly speaking its function than
this.
Some definitions rendered in this form fail to come under the aforesaid
division at all, e.g. a definition of anger as 'pain with a consciousness
of being slighted'. For what this means to say is that it is because of
a consciousness of this sort that the pain occurs; but to occur 'because
of' a thing is not the same as to occur '+ a thing' in any of its aforesaid
senses.
Part 14
Again, if he have described the whole compounded as the 'composition'
of these things (e.g. 'a living creature' as a 'composition of soul and
body'), first of all see whether he has omitted to state the kind of composition,
as (e.g.) in a definition of 'flesh' or 'bone' as the 'composition of fire,
earth, and air'. For it is not enough to say it is a composition, but you
should also go on to define the kind of composition: for these things do
not form flesh irrespective of the manner of their composition, but when
compounded in one way they form flesh, when in another, bone. It appears,
moreover, that neither of the aforesaid substances is the same as a 'composition'
at all: for a composition always has a decomposition as its contrary, whereas
neither of the aforesaid has any contrary. Moreover, if it is equally probable
that every compound is a composition or else that none is, and every kind
of living creature, though a compound, is never a composition, then no
other compound could be a composition either.
Again, if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally liable
to occur, and the thing has been defined through the one, clearly it has
not been defined; else there will be more than one definition of the same
thing; for how is it any more a definition to define it through this one
than through the other, seeing that both alike are naturally liable to
occur in it? Such is the definition of the soul, if defined as a substance
capable of receiving knowledge: for it has a like capacity for receiving
ignorance.
Also, even when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for
lack of acquaintance with the whole, one should attack some part of it,
if one knows that part and sees it to be incorrectly rendered: for if the
part be demolished, so too is the whole definition. Where, again, a definition
is obscure, one should first of all correct and reshape it in order to
make some part of it clear and get a handle for attack, and then proceed
to examine it. For the answerer is bound either to accept the sense as
taken by the questioner, or else himself to explain clearly whatever it
is that his definition means. Moreover, just as in the assemblies the ordinary
practice is to move an emendation of the existing law and, if the emendation
is better, they repeal the existing law, so one ought to do in the case
of definitions as well: one ought oneself to propose a second definition:
for if it is seen to be better, and more indicative of the object defined,
clearly the definition already laid down will have been demolished, on
the principle that there cannot be more than one definition of the same
thing.
In combating definitions it is always one of the chief elementary
principles to take by oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object
before one, or to adopt some correctly expressed definition. For one is
bound, with the model (as it were) before one's eyes, to discern both any
shortcoming in any features that the definition ought to have, and also
any superfluous addition, so that one is better supplied with lines of
attack.
As to definitions, then, let so much suffice.
Topics
By Aristotle
Book VII
Part 1
Whether two things are 'the same' or 'different', in the most literal of
the meanings ascribed to 'sameness' (and we said' that 'the same' applies
in the most literal sense to what is numerically one), may be examined
in the light of their inflexions and coordinates and opposites. For if
justice be the same as courage, then too the just man is the same as the
brave man, and 'justly' is the same as 'bravely'. Likewise, too, in the
case of their opposites: for if two things be the same, their opposites
also will be the same, in any of the recognized forms of opposition. For
it is the same thing to take the opposite of the one or that of the other,
seeing that they are the same. Again it may be examined in the light of
those things which tend to produce or to destroy the things in question
of their formation and destruction, and in general of any thing that is
related in like manner to each. For where things are absolutely the same,
their formations and destructions also are the same, and so are the things
that tend to produce or to destroy them. Look and see also, in a case where
one of two things is said to be something or other in a superlative degree,
if the other of these alleged identical things can also be described by
a superlative in the same respect. Thus Xenocrates argues that the happy
life and the good life are the same, seeing that of all forms of life the
good life is the most desirable and so also is the happy life: for 'the
most desirable' and the greatest' apply but to one thing.' Likewise also
in other cases of the kind. Each, however, of the two things termed 'greatest'
or most desirable' must be numerically one: otherwise no proof will have
been given that they are the same; for it does not follow because Peloponnesians
and Spartans are the bravest of the Greeks, that Peloponnesians are the
same as Spartans, seeing that 'Peloponnesian' is not any one person nor
yet 'Spartan'; it only follows that the one must be included under the
other as 'Spartans' are under 'Peloponnesians': for otherwise, if the one
class be not included under the other, each will be better than the other.
For then the Peloponnesians are bound to be better than the Spartans, seeing
that the one class is not included under the other; for they are better
than anybody else. Likewise also the Spartans must perforce be better than
the Peloponnesians; for they too are better than anybody else; each then
is better than the other! Clearly therefore what is styled 'best' and 'greatest'
must be a single thing, if it is to be proved to be 'the same' as another.
This also is why Xenocrates fails to prove his case: for the happy life
is not numerically single, nor yet the good life, so that it does not follow
that, because they are both the most desirable, they are therefore the
same, but only that the one falls under the other.
Again, look and see if, supposing the one to be the same as something,
the other also is the same as it: for if they be not both the same as the
same thing, clearly neither are they the same as one
another.
Moreover, examine them in the light of their accidents or of the
things of which they are accidents: for any accident belonging to the one
must belong also to the other, and if the one belong to anything as an
accident, so must the other also. If in any of these respects there is
a discrepancy, clearly they are not the same.
See further whether, instead of both being found in one class of
predicates, the one signifies a quality and the other a quantity or relation.
Again, see if the genus of each be not the same, the one being 'good' and
the other evil', or the one being 'virtue' and the other 'knowledge': or
see if, though the genus is the same, the differentiae predicted of either
be not the same, the one (e.g.) being distinguished as a 'speculative'
science, the other as a 'practical' science. Likewise also in other
cases.
Moreover, from the point of view of 'degrees', see if the one admits
an increase of degree but not the other, or if though both admit it, they
do not admit it at the same time; just as it is not the case that a man
desires intercourse more intensely, the more intensely he is in love, so
that love and the desire for intercourse are not the
same.
Moreover, examine them by means of an addition, and see whether
the addition of each to the same thing fails to make the same whole; or
if the subtraction of the same thing from each leaves a different remainder.
Suppose (e.g.) that he has declared 'double a half' to be the same as 'a
multiple of a half': then, subtracting the words 'a half' from each, the
remainders ought to have signified the same thing: but they do not; for
'double' and 'a multiple of' do not signify the same
thing.
Inquire also not only if some impossible consequence results directly
from the statement made, that A and B are the same, but also whether it
is possible for a supposition to bring it about; as happens to those who
assert that 'empty' is the same as 'full of air': for clearly if the air
be exhausted, the vessel will not be less but more empty, though it will
no longer be full of air. So that by a supposition, which may be true or
may be false (it makes no difference which), the one character is annulled
and not the other, showing that they are not the same.
Speaking generally, one ought to be on the look-out for any discrepancy
anywhere in any sort of predicate of each term, and in the things of which
they are predicated. For all that is predicated of the one should be predicated
also of the other, and of whatever the one is a predicate, the other should
be a predicate of it as well.
Moreover, as 'sameness' is a term used in many senses, see whether
things that are the same in one way are the same also in a different way.
For there is either no necessity or even no possibility that things that
are the same specifically or generically should be numerically the same,
and it is with the question whether they are or are not the same in that
sense that we are concerned.
Moreover, see whether the one can exist without the other; for,
if so, they could not be the same.
Part 2
Such is the number of the commonplace rules that relate to 'sameness'.
It is clear from what has been said that all the destructive commonplaces
relating to sameness are useful also in questions of definition, as was
said before:' for if what is signified by the term and by the expression
be not the same, clearly the expression rendered could not be a definition.
