Plato
428-348 B.C.E - Wrote in Greek
Ion
Written 380 B.C.E
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Persons of the Dialogue
SOCRATES
ION
Socrates. Welcome, Ion. Are you from your native city of
Ephesus?
Ion. No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I attended
the festival of Asclepius.
Soc. And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at
the festival?
Ion. O yes; and of all sorts of musical
performers.
Soc. And were you one of the competitors- and did you
succeed?
Ion. I obtained the first prize of all,
Socrates.
Soc. Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for
us at the Panathenaea.
Ion. And I will, please heaven.
Soc. I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for
you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can
is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in
the company of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the best
and most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn his
words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode
who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought
to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret
him well unless he knows what he means? All this is greatly to be
envied.
Ion. Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been
the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to speak about
Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor
Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucon, nor any one else who ever was, had
as good ideas about Homer as I have, or as many.
Soc. I am glad to hear you say so, Ion; I see that you will
not refuse to acquaint me with them.
Ion. Certainly, Socrates; and you really ought to hear how
exquisitely I render Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a
golden crown.
Soc. I shall take an opportunity of hearing your embellishments
of him at some other time. But just now I should like to ask you a question:
Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer
only?
Ion. To Homer only; he is in himself quite
enough.
Soc. Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod
agree?
Ion. Yes; in my opinion there are a good
many.
Soc. And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what
Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?
Ion. I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where
they agree.
Soc. But what about matters in which they do not agree?-
for example, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have something
to say-
Ion. Very true:
Soc. Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter
of what these two poets say about divination, not only when they agree,
but when they disagree?
Ion. A prophet.
Soc. And if you were a prophet, would you be able to interpret
them when they disagree as well as when they agree?
Ion. Clearly.
Soc. But how did you come to have this skill about Homer
only, and not about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of
the same themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument?
and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good
and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing with one another
and with mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world below,
and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes of which
Homer sings?
Ion. Very true, Socrates.
Soc. And do not the other poets sing of the
same?
Ion. Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as
Homer.
Soc. What, in a worse way?
Ion. Yes, in a far worse.
Soc. And Homer in a better way?
Ion. He is incomparably better.
Soc. And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion
about arithmetic, where many people are speaking, and one speaks better
than the rest, there is somebody who can judge which of them is the good
speaker?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And he who judges of the good will be the same as he
who judges of the bad speakers?
Ion. The same.
Soc. And he will be the arithmetician?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of
food, when many persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest,
will he who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from him
who recognizes the worse, or the same?
Ion. Clearly the same.
Soc. And who is he, and what is his name?
Ion. The physician.
Soc. And speaking generally, in all discussions in which
the subject is the same and many men are speaking, will not he who knows
the good know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad, neither
will he know the good when the same topic is being discussed.
Ion. True.
Soc. Is not the same person skilful in
both?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as
Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same
way; but the one speaks well and the other not so well?
Ion. Yes; and I am right in saying so.
Soc. And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know
the inferior speakers to be inferior?
Ion. That is true.
Soc. Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in saying that
Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself acknowledges
that the same person will be a good judge of all those who speak of the
same things; and that almost all poets do speak of the same
things?
Ion. Why then, Socrates, do I lose attention and go to sleep
and have absolutely no ideas of the least value, when any one speaks of
any other poet; but when Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and am all
attention and have plenty to say?
Soc. The reason, my friend, is obvious. No one can fail
to see that you speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were
able to speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak
of all other poets; for poetry is a whole.
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And when any one acquires any other art as a whole,
the same may be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning,
Ion?
Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates; I very much wish that you would:
for I love to hear you wise men talk.
Soc. O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly
call us so; but you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you
sing, are wise; whereas I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For
consider what a very commonplace and trivial thing is this which I have
said- a thing which any man might say: that when a man has acquired a knowledge
of a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let
us consider this matter; is not the art of painting a
whole?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And there are and have been many painters good and
bad?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing
out the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but
incapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any other
painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss, and had no ideas;
but when he had to give his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the painter
might be, and about him only, woke up and was attentive and had plenty
to say?
Ion. No indeed, I have never known such a
person.
Soc. Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture, who was
skilful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius
the son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of any individual sculptor;
but when the works of sculptors in general were produced, was at a loss
and went to sleep and had nothing to say?
Ion. No indeed; no more than the other.
Soc. And if I am not mistaken, you never met with any one
among flute-players or harp- players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes
who was able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyras or Orpheus, or Phemius
the rhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion
of Ephesus, and had no notion of his merits or defects?