None of the constructive commonplaces, on the other hand, helps in the
matter of definition; for it is not enough to show the sameness of content
between the expression and the term, in order to establish that the former
is a definition, but a definition must have also all the other characters
already announced.
Part 3
This then is the way, and these the arguments, whereby the attempt
to demolish a definition should always be made. If, on the other hand,
we desire to establish one, the first thing to observe is that few if any
who engage in discussion arrive at a definition by reasoning: they always
assume something of the kind as their starting points-both in geometry
and in arithmetic and the other studies of that kind. In the second place,
to say accurately what a definition is, and how it should be given, belongs
to another inquiry. At present it concerns us only so far as is required
for our present purpose, and accordingly we need only make the bare statement
that to reason to a thing's definition and essence is quite possible. For
if a definition is an expression signifying the essence of the thing and
the predicates contained therein ought also to be the only ones which are
predicated of the thing in the category of essence; and genera and differentiae
are so predicated in that category: it is obvious that if one were to get
an admission that so and so are the only attributes predicated in that
category, the expression containing so and so would of necessity be a definition;
for it is impossible that anything else should be a definition, seeing
that there is not anything else predicated of the thing in the category
of essence.
That a definition may thus be reached by a process of reasoning
is obvious. The means whereby it should be established have been more precisely
defined elsewhere, but for the purposes of the inquiry now before us the
same commonplace rules serve. For we have to examine into the contraries
and other opposites of the thing, surveying the expressions used both as
wholes and in detail: for if the opposite definition defines that opposite
term, the definition given must of necessity be that of the term before
us. Seeing, however, that contraries may be conjoined in more than one
way, we have to select from those contraries the one whose contrary definition
seems most obvious. The expressions, then, have to be examined each as
a whole in the way we have said, and also in detail as follows. First of
all, see that the genus rendered is correctly rendered; for if the contrary
thing be found in the contrary genus to that stated in the definition,
and the thing before you is not in that same genus, then it would clearly
be in the contrary genus: for contraries must of necessity be either in
the same genus or in contrary genera. The differentiae, too, that are predicated
of contraries we expect to be contrary, e.g. those of white and black,
for the one tends to pierce the vision, while the other tends to compress
it. So that if contrary differentiae to those in the definition are predicated
of the contrary term, then those rendered in the definition would be predicated
of the term before us. Seeing, then, that both the genus and the differentiae
have been rightly rendered, clearly the expression given must be the right
definition. It might be replied that there is no necessity why contrary
differentiae should be predicated of contraries, unless the contraries
be found within the same genus: of things whose genera are themselves contraries
it may very well be that the same differentia is used of both, e.g. of
justice and injustice; for the one is a virtue and the other a vice of
the soul: 'of the soul', therefore, is the differentia in both cases, seeing
that the body as well has its virtue and vice. But this much at least is
true, that the differentiae of contraries are either contrary or else the
same. If, then, the contrary differentia to that given be predicated of
the contrary term and not of the one in hand, clearly the differentia stated
must be predicated of the latter. Speaking generally, seeing that the definition
consists of genus and differentiae, if the definition of the contrary term
be apparent, the definition of the term before you will be apparent also:
for since its contrary is found either in the same genus or in the contrary
genus, and likewise also the differentiae predicated of opposites are either
contrary to, or the same as, each other, clearly of the term before you
there will be predicated either the same genus as of its contrary, while,
of its differentiae, either all are contrary to those of its contrary,
or at least some of them are so while the rest remain the same; or, vice
versa, the differentiae will be the same and the genera contrary; or both
genera and differentiae will be contrary. And that is all; for that both
should be the same is not possible; else contraries will have the same
definition.
Moreover, look at it from the point of view of its inflexions and
coordinates. For genera and definitions are bound to correspond in either
case. Thus if forgetfulness be the loss of knowledge, to forget is to lose
knowledge, and to have forgotten is to have lost knowledge. If, then, any
one whatever of these is agreed to, the others must of necessity be agreed
to as well. Likewise, also, if destruction is the decomposition of the
thing's essence, then to be destroyed is to have its essence decomposed,
and 'destructively' means 'in such a way as to decompose its essence';
if again 'destructive' means 'apt to decompose something's essence', then
also 'destruction' means 'the decomposition of its essence'. Likewise also
with the rest: an admission of any one of them whatever, and all the rest
are admitted too.
Moreover, look at it from the point of view of things that stand
in relations that are like each other. For if 'healthy' means 'productive
of health', 'vigorous' too will mean 'productive of vigour', and 'useful'
will mean 'productive of good.' For each of these things is related in
like manner to its own peculiar end, so that if one of them is defined
as 'productive of' that end, this will also be the definition of each of
the rest as well.
Moreover, look at it from the point of and like degrees, in all
the ways in which it is possible to establish a result by comparing two
and two together. Thus if A defines a better than B defines and B is a
definition of so too is A of a. Further, if A's claim to define a is like
B's to define B, and B defines B, then A too defines a. This examination
from the point of view of greater degrees is of no use when a single definition
is compared with two things, or two definitions with one thing; for there
cannot possibly be one definition of two things or two of the same
thing.
Part 4
The most handy of all the commonplace arguments are those just
mentioned and those from co-ordinates and inflexions, and these therefore
are those which it is most important to master and to have ready to hand:
for they are the most useful on the greatest number of occasions. Of the
rest, too, the most important are those of most general application: for
these are the most effective, e.g. that you should examine the individual
cases, and then look to see in the case of their various species whether
the definition applies. For the species is synonymous with its individuals.
This sort of inquiry is of service against those who assume the existence
of Ideas, as has been said before.' Moreover see if a man has used a term
metaphorically, or predicated it of itself as though it were something
different. So too if any other of the commonplace rules is of general application
and effective, it should be employed.
Part 5
That it is more difficult to establish than to overthrow a definition,
is obvious from considerations presently to be urged. For to see for oneself,
and to secure from those whom one is questioning, an admission of premisses
of this sort is no simple matter, e.g. that of the elements of the definition
rendered the one is genus and the other differentia, and that only the
genus and differentiae are predicated in the category of essence. Yet without
these premisses it is impossible to reason to a definition; for if any
other things as well are predicated of the thing in the category of essence,
there is no telling whether the formula stated or some other one is its
definition, for a definition is an expression indicating the essence of
a thing. The point is clear also from the following: It is easier to draw
one conclusion than many. Now in demolishing a definition it is sufficient
to argue against one point only (for if we have overthrown any single point
whatsoever, we shall have demolished the definition); whereas in establishing
a definition, one is bound to bring people to the view that everything
contained in the definition is attributable. Moreover, in establishing
a case, the reasoning brought forward must be universal: for the definition
put forward must be predicated of everything of which the term is predicated,
and must moreover be convertible, if the definition rendered is to be peculiar
to the subject. In overthrowing a view, on the other hand, there is no
longer any necessity to show one's point universally: for it is enough
to show that the formula is untrue of any one of the things embraced under
the term.
Further, even supposing it should be necessary to overthrow something
by a universal proposition, not even so is there any need to prove the
converse of the proposition in the process of overthrowing the definition.
For merely to show that the definition fails to be predicated of every
one of the things of which the term is predicated, is enough to overthrow
it universally: and there is no need to prove the converse of this in order
to show that the term is predicated of things of which the expression is
not predicated. Moreover, even if it applies to everything embraced under
the term, but not to it alone, the definition is thereby
demolished.
The case stands likewise in regard to the property and genus of
a term also. For in both cases it is easier to overthrow than to establish.