Ion. I cannot deny what you say, Socrates. Nevertheless
I am conscious in my own self, and the world agrees with me in thinking
that I do speak better and have more to say about Homer than any other
man. But I do not speak equally well about others- tell me the reason of
this.
Soc. I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you
what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you possess of
speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying,
an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in
the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as
the stone of Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also
imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes
you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another
so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of
suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all
inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other
persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic
as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because
they are inspired and possessed. And as the Corybantian revellers when
they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their
right mind when they are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling
under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like
Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers when they are under
the influence of Dionysus but not when they are in their right mind. And
the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves say; for they
tell us that they bring songs from honeyed fountains, culling them out
of the gardens and dells of the Muses; they, like the bees, winging their
way from flower to flower. And this is true. For the poet is a light and
winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been
inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when
he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter
his oracles.
Many are the noble words in which poets speak concerning the actions
of men; but like yourself when speaking about Homer, they do not speak
of them by any rules of art: they are simply inspired to utter that to
which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of them
will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains,
another epic or iambic verses- and he who is good at one is not good any
other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine.
Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of
one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets,
and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets,
in order that we who hear them may know them to be speaking not of themselves
who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that
God himself is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with
us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I
am saying: he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the
famous paean which; in every one's mouth, one of the finest poems ever
written, simply an invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this
way, the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that
these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and
the work of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods
by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the
God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the
best of songs? Am I not right, Ion?
Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are; for your
words touch my soul, and I am persuaded that good poets by a divine inspiration
interpret the things of the Gods to us.
Soc. And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the
poets?
Ion. There again you are right.
Soc. Then you are the interpreters of
interpreters?
Ion. Precisely.
Soc. I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going
to ask of you: When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in
the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus
leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows
at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows
of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,- are you in your right mind? Are you not
carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be
among the persons or places of which you are speaking, whether they are
in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the
poem?
Ion. That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must
frankly confess that at the tale of pity, my eyes are filled with tears,
and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart
throbs.
Soc. Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a
sacrifice or festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire and has golden
crowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears sweeping
or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly
faces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him;- is he in his right
mind or is he not?
Ion. No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking,
he is not in his right mind.
Soc. And are you aware that you produce similar effects
on most spectators?
Ion. Only too well; for I look down upon them from the stage,
and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon
their countenances when I am speaking: and I am obliged to give my very
best attention to them; for if I make them cry I myself shall laugh, and
if I make them laugh I myself shall cry when the time of payment
arrives.
Soc. Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings
which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one
another? The rhapsode like yourself and the actor are intermediate links,
and the poet himself is the first of them. Through all these the God sways
the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang
down from another. Thus there is a vast chain of dancers and masters and
undermasters of choruses, who are suspended, as if from the stone, at the
side of the rings which hang down from the Muse. And every poet has some
Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed,
which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken hold of. And from these
first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration
from Orpheus, others from Musaeus; but the greater number are possessed
and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer;
and when any one repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep, and
know not what to say; but when any one recites a strain of Homer you wake
up in a moment, and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to
say; for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but
by divine inspiration and by possession; just as the Corybantian revellers
too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to
the God by whom they are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words
for that, but take no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of
Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others.
You ask, "Why is this?" The answer is that you praise Homer not by art
but by divine inspiration.
Ion. That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you
will ever have eloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only
when I am mad and possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am
sure you would never think this to be the case.
Soc. I should like very much to hear you, but not until
you have answered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer
do you speak well?- not surely about every part.
Ion. There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak
well of that I can assure you.
Soc. Surely not about things in Homer of which you have
no knowledge?
Ion. And what is there in Homer of which I have no
knowledge?
Soc. Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about arts?
For example, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat
them.
Ion. I remember, and will repeat them.
Soc. Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son,
where he bids him be careful of the turn at the horse-race in honour of
Patroclus.
Ion. He says:
Bend gently in the polished chariot to the left of them, and urge
the horse on the right hand with whip and voice; and slacken the rein.
And when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw near, yet so that
the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the extremity;
and avoid catching the stone.
Soc. Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician
be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?
Ion. The charioteer, clearly.
Soc. And will the reason be that this is his art, or will
there be any other reason?
Ion. No, that will be the reason.
Soc. And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge
of a certain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do
not know by the art of medicine?
Ion. Certainly not.
Soc. Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which
we know by the art of medicine?
Ion. Certainly not.
Soc. And this is true of all the arts;- that which we know
with one art we do not know with the other? But let me ask a prior question:
You admit that there are differences of arts?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. You would argue, as I should, that when one art is
of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are
different?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Yes, surely; for if the subject of knowledge were the
same, there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were different,-
if they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are
five fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether I and
you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same art of arithmetic,
you would acknowledge that we did?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Tell me, then, what I was intending to ask you- whether
this holds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge,
and different arts other subjects of knowledge?