As regards the property this is clear from what has been said: for as a
rule the property is rendered in a complex phrase, so that to overthrow
it, it is only necessary to demolish one of the terms used, whereas to
establish it is necessary to reason to them all. Then, too, nearly all
the other rules that apply to the definition will apply also to the property
of a thing. For in establishing a property one has to show that it is true
of everything included under the term in question, whereas to overthrow
one it is enough to show in a single case only that it fails to belong:
further, even if it belongs to everything falling under the term, but not
to that only, it is overthrown in this case as well, as was explained in
the case of the definition. In regard to the genus, it is clear that you
are bound to establish it in one way only, viz. by showing that it belongs
in every case, while of overthrowing it there are two ways: for if it has
been shown that it belongs either never or not in a certain case, the original
statement has been demolished. Moreover, in establishing a genus it is
not enough to show that it belongs, but also that it belongs as genus has
to be shown; whereas in overthrowing it, it is enough to show its failure
to belong either in some particular case or in every case. It appears,
in fact, as though, just as in other things to destroy is easier than to
create, so in these matters too to overthrow is easier than to
establish.
In the case of an accidental attribute the universal proposition
is easier to overthrow than to establish; for to establish it, one has
to show that it belongs in every case, whereas to overthrow it, it is enough
to show that it does not belong in one single case. The particular proposition
is, on the contrary, easier to establish than to overthrow: for to establish
it, it is enough to show that it belongs in a particular instance, whereas
to overthrow it, it has to be shown that it never belongs at
all.
It is clear also that the easiest thing of all is to overthrow
a definition. For on account of the number of statements involved we are
presented in the definition with the greatest number of points for attack,
and the more plentiful the material, the quicker an argument comes: for
there is more likelihood of a mistake occurring in a large than in a small
number of things. Moreover, the other rules too may be used as means for
attacking a definition: for if either the formula be not peculiar, or the
genus rendered be the wrong one, or something included in the formula fail
to belong, the definition is thereby demolished. On the other hand, against
the others we cannot bring all of the arguments drawn from definitions,
nor yet of the rest: for only those relating to accidental attributes apply
generally to all the aforesaid kinds of attribute. For while each of the
aforesaid kinds of attribute must belong to the thing in question, yet
the genus may very well not belong as a property without as yet being thereby
demolished. Likewise also the property need not belong as a genus, nor
the accident as a genus or property, so long as they do belong. So that
it is impossible to use one set as a basis of attack upon the other except
in the case of definition. Clearly, then, it is the easiest of all things
to demolish a definition, while to establish one is the hardest. For there
one both has to establish all those other points by reasoning (i.e. that
the attributes stated belong, and that the genus rendered is the true genus,
and that the formula is peculiar to the term), and moreover, besides this,
that the formula indicates the essence of the thing; and this has to be
done correctly.
Of the rest, the property is most nearly of this kind: for it is
easier to demolish, because as a rule it contains several terms; while
it is the hardest to establish, both because of the number of things that
people must be brought to accept, and, besides this, because it belongs
to its subject alone and is predicated convertibly with its
subject.
The easiest thing of all to establish is an accidental predicate:
for in other cases one has to show not only that the predicate belongs,
but also that it belongs in such and such a particular way: whereas in
the case of the accident it is enough to show merely that it belongs. On
the other hand, an accidental predicate is the hardest thing to overthrow,
because it affords the least material: for in stating accident a man does
not add how the predicate belongs; and accordingly, while in other cases
it is possible to demolish what is said in two ways, by showing either
that the predicate does not belong, or that it does not belong in the particular
way stated, in the case of an accidental predicate the only way to demolish
it is to show that it does not belong at all.
The commonplace arguments through which we shall be well supplied
with lines of argument with regard to our several problems have now been
enumerated at about sufficient length.
Topics
By Aristotle
Book VIII
Part 1
Next there fall to be discussed the problems of arrangement and method
in pitting questions. Any one who intends to frame questions must, first
of all, select the ground from which he should make his attack; secondly,
he must frame them and arrange them one by one to himself; thirdly and
lastly, he must proceed actually to put them to the other party. Now so
far as the selection of his ground is concerned the problem is one alike
for the philosopher and the dialectician; but how to go on to arrange his
points and frame his questions concerns the dialectician only: for in every
problem of that kind a reference to another party is involved. Not so with
the philosopher, and the man who is investigating by himself: the premisses
of his reasoning, although true and familiar, may be refused by the answerer
because they lie too near the original statement and so he foresees what
will follow if he grants them: but for this the philosopher does not care.
Nay, he may possibly be even anxious to secure axioms as familiar and as
near to the question in hand as possible: for these are the bases on which
scientific reasonings are built up.
The sources from which one's commonplace arguments should be drawn
have already been described:' we have now to discuss the arrangement and
formation of questions and first to distinguish the premisses, other than
the necessary premisses, which have to be adopted. By necessary premisses
are meant those through which the actual reasoning is constructed. Those
which are secured other than these are of four kinds; they serve either
inductively to secure the universal premiss being granted, or to lend weight
to the argument, or to conceal the conclusion, or to render the argument
more clear. Beside these there is no other premiss which need be secured:
these are the ones whereby you should try to multiply and formulate your
questions. Those which are used to conceal the conclusion serve a controversial
purpose only; but inasmuch as an undertaking of this sort is always conducted
against another person, we are obliged to employ them as
well.
The necessary premisses through which the reasoning is effected,
ought not to be propounded directly in so many words. Rather one should
soar as far aloof from them as possible. Thus if one desires to secure
an admission that the knowledge of contraries is one, one should ask him
to admit it not of contraries, but of opposites: for, if he grants this,
one will then argue that the knowledge of contraries is also the same,
seeing that contraries are opposites; if he does not, one should secure
the admission by induction, by formulating a proposition to that effect
in the case of some particular pair of contraries. For one must secure
the necessary premisses either by reasoning or by induction, or else partly
by one and partly by the other, although any propositions which are too
obvious to be denied may be formulated in so many words. This is because
the coming conclusion is less easily discerned at the greater distance
and in the process of induction, while at the same time, even if one cannot
reach the required premisses in this way, it is still open to one to formulate
them in so many words. The premisses, other than these, that were mentioned
above, must be secured with a view to the latter. The way to employ them
respectively is as follows: Induction should proceed from individual cases
to the universal and from the known to the unknown; and the objects of
perception are better known, to most people if not invariably. Concealment
of one's plan is obtained by securing through prosyllogisms the premisses
through which the proof of the original proposition is going to be constructed-and
as many of them as possible. This is likely to be effected by making syllogisms
to prove not only the necessary premisses but also some of those which
are required to establish them. Moreover, do not state the conclusions
of these premisses but draw them later one after another; for this is likely
to keep the answerer at the greatest possible distance from the original
proposition. Speaking generally, a man who desires to get information by
a concealed method should so put his questions that when he has put his
whole argument and has stated the conclusion, people still ask 'Well, but
why is that?' This result will be secured best of all by the method above
described: for if one states only the final conclusion, it is unclear how
it comes about; for the answerer does not foresee on what grounds it is
based, because the previous syllogisms have not been made articulate to
him: while the final syllogism, showing the conclusion, is likely to be
kept least articulate if we lay down not the secured propositions on which
it is based, but only the grounds on which we reason to
them.
It is a useful rule, too, not to secure the admissions claimed
as the bases of the syllogisms in their proper order, but alternately those
that conduce to one conclusion and those that conduce to another; for,
if those which go together are set side by side, the conclusion that will
result from them is more obvious in advance.
One should also, wherever possible, secure the universal premiss
by a definition relating not to the precise terms themselves but to their
co-ordinates; for people deceive themselves, whenever the definition is
taken in regard to a co-ordinate, into thinking that they are not making
the admission universally. An instance would be, supposing one had to secure
the admission that the angry man desires vengeance on account of an apparent
slight, and were to secure this, that 'anger' is a desire for vengeance
on account of an apparent slight: for, clearly, if this were secured, we
should have universally what we intend. If, on the other hand, people formulate
propositions relating to the actual terms themselves, they often find that
the answerer refuses to grant them because on the actual term itself he
is readier with his objection, e.g. that the 'angry man' does not desire
vengeance, because we become angry with our parents, but we do not desire
vengeance on them. Very likely the objection is not valid; for upon some
people it is vengeance enough to cause them pain and make them sorry; but
still it gives a certain plausibility and air of reasonableness to the
denial of the proposition. In the case, however, of the definition of 'anger'
it is not so easy to find an objection.
Moreover, formulate your proposition as though you did so not for
its own sake, but in order to get at something else: for people are shy
of granting what an opponent's case really requires. Speaking generally,
a questioner should leave it as far as possible doubtful whether he wishes
to secure an admission of his proposition or of its opposite: for if it
be uncertain what their opponent's argument requires, people are more ready
to say what they themselves think.
Moreover, try to secure admissions by means of likeness: for such
admissions are plausible, and the universal involved is less patent; e.g.
make the other person admit that as knowledge and ignorance of contraries
is the same, so too perception of contraries is the same; or vice versa,
that since the perception is the same, so is the knowledge also. This argument
resembles induction, but is not the same thing; for in induction it is
the universal whose admission is secured from the particulars, whereas
in arguments from likeness, what is secured is not the universal under
which all the like cases fall.
It is a good rule also, occasionally to bring an objection against
oneself: for answerers are put off their guard against those who appear
to be arguing impartially. It is useful too, to add that 'So and so is
generally held or commonly said'; for people are shy of upsetting the received
opinion unless they have some positive objection to urge: and at the same
time they are cautious about upsetting such things because they themselves
too find them useful. Moreover, do not be insistent, even though you really
require the point: for insistence always arouses the more opposition. Further,
formulate your premiss as though it were a mere illustration: for people
admit the more readily a proposition made to serve some other purpose,
and not required on its own account. Moreover, do not formulate the very
proposition you need to secure, but rather something from which that necessarily
follows: for people are more willing to admit the latter, because it is
not so clear from this what the result will be, and if the one has been
secured, the other has been secured also. Again, one should put last the
point which one most wishes to have conceded; for people are specially
inclined to deny the first questions put to them, because most people in
asking questions put first the points which they are most eager to secure.
On the other hand, in dealing with some people propositions of this sort
should be put forward first: for ill-tempered men admit most readily what
comes first, unless the conclusion that will result actually stares them
in the face, while at the close of an argument they show their ill-temper.
Likewise also with those who consider themselves smart at answering: for
when they have admitted most of what you want they finally talk clap-trap
to the effect that the conclusion does not follow from their admissions:
yet they say 'Yes' readily, confident in their own character, and imagining
that they cannot suffer any reverse. Moreover, it is well to expand the
argument and insert things that it does not require at all, as do those
who draw false geometrical figures: for in the multitude of details the
whereabouts of the fallacy is obscured. For this reason also a questioner
sometimes evades observation as he adds in a corner what, if he formulated
it by itself, would not be granted.
For concealment, then, the rules which should be followed are the
above. Ornament is attained by induction and distinction of things closely
akin. What sort of process induction is obvious: as for distinction, an
instance of the kind of thing meant is the distinction of one form of knowledge
as better than another by being either more accurate, or concerned with
better objects; or the distinction of sciences into speculative, practical,
and productive. For everything of this kind lends additional ornament to
the argument, though there is no necessity to say them, so far as the conclusion
goes.
For clearness, examples and comparisons should be adduced, and
let the illustrations be relevant and drawn from things that we know, as
in Homer and not as in Choerilus; for then the proposition is likely to
become clearer.
Part 2
In dialectics, syllogism should be employed in reasoning against
dialecticians rather than against the crowd: induction, on the other hand,
is most useful against the crowd. This point has been treated previously
as well.' In induction, it is possible in some cases to ask the question
in its universal form, but in others this is not easy, because there is
no established general term that covers all the resemblances: in this case,
when people need to secure the universal, they use the phrase 'in all cases
of this sort'. But it is one of the very hardest things to distinguish
which of the things adduced are 'of this sort', and which are not: and
in this connexion people often throw dust in each others' eyes in their
discussion, the one party asserting the likeness of things that are not
alike, and the other disputing the likeness of things that are. One ought,
therefore, to try oneself to coin a word to cover all things of the given
sort, so as to leave no opportunity either to the answerer to dispute,
and say that the thing advanced does not answer to a like description,
or to the questioner to suggest falsely that it does answer to a like description,
for many things appear to answer to like descriptions that do not really
do so.
If one has made an induction on the strength of several cases and
yet the answerer refuses to grant the universal proposition, then it is
fair to demand his objection. But until one has oneself stated in what
cases it is so, it is not fair to demand that he shall say in what cases
it is not so: for one should make the induction first, and then demand
the objection. One ought, moreover, to claim that the objections should
not be brought in reference to the actual subject of the proposition, unless
that subject happen to be the one and only thing of the kind, as for instance
two is the one prime number among the even numbers: for, unless he can
say that this subject is unique of its kind, the objector ought to make
his objection in regard to some other. People sometimes object to a universal
proposition, and bring their objection not in regard to the thing itself,
but in regard to some homonym of it: thus they argue that a man can very
well have a colour or a foot or a hand other than his own, for a painter
may have a colour that is not his own, and a cook may have a foot that
is not his own. To meet them, therefore, you should draw the distinction
before putting your question in such cases: for so long as the ambiguity
remains undetected, so long will the objection to the proposition be deemed
valid. If, however, he checks the series of questions by an objection in
regard not to some homonym, but to the actual thing asserted, the questioner
should withdraw the point objected to, and form the remainder into a universal
proposition, until he secures what he requires; e.g. in the case of forgetfulness
and having forgotten: for people refuse to admit that the man who has lost
his knowledge of a thing has forgotten it, because if the thing alters,
he has lost knowledge of it, but he has not forgotten it. Accordingly the
thing to do is to withdraw the part objected to, and assert the remainder,
e.g. that if a person have lost knowledge of a thing while it still remains,
he then has forgotten it. One should similarly treat those who object to
the statement that 'the greater the good, the greater the evil that is
its opposite': for they allege that health, which is a less good thing
than vigour, has a greater evil as its opposite: for disease is a greater
evil than debility. In this case too, therefore, we have to withdraw the
point objected to; for when it has been withdrawn, the man is more likely
to admit the proposition, e.g. that 'the greater good has the greater evil
as its opposite, unless the one good involves the other as well', as vigour
involves health. This should be done not only when he formulates an objection,
but also if, without so doing, he refuses to admit the point because he
foresees something of the kind: for if the point objected to be withdrawn,
he will be forced to admit the proposition because he cannot foresee in
the rest of it any case where it does not hold true: if he refuse to admit
it, then when asked for an objection he certainly will be unable to render
one. Propositions that are partly false and partly true are of this type:
for in the case of these it is possible by withdrawing a part to leave
the rest true. If, however, you formulate the proposition on the strength
of many cases and he has no objection to bring, you may claim that he shall
admit it: for a premiss is valid in dialectics which thus holds in several
instances and to which no objection is forthcoming.
Whenever it is possible to reason to the same conclusion either
through or without a reduction per impossibile, if one is demonstrating
and not arguing dialectically it makes no difference which method of reasoning
be adopted, but in argument with another reasoning per impossibile should
be avoided. For where one has reasoned without the reduction per impossibile,
no dispute can arise; if, on the other hand, one does reason to an impossible
conclusion, unless its falsehood is too plainly manifest, people deny that
it is impossible, so that the questioners do not get what they
want.
One should put forward all propositions that hold true of several
cases, and to which either no objection whatever appears or at least not
any on the surface: for when people cannot see any case in which it is
not so, they admit it for true.