Ion. That is my opinion, Socrates.
Soc. Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will
have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that
art?
Ion. Very true.
Soc. Then which will be a better judge of the lines which
you were reciting from Homer, you or the charioteer?
Ion. The charioteer.
Soc. Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a
charioteer.
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And the art of the rhapsode is different from that
of the charioteer?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different
matters?
Ion. True.
Soc. You know the passage in which Hecamede, the concubine
of Nestor, is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as he
says,
Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat's milk with
a grater of bronze, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish
to drink. Now would you say that the art of the rhapsode or the art of
medicine was better able to judge of the propriety of these
lines?
Ion. The art of medicine.
Soc. And when Homer says,
And she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set
in the horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death
among the ravenous fishes,- will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode
be better able to judge whether these lines are rightly expressed or
not?
Ion. Clearly, Socrates, the art of the
fisherman.
Soc. Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: "Since
you, Socrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their
corresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages
of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic
art"; and you will see how readily and truly I shall answer you. For there
are many such passages, particularly in the Odyssey; as, for example, the
passage in which Theoclymenus the prophet of the house of Melampus says
to the suitors:-
Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces
and your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of lamentation
bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the vestibule is
full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the darkness of
Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread
abroad.
And there are many such passages in the Iliad also; as for example
in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he
says:-
As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen:
a soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody
dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned
the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the
breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground
into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar
on the wings of the wind.
These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet
ought to consider and determine.
Ion. And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying
so.
Soc. Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected
from the Iliad and Odyssey for you passages which describe the office of
the prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer
so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the
rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine
and judge of better than other men.
Ion. All passages, I should say, Socrates.
Soc. Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what
you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.
Ion. Why, what am I forgetting?
Soc. Do you not remember that you declared the art of the
rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?
Ion. Yes, I remember.
Soc. And you admitted that being different they would have
different subjects of knowledge?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art
of the rhapsode, will not know everything?
Ion. I should exclude certain things,
Socrates.
Soc. You mean to say that you would exclude pretty much
the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which
of them will he know?
Ion. He will know what a man and what a woman ought to say,
and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and
what a subject.
Soc. Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the
pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to
say?
Ion. No; the pilot will know best.
Soc. Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician
what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?
Ion. He will not.
Soc. But he will know what a slave ought to
say?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will
know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the
infuriated cows?
Ion. No, he will not.
Soc. But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say
about the working of wool?
Ion. No.
Soc. At any rate he will know what a general ought to say
when exhorting his soldiers?
Ion. Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will
be sure to know.
Soc. Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the
general?
Ion. I am sure that I should know what a general ought to
say.
Soc. Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a knowledge
of the art of the general as well as of the rhapsode; and you may also
have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre: and then you would
know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you:
By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed,
by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre- what would you
answer?
Ion. I should reply, by my skill as a
horseman.
Soc. And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would
admit that you judged of them as a performer on the lyre, and not as a
horseman?
Ion. Yes.
Soc. And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of
it as a general or a rhapsode?
Ion. To me there appears to be no difference between
them.
Soc. What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of
the rhapsode and of the general is the same?
Ion. Yes, one and the same.
Soc. Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good
general?
Ion. Certainly, Socrates.
Soc. And he who is a good general is also a good
rhapsode?
Ion. No; I do not say that.
Soc. But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also
a good general.
Ion. Certainly.
Soc. And you are the best of Hellenic
rhapsodes?
Ion. Far the best, Socrates.
Soc. And are you the best general, Ion?
Ion. To be sure, Socrates; and Homer was my
master.
Soc. But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be
the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of
rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode when you might be a general?
Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and
do not want a general?
Ion. Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the
Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need a general;
and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have
enough generals of your own.
Soc. My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of
Cyzicus?
Ion. Who may he be?
Soc. One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen
their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and
Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command
of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown
their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general,
and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally
Athenians, and Ephesus is no mean city? But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct
in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do
not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many,
glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them,
you are only a deceiver, and so far from exhibiting the art of which you
are a master, will not, even after my repeated entreaties, explain to me
the nature of it. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now
you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become
all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise
of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore.
And if you have art, then, as I was saying, in falsifying your promise
that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if,
as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about
Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of
dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer
to be thought, dishonest or inspired?
Ion. There is a great difference, Socrates, between the
two alternatives; and inspiration is by far the nobler.
Soc. Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and
attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not
art.
THE END
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