The conclusion should not be put in the form of a question; if
it be, and the man shakes his head, it looks as if the reasoning had failed.
For often, even if it be not put as a question but advanced as a consequence,
people deny it, and then those who do not see that it follows upon the
previous admissions do not realize that those who deny it have been refuted:
when, then, the one man merely asks it as a question without even saying
that it so follows, and the other denies it, it looks altogether as if
the reasoning had failed.
Not every universal question can form a dialectical proposition
as ordinarily understood, e.g. 'What is man?' or 'How many meanings has
"the good"?' For a dialectical premiss must be of a form to which it is
possible to reply 'Yes' or 'No', whereas to the aforesaid it is not possible.
For this reason questions of this kind are not dialectical unless the questioner
himself draws distinctions or divisions before expressing them, e.g. 'Good
means this, or this, does it not?' For questions of this sort are easily
answered by a Yes or a No. Hence one should endeavour to formulate propositions
of this kind in this form. It is at the same time also perhaps fair to
ask the other man how many meanings of 'the good' there are, whenever you
have yourself distinguished and formulated them, and he will not admit
them at all.
Any one who keeps on asking one thing for a long time is a bad
inquirer. For if he does so though the person questioned keeps on answering
the questions, clearly he asks a large number of questions, or else asks
the same question a large number of times: in the one case he merely babbles,
in the other he fails to reason: for reasoning always consists of a small
number of premisses. If, on the other hand, he does it because the person
questioned does not answer the questions, he is at fault in not taking
him to task or breaking off the discussion.
Part 3
There are certain hypotheses upon which it is at once difficult
to bring, and easy to stand up to, an argument. Such (e.g.) are those things
which stand first and those which stand last in the order of nature. For
the former require definition, while the latter have to be arrived at through
many steps if one wishes to secure a continuous proof from first principles,
or else all discussion about them wears the air of mere sophistry: for
to prove anything is impossible unless one begins with the appropriate
principles, and connects inference with inference till the last are reached.
Now to define first principles is just what answerers do not care to do,
nor do they pay any attention if the questioner makes a definition: and
yet until it is clear what it is that is proposed, it is not easy to discuss
it. This sort of thing happens particularly in the case of the first principles:
for while the other propositions are shown through these, these cannot
be shown through anything else: we are obliged to understand every item
of that sort by a definition. The inferences, too, that lie too close to
the first principle are hard to treat in argument: for it is not possible
to bring many arguments in regard to them, because of the small number
of those steps, between the conclusion and the principle, whereby the succeeding
propositions have to be shown. The hardest, however, of all definitions
to treat in argument are those that employ terms about which, in the first
place, it is uncertain whether they are used in one sense or several, and,
further, whether they are used literally or metaphorically by the definer.
For because of their obscurity, it is impossible to argue upon such terms;
and because of the impossibility of saying whether this obscurity is due
to their being used metaphorically, it is impossible to refute
them.
In general, it is safe to suppose that, whenever any problem proves
intractable, it either needs definition or else bears either several senses,
or a metaphorical sense, or it is not far removed from the first principles;
or else the reason is that we have yet to discover in the first place just
this-in which of the aforesaid directions the source of our difficulty
lies: when we have made this clear, then obviously our business must be
either to define or to distinguish, or to supply the intermediate premisses:
for it is through these that the final conclusions are
shown.
It often happens that a difficulty is found in discussing or arguing
a given position because the definition has not been correctly rendered:
e.g. 'Has one thing one contrary or many?': here when the term 'contraries'
has been properly defined, it is easy to bring people to see whether it
is possible for the same thing to have several contraries or not: in the
same way also with other terms requiring definition. It appears also in
mathematics that the difficulty in using a figure is sometimes due to a
defect in definition; e.g. in proving that the line which cuts the plane
parallel to one side divides similarly both the line which it cuts and
the area; whereas if the definition be given, the fact asserted becomes
immediately clear: for the areas have the same fraction subtracted from
them as have the sides: and this is the definition of 'the same ratio'.
The most primary of the elementary principles are without exception very
easy to show, if the definitions involved, e.g. the nature of a line or
of a circle, be laid down; only the arguments that can be brought in regard
to each of them are not many, because there are not many intermediate steps.
If, on the other hand, the definition of the starting-points be not laid
down, to show them is difficult and may even prove quite impossible. The
case of the significance of verbal expressions is like that of these mathematical
conceptions.
One may be sure then, whenever a position is hard to discuss, that
one or other of the aforesaid things has happened to it. Whenever, on the
other hand, it is a harder task to argue to the point claimed, i.e. the
premiss, than to the resulting position, a doubt may arise whether such
claims should be admitted or not: for if a man is going to refuse to admit
it and claim that you shall argue to it as well, he will be giving the
signal for a harder undertaking than was originally proposed: if, on the
other hand, he grants it, he will be giving the original thesis credence
on the strength of what is less credible than itself. If, then, it is essential
not to enhance the difficulty of the problem, he had better grant it; if,
on the other hand, it be essential to reason through premisses that are
better assured, he had better refuse. In other words, in serious inquiry
he ought not to grant it, unless he be more sure about it than about the
conclusion; whereas in a dialectical exercise he may do so if he is merely
satisfied of its truth. Clearly, then, the circumstances under which such
admissions should be claimed are different for a mere questioner and for
a serious teacher.
Part 4
As to the formulation, then, and arrangement of one's questions,
about enough has been said.
With regard to the giving of answers, we must first define what
is the business of a good answerer, as of a good questioner. The business
of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make the answerer
utter the most extrvagant paradoxes that necessarily follow because of
his position: while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is
not he who is responsible for the absurdity or paradox, but only his position:
for one may, perhaps, distinguish between the mistake of taking up a wrong
position to start with, and that of not maintaining it properly, when once
taken up.
Part 5
Inasmuch as no rules are laid down for those who argue for the
sake of training and of examination:-and the aim of those engaged in teaching
or learning is quite different from that of those engaged in a competition;
as is the latter from that of those who discuss things together in the
spirit of inquiry: for a learner should always state what he thinks: for
no one is even trying to teach him what is false; whereas in a competition
the business of the questioner is to appear by all means to produce an
effect upon the other, while that of the answerer is to appear unaffected
by him; on the other hand, in an assembly of disputants discussing in the
spirit not of a competition but of an examination and inquiry, there are
as yet no articulate rules about what the answerer should aim at, and what
kind of things he should and should not grant for the correct or incorrect
defence of his position:-inasmuch, then, as we have no tradition bequeathed
to us by others, let us try to say something upon the matter for
ourselves.
The thesis laid down by the answerer before facing the questioner's
argument is bound of necessity to be one that is either generally accepted
or generally rejected or else is neither: and moreover is so accepted or
rejected either absolutely or else with a restriction, e.g. by some given
person, by the speaker or by some one else. The manner, however, of its
acceptance or rejection, whatever it be, makes no difference: for the right
way to answer, i.e. to admit or to refuse to admit what has been asked,
will be the same in either case. If, then, the statement laid down by the
answerer be generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the questioner
is bound to be one generally accepted, whereas if the former be generally
accepted, the latter is generally rejected: for the conclusion which the
questioner tries to draw is always the opposite of the statement laid down.
If, on the other hand, what is laid down is generally neither rejected
nor accepted, the conclusion will be of the same type as well. Now since
a man who reasons correctly demonstrates his proposed conclusion from premisses
that are more generally accepted, and more familiar, it is clear that (1)
where the view laid down by him is one that generally is absolutely rejected,
the answerer ought not to grant either what is thus absolutely not accepted
at all, or what is accepted indeed, but accepted less generally than the
questioner's conclusion. For if the statement laid down by the answerer
be generally rejected, the conclusion aimed at by the questioner will be
one that is generally accepted, so that the premisses secured by the questioner
should all be views generally accepted, and more generally accepted than
his proposed conclusion, if the less familiar is to be inferred through
the more familiar. Consequently, if any of the questions put to him be
not of this character, the answerer should not grant them. (2) If, on the
other hand, the statement laid down by the answerer be generally accepted
without qualification, clearly the conclusion sought by the questioner
will be one generally rejected without qualification. Accordingly, the
answerer should admit all views that are generally accepted and, of those
that are not generally accepted, all that are less generally rejected than
the conclusion sought by the questioner. For then he will probably be thought
to have argued sufficiently well. (3) Likewise, too, if the statement laid
down by the answerer be neither rejected generally nor generally accepted;
for then, too, anything that appears to be true should be granted, and,
of the views not generally accepted, any that are more generally accepted
than the questioner's conclusion; for in that case the result will be that
the arguments will be more generally accepted. If, then, the view laid
down by the answerer be one that is generally accepted or rejected without
qualification, then the views that are accepted absolutely must be taken
as the standard of comparison: whereas if the view laid down be one that
is not generally accepted or rejected, but only by the answerer, then the
standard whereby the latter must judge what is generally accepted or not,
and must grant or refuse to grant the point asked, is himself. If, again,
the answerer be defending some one else's opinion, then clearly it will
be the latter's judgement to which he must have regard in granting or denying
the various points. This is why those, too, who introduce other's opinions,
e.g. that 'good and evil are the same thing, as Heraclitus says,' refuse
to admit the impossibility of contraries belonging at the same time to
the same thing; not because they do not themselves believe this, but because
on Heraclitus' principles one has to say so. The same thing is done also
by those who take on the defence of one another's positions; their aim
being to speak as would the man who stated the position.
Part 6
It is clear, then, what the aims of the answerer should be, whether
the position he lays down be a view generally accepted without qualification
or accepted by some definite person. Now every question asked is bound
to involve some view that is either generally held or generally rejected
or neither, and is also bound to be either relevant to the argument or
irrelevant: if then it be a view generally accepted and irrelevant, the
answerer should grant it and remark that it is the accepted view: if it
be a view not generally accepted and irrelevant, he should grant it but
add a comment that it is not generally accepted, in order to avoid the
appearance of being a simpleton. If it be relevant and also be generally
accepted, he should admit that it is the view generally accepted but say
that it lies too close to the original proposition, and that if it be granted
the problem proposed collapses. If what is claimed by the questioner be
relevant but too generally rejected, the answerer, while admitting that
if it be granted the conclusion sought follows, should yet protest that
the proposition is too absurd to be admitted. Suppose, again, it be a view
that is neither rejected generally nor generally accepted, then, if it
be irrelevant to the argument, it may be granted without restriction; if,
however, it be relevant, the answerer should add the comment that, if it
be granted, the original problem collapses. For then the answerer will
not be held to be personally accountable for what happens to him, if he
grants the several points with his eyes open, and also the questioner will
be able to draw his inference, seeing that all the premisses that are more
generally accepted than the conclusion are granted him. Those who try to
draw an inference from premisses more generally rejected than the conclusion
clearly do not reason correctly: hence, when men ask these things, they
ought not to be granted.
Part 7
The questioner should be met in a like manner also in the case
of terms used obscurely, i.e. in several senses. For the answerer, if he
does not understand, is always permitted to say 'I do not understand':
he is not compelled to reply 'Yes' or 'No' to a question which may mean
different things. Clearly, then, in the first place, if what is said be
not clear, he ought not to hesitate to say that he does not understand
it; for often people encounter some difficulty from assenting to questions
that are not clearly put. If he understands the question and yet it covers
many senses, then supposing what it says to be universally true or false,
he should give it an unqualified assent or denial: if, on the other hand,
it be partly true and partly false, he should add a comment that it bears
different senses, and also that in one it is true, in the other false:
for if he leave this distinction till later, it becomes uncertain whether
originally as well he perceived the ambiguity or not. If he does not foresee
the ambiguity, but assents to the question having in view the one sense
of the words, then, if the questioner takes it in the other sense, he should
say, 'That was not what I had in view when I admitted it; I meant the other
sense': for if a term or expression covers more than one thing, it is easy
to disagree. If, however, the question is both clear and simple, he should
answer either 'Yes' or 'No'.
Part 8
A premiss in reasoning always either is one of the constituent
elements in the reasoning, or else goes to establish one of these: (and
you can always tell when it is secured in order to establish something
else by the fact of a number of similar questions being put: for as a rule
people secure their universal by means either of induction or of likeness):-accordingly
the particular propositions should all be admitted, if they are true and
generally held. On the other hand, against the universal one should try
to bring some negative instance; for to bring the argument to a standstill
without a negative instance, either real or apparent, shows ill-temper.
If, then, a man refuses to grant the universal when supported by many instances,
although he has no negative instance to show, he obviously shows ill-temper.
If, moreover, he cannot even attempt a counter-proof that it is not true,
far more likely is he to be thought ill-tempered-although even counter-proof
is not enough: for we often hear arguments that are contrary to common
opinions, whose solution is yet difficult, e.g. the argument of Zeno that
it is impossible to move or to traverse the stadium;-but still, this is
no reason for omitting to assert the opposites of these views. If, then,
a man refuses to admit the proposition without having either a negative
instance or some counter-argument to bring against it, clearly he is ill-tempered:
for ill-temper in argument consists in answering in ways other than the
above, so as to wreck the reasoning.
Part 9
Before maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer
should try his hand at attacking it by himself; for clearly his business
is to oppose those positions from which questioners demolish what he has
laid down.
He should beware of maintaining a hypothesis that is generally
rejected: and this it may be in two ways: for it may be one which results
in absurd statements, e.g. suppose any one were to say that everything
is in motion or that nothing is; and also there are all those which only
a bad character would choose, and which are implicitly opposed to men's
wishes, e.g. that pleasure is the good, and that to do injustice is better
than to suffer it. For people then hate him, supposing him to maintain
them not for the sake of argument but because he really thinks
them.
Part 10
Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the right solution
is to demolish the point on which the fallacy that occurs depends: for
the demolition of any random point is no solution, even though the point
demolished be false. For the argument may contain many falsehoods, e.g.
suppose some one to secure the premisses, 'He who sits, writes' and 'Socrates
is sitting': for from these it follows that 'Socrates is writing'. Now
we may demolish the proposition 'Socrates is sitting', and still be no
nearer a solution of the argument; it may be true that the point claimed
is false; but it is not on that that fallacy of the argument depends: for
supposing that any one should happen to be sitting and not writing, it
would be impossible in such a case to apply the same solution. Accordingly,
it is not this that needs to be demolished, but rather that 'He who sits,
writes': for he who sits does not always write. He, then, who has demolished
the point on which the fallacy depends, has given the solution of the argument
completely. Any one who knows that it is on such and such a point that
the argument depends, knows the solution of it, just as in the case of
a figure falsely drawn. For it is not enough to object, even if the point
demolished be a falsehood, but the reason of the fallacy should also be
proved: for then it would be clear whether the man makes his objection
with his eyes open or not.
There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his
argument to a conclusion. It can be done either by demolishing the point
on which the falsehood that comes about depends, or by stating an objection
directed against the questioner: for often when a solution has not as a
matter of fact been brought, yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable
to pursue the argument any farther. Thirdly, one may object to the questions
asked: for it may happen that what the questioner wants does not follow
from the questions he has asked because he has asked them badly, whereas
if something additional be granted the conclusion comes about. If, then,
the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther, the objection
would properly be directed against the questioner; if he can do so, then
it would be against his questions. The fourth and worst kind of objection
is that which is directed to the time allowed for discussion: for some
people bring objections of a kind which would take longer to answer than
the length of the discussion in hand.
There are then, as we said, four ways of making objections: but
of them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and
stumbling-blocks to prevent the conclusions.
Part 11
Adverse criticism of an argument on its own merits, and of it when
presented in the form of questions, are two different things. For often
the failure to carry through the argument correctly in discussion is due
to the person questioned, because he will not grant the steps of which
a correct argument might have been made against his position: for it is
not in the power of the one side only to effect properly a result that
depends on both alike. Accordingly it sometimes becomes necessary to attack
the speaker and not his position, when the answerer lies in wait for the
points that are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well:
when people lose their tempers in this way, their argument becomes a contest,
not a discussion. Moreover, since arguments of this kind are held not for
the sake of instruction but for purposes of practice and examination, clearly
one has to reason not only to true conclusions, but also to false ones,
and not always through true premisses, but sometimes through false as well.
For often, when a true proposition is put forward, the dialectician is
compelled to demolish it: and then false propositions have to be formulated.
Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward, it has to be demolished
by means of false propositions: for it is possible for a given man to believe
what is not the fact more firmly than the truth. Accordingly, if the argument
be made to depend on something that he holds, it will be easier to persuade
or help him. He, however, who would rightly convert any one to a different
opinion should do so in a dialectical and not in a contentious manner,
just as a geometrician should reason geometrically, whether his conclusion
be false or true: what kind of syllogisms are dialectical has already been
said. The principle that a man who hinders the common business is a bad
partner, clearly applies to an argument as well; for in arguments as well
there is a common aim in view, except with mere contestants, for these
cannot both reach the same goal; for more than one cannot possibly win.
It makes no difference whether he effects this as answerer or as questioner:
for both he who asks contentious questions is a bad dialectician, and also
he who in answering fails to grant the obvious answer or to understand
the point of the questioner's inquiry. What has been said, then, makes
it clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like strain upon
the argument on its own merits, and upon the questioner: for it may very
well be that the argument is bad, but that the questioner has argued with
the answerer in the best possible way: for when men lose their tempers,
it may perhaps be impossible to make one's inferences straight-forwardly
as one would wish: we have to do as we can.
Inasmuch as it is indeterminate when people are claiming the admission
of contrary things, and when they are claiming what originally they set
out to prove-for often when they are talking by themselves they say contrary
things, and admit afterwards what they have previously denied; for which
reason they often assent, when questioned, to contrary things and to what
originally had to be proved-the argument is sure to become vitiated. The
responsibility, however, for this rests with the answerer, because while
refusing to grant other points, he does grant points of that kind. It is,
then, clear that adverse criticism is not to be passed in a like manner
upon questioners and upon their arguments.
In itself an argument is liable to five kinds of adverse
criticism:
(1) The first is when neither the proposed conclusion nor indeed any
conclusion at all is drawn from the questions asked, and when most, if
not all, of the premisses on which the conclusion rests are false or generally
rejected, when, moreover, neither any withdrawals nor additions nor both
together can bring the conclusions about.
(2) The second is, supposing the reasoning, though constructed
from the premisses, and in the manner, described above, were to be irrelevant
to the original position.
(3) The third is, supposing certain additions would bring an inference
about but yet these additions were to be weaker than those that were put
as questions and less generally held than the conclusion.
(4) Again, supposing certain withdrawals could effect the same:
for sometimes people secure more premisses than are necessary, so that
it is not through them that the inference comes about.
(5) Moreover, suppose the premisses be less generally held and
less credible than the conclusion, or if, though true, they require more
trouble to prove than the proposed view.
One must not claim that the reasoning to a proposed view shall
in every case equally be a view generally accepted and convincing: for
it is a direct result of the nature of things that some subjects of inquiry
shall be easier and some harder, so that if a man brings people to accept
his point from opinions that are as generally received as the case admits,
he has argued his case correctly. Clearly, then, not even the argument
itself is open to the same adverse criticism when taken in relation to
the proposed conclusion and when taken by itself. For there is nothing
to prevent the argument being open to reproach in itself, and yet commendable
in relation to the proposed conclusion, or again, vice versa, being commendable
in itself, and yet open to reproach in relation to the proposed conclusion,
whenever there are many propositions both generally held and also true
whereby it could easily be proved. It is possible also that an argument,
even though brought to a conclusion, may sometimes be worse than one which
is not so concluded, whenever the premisses of the former are silly, while
its conclusion is not so; whereas the latter, though requiring certain
additions, requires only such as are generally held and true, and moreover
does not rest as an argument on these additions. With those which bring
about a true conclusion by means of false premisses, it is not fair to
find fault: for a false conclusion must of necessity always be reached
from a false premiss, but a true conclusion may sometimes be drawn even
from false premisses; as is clear from the Analytics.
Whenever by the argument stated something is demonstrated, but
that something is other than what is wanted and has no bearing whatever
on the conclusion, then no inference as to the latter can be drawn from
it: and if there appears to be, it will be a sophism, not a proof. A philosopheme
is a demonstrative inference: an epichireme is a dialectical inference:
a sophism is a contentious inference: an aporeme is an inference that reasons
dialectically to a contradiction.
If something were to be shown from premisses, both of which are
views generally accepted, but not accepted with like conviction, it may
very well be that the conclusion shown is something held more strongly
than either. If, on the other hand, general opinion be for the one and
neither for nor against the other, or if it be for the one and against
the other, then, if the pro and con be alike in the case of the premisses,
they will be alike for the conclusion also: if, on the other hand, the
one preponderates, the conclusion too will follow suit.
It is also a fault in reasoning when a man shows something through
a long chain of steps, when he might employ fewer steps and those already
included in his argument: suppose him to be showing (e.g.) that one opinion
is more properly so called than another, and suppose him to make his postulates
as follows: 'x-in-itself is more fully x than anything else': 'there genuinely
exists an object of opinion in itself': therefore 'the object-of-opinion-in-itself
is more fully an object of opinion than the particular objects of opinion'.
Now 'a relative term is more fully itself when its correlate is more fully
itself': and 'there exists a genuine opinion-in-itself, which will be "opinion"
in a more accurate sense than the particular opinions': and it has been
postulated both that 'a genuine opinion-in-itself exists', and that 'x-in-itself
is more fully x than anything else': therefore 'this will be opinion in
a more accurate sense'. Wherein lies the viciousness of the reasoning?
Simply in that it conceals the ground on which the argument
depends.
Part 12
An argument is clear in one, and that the most ordinary, sense,
if it be so brought to a conclusion as to make no further questions necessary:
in another sense, and this is the type most usually advanced, when the
propositions secured are such as compel the conclusion, and the argument
is concluded through premisses that are themselves conclusions: moreover,
it is so also if some step is omitted that generally is firmly
accepted.
An argument is called fallacious in four senses: (1) when it appears
to be brought to a conclusion, and is not really so-what is called 'contentious'
reasoning: (2) when it comes to a conclusion but not to the conclusion
proposed-which happens principally in the case of reductiones ad impossibile:
(3) when it comes to the proposed conclusion but not according to the mode
of inquiry appropriate to the case, as happens when a non-medical argument
is taken to be a medical one, or one which is not geometrical for a geometrical
argument, or one which is not dialectical for dialectical, whether the
result reached be true or false: (4) if the conclusion be reached through
false premisses: of this type the conclusion is sometimes false, sometimes
true: for while a false conclusion is always the result of false premisses,
a true conclusion may be drawn even from premisses that are not true, as
was said above as well.
Fallacy in argument is due to a mistake of the arguer rather than
of the argument: yet it is not always the fault of the arguer either, but
only when he is not aware of it: for we often accept on its merits in preference
to many true ones an argument which demolishes some true proposition if
it does so from premisses as far as possible generally accepted. For an
argument of that kind does demonstrate other things that are true: for
one of the premisses laid down ought never to be there at all, and this
will then be demonstrated. If, however, a true conclusion were to be reached
through premisses that are false and utterly childish, the argument is
worse than many arguments that lead to a false conclusion, though an argument
which leads to a false conclusion may also be of this type. Clearly then
the first thing to ask in regard to the argument in itself is, 'Has it
a conclusion?'; the second, 'Is the conclusion true or false?'; the third,
'Of what kind of premisses does it consist?': for if the latter, though
false, be generally accepted, the argument is dialectical, whereas if,
though true, they be generally rejected, it is bad: if they be both false
and also entirely contrary to general opinion, clearly it is bad, either
altogether or else in relation to the particular matter in
hand.
Part 13
Of the ways in which a questioner may beg the original question
and also beg contraries the true account has been given in the Analytics:'
but an account on the level of general opinion must be given
now.
People appear to beg their original question in five ways: the
first and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point requiring
to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words; but it
is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms, or a term
and an expression, that mean the same thing. A second way occurs whenever
any one begs universally something which he has to demonstrate in a particular
case: suppose (e.g.) he were trying to prove that the knowledge of contraries
is one and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites in general is
one: for then he is generally thought to be begging, along with a number
of other things, that which he ought to have shown by itself. A third way
is if any one were to beg in particular cases what he undertakes to show
universally: e.g. if he undertook to show that the knowledge of contraries
is always one, and begged it of certain pairs of contraries: for he also
is generally considered to be begging independently and by itself what,
together with a number of other things, he ought to have shown. Again,
a man begs the question if he begs his conclusion piecemeal: supposing
e.g. that he had to show that medicine is a science of what leads to health
and to disease, and were to claim first the one, then the other; or, fifthly,
if he were to beg the one or the other of a pair of statements that necessarily
involve one other; e.g. if he had to show that the diagonal is incommensurable
with the side, and were to beg that the side is incommensurable with the
diagonal.
The ways in which people assume contraries are equal in number
to those in which they beg their original question. For it would happen,
firstly, if any one were to beg an opposite affirmation and negation; secondly,
if he were to beg the contrary terms of an antithesis, e.g. that the same
thing is good and evil; thirdly, suppose any one were to claim something
universally and then proceed to beg its contradictory in some particular
case, e.g. if having secured that the knowledge of contraries is one, he
were to claim that the knowledge of what makes for health or for disease
is different; or, fourthly, suppose him, after postulating the latter view,
to try to secure universally the contradictory statement. Again, fifthly,
suppose a man begs the contrary of the conclusion which necessarily comes
about through the premisses laid down; and this would happen suppose, even
without begging the opposites in so many words, he were to beg two premisses
such that this contradictory statement that is opposite to the first conclusion
will follow from them. The securing of contraries differs from begging
the original question in this way: in the latter case the mistake lies
in regard to the conclusion; for it is by a glance at the conclusion that
we tell that the original question has been begged: whereas contrary views
lie in the premisses, viz. in a certain relation which they bear to one
another.
Part 14
The best way to secure training and practice in arguments of this
kind is in the first place to get into the habit of converting the arguments.
For in this way we shall be better equipped for dealing with the proposition
stated, and after a few attempts we shall know several arguments by heart.
For by 'conversion' of an argument is meant the taking the reverse of the
conclusion together with the remaining propositions asked and so demolishing
one of those that were conceded: for it follows necessarily that if the
conclusion be untrue, some one of the premisses is demolished, seeing that,
given all the premisses, the conclusion was bound to follow. Always, in
dealing with any proposition, be on the look-out for a line of argument
both pro and con: and on discovering it at once set about looking for the
solution of it: for in this way you will soon find that you have trained
yourself at the same time in both asking questions and answering them.
If we cannot find any one else to argue with, we should argue with ourselves.
Select, moreover, arguments relating to the same thesis and range them
side by side: for this produces a plentiful supply of arguments for carrying
a point by sheer force, and in refutation also it is of great service,
whenever one is well stocked with arguments pro and con: for then you find
yourself on your guard against contrary statements to the one you wish
to secure. Moreover, as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic wisdom
the power of discerning and holding in one view the results of either of
two hypotheses is no mean instrument; for it then only remains to make
a right choice of one of them. For a task of this kind a certain natural
ability is required: in fact real natural ability just is the power right
to choose the true and shun the false. Men of natural ability can do this;
for by a right liking or disliking for whatever is proposed to them they
rightly select what is best.
It is best to know by heart arguments upon those questions which
are of most frequent occurrence, and particularly in regard to those propositions
which are ultimate: for in discussing these answerers frequently give up
in despair. Moreover, get a good stock of definitions: and have those of
familiar and primary ideas at your fingers' ends: for it is through these
that reasonings are effected. You should try, moreover, to master the heads
under which other arguments mostly tend to fall. For just as in geometry
it is useful to be practised in the elements, and in arithmetic to have
the multiplication table up to ten at one's fingers' ends-and indeed it
makes a great difference in one's knowledge of the multiples of other numbers
too-likewise also in arguments it is a great advantage to be well up in
regard to first principles, and to have a thorough knowledge of premisses
at the tip of one's tongue. For just as in a person with a trained memory,
a memory of things themselves is immediately caused by the mere mention
of their loci, so these habits too will make a man readier in reasoning,
because he has his premisses classified before his mind's eye, each under
its number. It is better to commit to memory a premiss of general application
than an argument: for it is difficult to be even moderately ready with
a first principle, or hypothesis.
Moreover, you should get into the habit of turning one argument
into several, and conceal your procedure as darkly as you can: this kind
of effect is best produced by keeping as far as possible away from topics
akin to the subject of the argument. This can be done with arguments that
are entirely universal, e.g. the statement that 'there cannot be one knowledge
of more than one thing': for that is the case with both relative terms
and contraries and co-ordinates.
Records of discussions should be made in a universal form, even
though one has argued only some particular case: for this will enable one
to turn a single rule into several. A like rule applies in Rhetoric as
well to enthymemes. For yourself, however, you should as far as possible
avoid universalizing your reasonings. You should, moreover, always examine
arguments to see whether they rest on principles of general application:
for all particular arguments really reason universally, as well, i.e. a
particular demonstration always contains a universal demonstration, because
it is impossible to reason at all without using universals.
You should display your training in inductive reasoning against
a young man, in deductive against an expert. You should try, moreover,
to secure from those skilled in deduction their premisses, from inductive
reasoners their parallel cases; for this is the thing in which they are
respectively trained. In general, too, from your exercises in argumentation
you should try to carry away either a syllogism on some subject or a refutation
or a proposition or an objection, or whether some one put his question
properly or improperly (whether it was yourself or some one else) and the
point which made it the one or the other. For this is what gives one ability,
and the whole object of training is to acquire ability, especially in regard
to propositions and objections. For it is the skilled propounder and objector
who is, speaking generally, a dialectician. To formulate a proposition
is to form a number of things into one-for the conclusion to which the
argument leads must be taken generally, as a single thing-whereas to formulate
an objection is to make one thing into many; for the objector either distinguishes
or demolishes, partly granting, partly denying the statements
proposed.
Do not argue with every one, nor practise upon the man in the street:
for there are some people with whom any argument is bound to degenerate.
For against any one who is ready to try all means in order to seem not
to be beaten, it is indeed fair to try all means of bringing about one's
conclusion: but it is not good form. Wherefore the best rule is, not lightly
to engage with casual acquaintances, or bad argument is sure to result.
For you see how in practising together people cannot refrain from contentious
argument.
It is best also to have ready-made arguments relating to those
questions in which a very small stock will furnish us with arguments serviceable
on a very large number of occasions. These are those that are universal,
and those in regard to which it is rather difficult to produce points for
ourselves from matters of everyday experience.
THE END
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